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This thesis contains the outcome of three separate but interrelated empirical analyses 
on stock return synchronicity, earnings informativeness and institutional development 
in a sample of African markets. 
 
The first analysis investigates the level and determinants of stock return 
synchronicity. Some recent studies have provided a theoretical argument that contrary 
to conventional wisdom, stock return synchronicity can be high in a strong information 
environment as market participants are less surprised about the occurrence of future 
events arising out of having more available information. This may therefore imply that 
stock return synchronicity can be conversely low in a relatively weaker information 
environment. The first empirical analysis of the thesis tests this conjecture using a total 
of 616 firms across five African countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa) over the 2005-2015 period. The main measure of stock return 
synchronicity used is the R2 from a market model regression of individual stock returns 
on the returns of a corresponding market index. The findings show that on average, 
firms in African markets do not exhibit high levels of stock return synchronicity, 
providing support for the view that stock return synchronicity can be low in markets 
with relatively weak transparency and conversely high in strong information 
environments. In regression analysis, the main driver of stock return synchronicity, 
however, is firm size, whilst contrary to some previous studies, ownership structure 
has no impact. These results are robust to different measures of stock return 
synchronicity that include both a lagged market index and a world market index. They 
are also robust to different estimation techniques including Fama-Macbeth regressions 
and ordered probit regressions.  
 
 The second empirical analysis of this thesis investigates the informativeness of 
earnings announcements in African stock markets and examines whether conditional 
on the level of stock return synchronicity, market reactions to earnings announcements 
are influenced by firm fundamentals or trading frequency. This chapter uses a set of 
1762 annual earnings announcements across 369 firms from three countries (Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa) over the 2005-2015 period. In univariate analysis, the main 
measure of earnings informativeness is Normalised Volatility, which divides volatility 
during a 21-day event window by volatility in a period of 120 days outside of the event 




across the sample. The results are driven by less frequently-traded stocks (stocks which 
experience price changes of between 50% to 74% of trading days in the previous year), 
although informativeness is also present for highly traded stocks (stocks which 
experience price changes in at least 75% of trading days in the previous year). 
Informativeness manifests more clearly at announcement and in the post-
announcement window, and there is little evidence of leakage. Cross-sectional tests, 
using regression analysis, provide evidence of an effect of both earnings fundamentals 
and investor behaviour on stock returns around earnings announcements. 
 
The third and final empirical analysis examines the impact of two institutional 
factors— the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the perceptions of corruption, on the 
market reactions earnings informativeness within the same period of 2005-2015. The 
first part of the analysis tests whether earnings became more informative following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. This analysis is restricted to only Nigeria and South 
Africa as Kenya adopted the use of IFRS prior to the start of the sample period of this 
study. The second part of this analysis tests the impact of the perception of corruption 
on earnings informativeness in a sample made of firms from Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa. Both univariate and regression results show that the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS did not lead to significant improvement in earnings informativeness. This finding 
is consistent with the view that the improvement in accounting standards must be 
accompanied by effective mechanisms of enforcement in order to realise their capital 
market benefits. However, with respect to corruption, there is a significant negative 
impact on earnings informativeness in terms of abnormal trading volume. Overall the 
findings in this chapter point to the growing importance of how the institutional 
environment can have capital market implications for firms. Therefore, more work 
needs to be done to strengthen the institutional framework in order to further enhance 
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1.1 Background  
Corporate news announcements are a major means by which firms disseminate 
information to investors, based on which investors form opinions and estimates about 
asset fundamentals (Griffin et al. 2011). The notion of market efficiency requires that 
stock prices should accurately impound new information about the firm when it becomes 
available, as this contributes to the stock pricing process. Prior studies such as Morck et 
al. (2000), however, argue that stock returns are highly synchronous in developing 
countries and less so in more developed countries. Stock return synchronicity implies that 
prices are driven by market and industry-wide factors as opposed to firm-specific 
information and corporate fundamentals. The ability (or lack thereof) of stock prices to 
incorporate firm information, particularly in developing markets, whether arising out of 
stock return synchronicity or not, has investor protection implications if investors cannot 
rely on the efficiency of the market. 
 One of the main factors which have been proposed as an explanation for the high 
levels of stock return synchronicity in developing countries (and by contrast low 
synchronicity in developed countries) is a weak information environment arising out of a 
lack of transparency (Jin and Myers 2006). Another argument is that weak protection of 
property and investor rights adversely affect how investors react to corporate information 
and therefore leads to lower incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices 
(Morck et al. 2000). Further, generally poor corporate governance practices, which 
encourage the presence of controlling shareholders (Boubaker et al. 2014), and director 
interlocks (Khanna and Thomas 2009), could bring about reduced firm-level transparency 
leading to higher levels of stock return synchronicity. Another reason also may lie in 
different types of corporate ownership structure (eg. Brockman and Yan 2009, Gul et al. 
2010, Boubaker et al. 2014). For example, Gul et al. (2010) find that firms with generally 
higher levels of ownership concentration tend to have a lower level of firm-specific 
information incorporated into their stock prices. 
A recent study by Dasgupta et al. (2010), however, departs from these previous 
studies by arguing that stock return synchronicity can be high in more developed countries 
that have greater transparency. They argue that most often, stock prices react to news that 
has not been anticipated by the market. Hence in an improved information environment, 
the market is able to make predictions about future events due to the availability of 
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information. Consequently, when these events occur, there is little surprise and thus lower 
firm-specific variation. This raises an interesting debate where it can be conversely argued 
that, in a relatively weak information environment like African markets, the inability to 
accurately value firms can lead to greater information shocks from new information and 
can result in higher firm-specific variation, i.e. lower stock return synchronicity. 
What will be the implications of the level of stock return synchronicity for African 
markets? Would a low level of stock return synchronicity suggest that stock prices in 
African markets do incorporate firm’s specific information? In spite of the many studies 
of synchronicity in both developed and developing markets, its impact on the 
informativeness of specific corporate announcements has been unexplored. One of the 
most important sources of communication between managers and investors is the 
earnings report (Pevzner et al. 2015). And the relationship between earnings and stock 
prices is one of the cornerstones of finance and corporate governance (Gordon 1959). 
Equally the value of a company is the discounted value of future earnings. Indeed, in a 
very recent paper, Beaver et al. (2018) show that the information content of earnings has 
increased over time particularly from the beginning of the 21st century owing to such 
factors as changes in regulation and financial reporting standards. Therefore, in trying to 
investigate the implications of the level of stock return synchronicity in African stock 
markets, earnings announcements would serve as a suitable event to test how investors in 
these markets react to corporate information. 
However,  DeFond et al. (2007) argue that structural and institutional factors in a 
firm’s information environment also affect how stock prices respond to corporate 
information, particularly earnings announcements. Indeed, there is a growing literature 
on the impact of structural and institutional factors on the market reaction to corporate 
earnings announcements. These studies form part of the overall literature examining the 
informativeness of earnings in an international context. Of particular note among these 
factors are: media sophistication and accounting quality (Griffin et al. 2011); investor 
protection (DeFond et al. 2007); and accounting standards in terms of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption (Landsman et al. 2012). But both Daske 
et al. (2008) and Landsman et al. (2012) argue that the capital market benefits of improved 
institutional mechanisms such as the adoption of IFRS can only be realised when there is 
stronger enforcement of regulations. This raises an interesting question about whether the 
adoption of IFRS in countries that are characterised by weak enforcement can result in 
greater earnings informativeness. Again, despite the large extant literature on how 
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institutional factors affect the informativeness of earnings, the impact of the perception 
of corruption has been unexplored. Corruption is a reflection of the strength of a country’s 
economic and legal institutions (Svensson 2005). While some studies have shown that 
corruption can have adverse effects on such factors as economic growth and development, 
its impact on firm-level outcomes has been overlooked. 
Based on the above premise, this study uses a sample of African markets to address 
three separate but interrelated issues relating to stock return synchronicity, earnings 
informativeness and institutional development. The first analysis examines the level of 
synchronicity of firms in a sample of five African countries. The chapter also investigates 
the particular firm-level factors that drive stock return synchronicity of individual firms. 
Finally, it also examines whether stock return synchronicity is influenced by ownership 
structure. The second analysis uses a larger set of annual earnings announcements to 
investigate the informativeness of corporate earnings. Having ascertained the level of 
stock return synchronicity in these markets, it is necessary to examine the implications 
for stock pricing. In other words, do stock prices actually respond to corporate 
information and if so, is informativeness driven by trading frequency or the fundamentals 
of the firm? The third and final analysis examines the impact of institutional development 
on earnings informativeness by focusing on the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the 
perception of corruption.  
1.2 Motivation: Choice of markets 
 
African markets provide a suitable and appropriate context for this study for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, and as already indicated earlier, the first part of this thesis attempts to 
test the conjecture that if stock return synchronicity can be high in more developed 
markets as argued by Dasgupta et al. (2010), then it can be conversely low in less 
developed markets. African markets therefore provide a suitable setting as these countries 
are amongst the underdeveloped countries in the world. This underdevelopment is 
manifested in a relatively weak level of transparency which primarily stems from poor 
disclosure practices by firms (Tsamenyi et al. 2007).  
Secondly, although some African countries have developed or adopted corporate 
governance codes, the principles of good corporate governance remain far from being 
entrenched. One of the reasons for this situation is that most corporate governance codes 
in African countries are modelled after those of developed markets and therefore, do not 
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fully complement the institutional and cultural setting of the African countries that adopt 
them (Rossouw 2005). Moreover, phenomena such as the market for corporate control, 
which can serve as a disciplinary mechanism to compel managers to act in the best interest 
of shareholders, are virtually non-existent (Tsamenyi et al. 2007). Therefore, poor 
corporate governance may lead to a generally weak information environment with its 
consequent impact on stock return synchronicity and/or earnings informativeness. 
Also, despite the existence of some regulatory framework in African countries to 
govern operations in financial markets, there is also a generally weak level of 
enforcement, owing to weak legal systems and high bureaucracy (Kaufmann et al. 2011). 
In most African countries, there is a lack of capacity or unwillingness by mandated 
institutions to enforce rules, laws and regulations (NEPAD-OECD 2009). Moreover, 
corruption remains a significant socio-economic threat. For example, Africa has one of 
the worst records in the yearly Transparency International corruption perception index 
surveys as countries that consistently rank at the bottom include a good number of African 
countries. Munisi et al. (2014) show that Africa ranks lowest in comparison to other 
continents in governance indicators such as the rule of law, regulatory quality and control 
of corruption. 
 The above three factors (i.e low level of transparency, poor corporate governance 
and weak institutional and regulatory quality) show that African markets are still 
developing, and are generally characterised by a weaker information environment, which 
makes them an exciting setting for testing the level and determinants of stock return 
synchronicity in less developed countries.  
The fourth and final motivation for the choice of African markets is that the 
remaining part of this thesis is devoted to investigating the informativeness of earnings 
and whether earnings informativeness is influenced by fundamentals, trading frequency, 
as well as examining the impact of institutional development. Most tests of market 
efficiency in African markets have been limited to weak form tests (eg. Smith et al. 2002, 
Magnusson and Wydick 2002, Jefferis and Smith 2005, Smith 2008, Lagoarde-Segot and 
Lucey 2008, Ntim et al. 2011, Nwosu et al. 2013). There appears to be a dearth of studies 
that examine semi-strong efficiency either from the perspective of stock return 
synchronicity or the market reaction to corporate information. The few studies that test 
the market reaction to corporate information such as earnings have mostly relied on small 
samples due to challenges of data availability, (eg. Afego 2013, Kiremu et al. 2013). 
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However, as African markets continue to make gradual and modest improvements, and 
given the availability of more data, it is necessary to build a critical mass of studies that 
investigate the informational efficiency of African stock markets in order to demonstrate 
whether or not these markets can continue to be an attractive investment destination to 
foreign portfolio investors. 
Taken all the above factors together, African markets provide an appropriate and 
interesting context for this study. However, in determining the specific countries that can 
be used as an appropriate setting for capital market research in African countries, this 
thesis relies on the arguments by La Porta et al. (2000) that common law countries are 
more market centered than civil law countries. They further argue that common law 
markets provide better protection of investors than civil law countries. As such, it is very 
likely that the cornerstone of governance in common law countries will be the stock 
market. The stock market will play a much more important role in the financial system. 
One of the main reasons they advance to support this view is that in common law 
countries, judges make decisions based on precedents, and are motivated by principles on 
what is fair and equitable. In Civil law countries on the other hand, there is heavy reliance 
on codes and statutes and to the extent that people can find ways around these, they could 
still engage in self-dealing activities. And therefore, to provide a more appropriate setting 
where the market plays an important role in the financial system, this study focuses on 
five countries that are predominantly common law—Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa. It is important to mention that over time, most common law countries 
have become mixed, adopting elements of both civil law and other legal systems such as 
Islamic law. This notwithstanding, the stock market continuous to play a more dominant 
role in the financial system, compared to those that rely predominantly on the French or 
German Civil law system. The focus on these countries in the study is also partly 
motivated by the availability of the relevant data. Moreover, five countries is considered 
appropriate due to the need to conduct the analyses on a country by country bases which 
provides a greater opportunity to draw more insights from the respective countries. 
A potential concern, however, with this sample lies in the inclusion of South Africa. 
One may argue that South Africa is more advanced than most other countries on the 
continent, and may have some accounting, governance and legal similarities to more 
developed countries like the UK. Although the South African market is arguably the most 
developed of all markets in the sample and of all markets on the continent, there is also 
evidence to show that, like many other markets in Africa, the South African market also 
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has significant differences to developed markets. For example, and as will be discussed 
later in Chapter 2, ownership is relatively more concentrated in South Africa than in most 
developed countries. Also, Ntim (2009) demonstrates differences between South Africa 
and developed markets in terms of market capitalisation, number of listed companies, 
liquidity and the enforcement of regulation—differences that we find when equally 
comparing other African countries to more developed Western countries. Therefore, it is 
not out of place to include South Africa in the sample. Moreover, since most of the 
analyses are carried out on a country by country basis, the inclusion of South Africa will 
provide an opportunity to compare a more relatively developed African market with 
relatively less developed ones. 
 
1.3 Research objectives, methods and findings 
 
The first objective of this thesis is to examine the level of stock return synchronicity in a 
sample of African markets. The specific research questions answered are: What is the 
average level of stock return synchronicity among firms in each of the sample markets? 
Is stock return synchronicity influenced by firm size and age? Does the nature of 
corporate ownership also affect stock return synchronicity of firms? To answer these 
research questions in order to achieve the above research objective, the first empirical 
analyses of this thesis uses a sample of 616 firms and drawn from five African countries 
namely; Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. The main measure of stock 
return synchronicity used is the R2 from a market model regression of individual stock 
returns on the returns of a corresponding market index. The results reveal that, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, firms in African markets on average do not exhibit high levels 
of synchronicity, hence providing support for the argument that synchronicity can be 
relatively low in a poor information environment. In multivariate analysis, using OLS 
regressions, the findings show that the main driver of stock return synchronicity within 
firms and across all five countries is firm size. Larger firms are associated with greater 
levels of synchronicity, consistent with the arguments that they act as leading market 
indicators by signaling macroeconomic trends which have the potential to trigger similar 
aggregate markets movements (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Finally, no evidence is 
found to support the view that stock return synchronicity is influenced by ownership 
structure. These results are robust to different measures of stock return synchronicity and 
different estimation techniques including Fama Macbeth regressions and ordered probit 
regressions. 
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 Based on the findings of the first empirical analysis, the second objective of this 
thesis is to investigate the informativeness of earnings and to determine whether given 
the low level of stock return synchronicity, earnings informativeness is influenced by 
trading frequency or the fundamentals of the firm. The specific research questions to be 
answered include: Do earnings announcements have any information content in African 
markets? Is earnings informativeness influenced by earnings characteristics? Is earnings 
informativeness influenced by trading frequency? This analysis uses an event study 
methodology to capture the information content of a set of 1762 earnings announcements 
from 369 firms across three out of the five countries namely: Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa. In univariate analysis, the main measure of informativeness, normalised volatility 
(which is explained in detail in Chapter 7), indicates that earnings are informative across 
the sample and trading frequency plays an important role in driving informativeness. 
Informativeness is more clearly manifest at the announcement and in the post-
announcement window. Cross-sectional tests, using OLS regressions, also show evidence 
of an effect of both earnings fundamentals and some investor behaviour on stock returns 
around earnings announcements. Finally, and consistent with the findings in the previous 
chapter, synchronicity has no significant impact on earnings informativeness. 
 The third and final objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of two 
institutional factors— the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the perception of corruption 
on earnings informativeness. The specific research questions answered in this analysis 
include: Did earnings become more informative following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS? Does the perception of corruption affect the informativeness of corporate 
earnings? The findings from this analysis show that the mandatory adoption of IFRS did 
not have a significant impact on the market reactions to earnings providing support for 
the view that enforcement of regulations will have to improve if the capital markets 
benefits of institutional development such as the adoption of IFRS, are to be achieved. 
The analysis in this chapter also provide some evidence that the perception of corruption 
has a negative impact on earnings informativeness in terms of abnormal trading volume. 
These results are robust to different measures of the corruption.  
1.4 Contributions 
The findings in this thesis make a number of important contributions to the literature. 
Firstly, the analysis on stock return synchronicity contributes to the literature on stock 
return synchronicity by providing evidence in further support of the theoretical arguments 
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of Dasgupta et al. (2010) that stock returns in developing markets, usually characterised 
by poor information environments, may not always fit the stereotypical view that they are 
synchronous. Despite investors being unable to efficiently evaluate future returns, the 
announcement of new information could trigger market reactions. In the absence of 
synchronicity, such information may provide an important avenue, perhaps the most 
important avenue, for investors to evaluate the appropriateness of stock prices of 
companies. Any investors in African stocks or who wish to invest in African stocks may 
find these results informative. 
Secondly, the analysis on earnings informativeness extends the international 
literature on the market responses to earnings announcements by providing new evidence 
of how firms respond to value-relevant information in African markets, where studies of 
market efficiency have mostly focused on tests of the weak form. Further to this, the 
important role of liquidity is highlighted in this context. More highly traded stocks are 
less responsive to new earnings information, providing some support for the argument 
that company earnings are less important than market movements in pricing more liquid 
African stocks.  The role of illiquidity in asset pricing in developing markets has focused 
on the cost of capital (Hearn and Piesse 2013) as well as the market reaction to analyst 
recommendations (Murg et al. 2016). This chapter attempts to extend our understanding 
of liquidity and earnings informativeness in developing countries using African markets. 
The third empirical analysis contributes to the growing literature on how structural 
and institutional factors affect earnings informativeness. As mentioned earlier, a 
developing strand of literature documents how country-wide factors affect the 
informativeness of earnings including investor protection, development of technology, 
and earnings quality. This chapter investigates the impact of the adoption of IFRS in an 
African setting. Again, this analysis introduces a new institutional factor to this strand of 
literature i.e. the perceptions corruption. This is of particular interest as countries in the 
sample tend to be characterised by weaker legal and economic institutions. The literature 
on corruption is also extended by showing that it has implications for firm-level 
outcomes.  
Finally, this thesis contributes to the broader literature on market efficiency and 
investor protection in developing countries. Financial development may follow from 
strong investor protection and market efficiency is of paramount importance as a 
mechanism for investor protection in developing markets. Markets, developing or 
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otherwise, will only attract investment funds if investors believe that market values reflect 
the value of companies and if the market is sufficiently liquid to ensure shareholders can 
sell their stocks cheaply and quickly. This begs the question as to whether African markets 
respond to new information in a similar way to more developed markets. If markets are 
relatively inefficient but prices do react to new information, then what determines the 
magnitude of such adjustments and can pattern be identified in this data? The 
responsiveness of markets to earnings information provides evidence of this type of 
information efficiency and investor protection. The results suggest that whilst earnings 
are informative across the sample, considerable work is needed to improve investor 
protection in African markets. 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background of the 
markets that are the focus of the study. It first highlights the development and challenges 
of African stock markets, provides a profile of each of the countries used in this thesis, 
and sheds some light on the regulatory framework for information disclosure and the 
nature of corporate ownership in the five markets. Chapter 3 presents a review of both the 
theoretical and empirical work relevant to the thesis, highlighting on the key strands. 
Chapter 4 describes the data used in the thesis including sources and sample selection. It 
also gives an overview of the methods used in the analysis which are then expanded upon 
in the respective empirical analyses. Chapter 5 contains the first empirical analysis which 
examines the level of synchronicity of stocks in African markets and determines the 
factors that drive stock synchronicity. Chapter 6 contains the second empirical analysis 
which looks at the informativeness of earnings and whether given the low level of 
synchronicity, earnings informativeness is influenced by trading frequency or firm 
fundamentals. Chapter 7 contains the third and final empirical analysis which investigates 
whether earnings informativeness is also influenced by institutional factors including the 
adoption of IFRS and the perceptions of corruption. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by 












2 Overview of African Stock Markets 
 
 





This chapter aims to provide an overview of African stock markets with particular focus 
on the markets that are the subject of the study. It first provides a general overview of the 
development and challenges of African stock markets. It then provides a profile of each 
country used in the study, highlighting their political, economic, corporate governance, 
accounting and regulatory environments. The chapter also compares the five countries 
along these characteristics whilst reflecting on the implications of these characteristics 
for stock return synchronicity and/or earnings informativeness. Further, the operational 
and development characteristics of the five stock markets used in the study are 
highlighted, and trends in some major stock market indicators are also discussed. The 
chapter also highlights sections of relevant legislation that provide a basis for corporate 
information disclosure as a way of facilitating stock pricing in these markets. Finally, 
some light is shed on the nature of corporate ownership, based on previous studies.   
2.2 Development and challenges of African stock markets 
Most stock markets in Africa are relatively young having been established in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, following policy shifts by respective governments to bring about 
financial deregulation and promote openness. The main exceptions are the Egypt and 
Johannesburg Stock Exchanges which were established in 1883 and 1887 respectively. 
Currently, there are 29 stock exchanges on the continent. Two of these are regional 
exchanges and represent the exchanges of a group of countries. The Bourse Régionale 
des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), located in Abidjan, Cote d’ Ivoire, serves Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Togo, whilst the Bourse 
Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières d'Afrique Centrale (BVMAC) located in Libreville, 
serves Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon. The youngest stock market is the Angolan exchange, established in 
2016. Thus, the last three decades have witnessed an increase in the number of stock 
markets from 8 in 1989 to the current number of 29. 
It is important to mention that growth in capital market activity in Africa has been 
partly driven by regulatory changes (PWC 2017). Regulators in some African countries 
are beginning to require companies in specific sectors of the economy to list shares on 
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the domestic market. For example, in Tanzania, companies in the telecommunications 
sector are required to list their shares on the domestic stock markets. The rationale for 
this is to allow governments to be able to track revenues of these companies for the 
purposes of taxation and also to give citizens of the country an opportunity to own shares 
in these companies. This led to one of the largest Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the 
country involving Vodacom Tanzania. Mobile Telecommunications Network (MTN) 
also reached an agreement with the Nigerian Federal Communications Commission to 
take steps to list their Nigerian business on the stock market. This current trend of 
regulations and intervention by relevant state agencies will likely see more capital market 
activity over the coming years (PWC 2017). 
 Related to the preceding paragraph is also the requirement by financial companies 
in some countries to meet enhanced capital thresholds in order to safeguard the security 
of the financial system. This has had the effect of driving some banks and non-banking 
financial institutions to access equity markets. Ecobank Côte d’Ivoire and NSIA Banque 
Côte d’Ivoire for example, have recently raised equity capital on the BRVM to improve 
their capital structure in line with new capital adequacy requirements by the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union. In Ghana too, the central bank (Bank of Ghana) has 
recently increased the minimum capital requirements of banks from the local currency 
equivalent of $30m to the equivalent of about $100m, with banks being given a deadline 
of December 2018 to comply. Some banks have already signaled their intention to go to 
the equity markets. These trends are therefore likely to result in more IPOs and increased 
capital market activity. 
 Another important highlight of the development of stock markets on the African 
continent has been the establishment of the African Securities Exchanges Association 
(ASEA). The ASEA was set up with the purpose of helping member exchanges to develop 
by providing them with a platform to share information. Established it 1993, the ASEA 
currently has a membership of 27 stock exchanges and a two-fold mission. Firstly, it 
provides an avenue for cooperation, exchange of information and technical assistance. 
The second mission is to expedite the process of financial integration within the region 
so as to ensure the effective and efficient mobilisation of capital for accelerated growth 
on the continent. The ASEA tries to achieve its mission by (1) enhancing the visibility of 
member exchanges with the view to attracting capital inflows; (2) being an advocacy 
voice for member exchanges; (3) promoting market development among member states 
and (4) promoting capacity building. 
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 Despite the above positive trends which appear to be auguring well for the growth 
and development of stock markets, certain factors have had, and still continue to have the 
potential of reducing the gains made. The first is the generally weak macroeconomic 
environment which serves as a barrier to growth. In particular, high levels of inflation 
have often diminished the confidence of both foreign and domestic investors, which 
makes them unwilling to invest in stock markets. High levels of volatility in the 
macroeconomic environment can also lead to high information asymmetry, which further 
discourages more investors from participating in stock market activity (Yartey and Adjasi 
2007). 
Further, the lack of a robust and well-organised banking system, and the high costs 
of doing business have also adversely affected the growth and development of stock 
markets on the continent. Studies such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) argue that 
there is a strong positive correlation between stock market development and the growth 
of the banking sector. Banks in many countries on the continent are relatively smaller in 
size when compared to those in developed markets. Many are also undercapitalised and 
are not able to finance projects with much larger financial outlays. Moreover, in some 
countries, the government also tends to be the largest borrower from domestic banks, 
which results in a crowding out of the private sector (Senadza et al. 2017). Therefore, the 
cost of raising funds by businesses becomes extremely high and unattractive. 
Another important challenge that confronts stock markets in Africa is the low level 
of liquidity. A large percentage of stocks are in the hands of institutional investors who 
have mostly adopted a buy and hold strategy on the continent. Again, although many 
governments have tried over the years to privatise a lot of state-owned enterprises, there 
is still some amount of government ownership which helps to exacerbate the liquidity 
problem. As such, there is usually not very much trading activity. For example, the 
BRVM, until 2012, traded for only about 2 hours a day, although this has since increased 
to a 6 hours a day. 
2.3 Country profiles of markets used in the study 
Botswana 
Botswana is a mid-size Southern African country with a population of just over 2 million. 
A former British protectorate that gained independence in 1966, the country is currently 
run as a presidential republic, and has had a stable political environment with democratic 
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elections held every 5 years. Economically, Botswana is regarded as one of the promising 
countries on the continent with a GDP and GDP per capita of about $14b and $6,527 
respectively as at 2015, making it an upper middle-income country. It has been described 
as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (World Bank 2018a). The 
encouraging economic performance of Botswana over the past few decades has mainly 
been driven by the mining sector, particularly, diamonds. The reliance on this sector of 
the economy, however, renders the country vulnerable to international market price 
fluctuations (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2017). In spite of the 
economic growth, Botswana is still beset with high levels of poverty, especially in the 
rural areas. There is also a considerable amount of inequality of wealth distribution, which 
makes it difficult for increased  economic growth to translate into significant reduction in 
poverty (World Bank 2018a). 
The Accounting and auditing environment is regulated by the Companies Act 2003 
and the Financial Reporting Act 2010, which set out the financial reporting and auditing 
requirements for all companies except exempt private companies. The Botswana Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (BICA), in September 2007, adopted IFRS without 
amendment. Prior to that, local accounting standards, set by the BICA, were used. 
Similarly the Financial Reporting Act 2010 requires that audits of financial statements be 
done according to International Standards on Auditing (ISA). The Financial Reporting 
Act 2010 also established the Botswana Accounting Oversight Authority (BAOA) as the 
new setter of Accounting and Auditing standards, which has the authority to adopt, adapt 
and issue new standards that are consistent with IFRS and ISA. 
 With respect to corruption, Botswana is generally regarded as one of the countries 
with the best record on the continent. The country has proactively sought to reinforce its 
legal and institutional framework by adequately resourcing institutions mandated to fight 
corruption. This reform was largely influenced by corruption scandals that occurred 
during the 1990s, where several high-ranking government officials were involved in the 
misuse of public funds (Transparency International 2014b).  In 2015, Botswana was 
ranked as the 29th country with the least perception of corruption out of 169 countries 
world-wide by Transparency International. The relatively low level of corruption in 
Botswana has also been attributed to prevention and education programmes, procurement 
reform, parliamentary accountability and the general political will of the country’s leaders 
(Jones 2017). Notwithstanding the encouraging corruption record, deeply entrenched 
Chapter 2: Overview of African Stock Markets  
16 
  
patronage networks, lack of transparency, and concerns over judicial independence still 
represent a challenge in the fight against corruption (Transparency International 2014b). 
 
In terms of corporate governance, there had been no corporate governance code 
prior to 2013. But companies in Botswana had mostly adopted codes from other countries, 
particularly the South Africa King report on corporate governance, as several Botswanan 
companies had their headquarters in South Africa (Magang 2016). In 2013, the Botswana 
Stock Exchange (BSE) developed a Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance by 
relying on some of the provisions in the corporate governance code of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka and the King Report of Corporate Governance 2002. 
The BSE Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance makes a number of provisions 
for how companies are governed in line with international best practices. These include a 
separation of the role of the Chairman and CEO, and a provision that the board should be 
chaired by non-executive directors. Motshegwa et al. (2017), however, argue that the BSE 
Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance focuses too much on only the Board of 
Directors to the neglect of other structures of corporate governance. 
The stock market of Botswana, the Botswana Stock Exchange, since its 
establishment in 1989, has continuously played an integral role in the enhancement of 
Botswana’s financial system, and in particular the capital market, as a platform on which 
government, quasi-government institutions and the private sector can raise debt and 
equity capital. The Botswana Stock Exchange plays host to the most pre-eminent 
companies doing business in Botswana. These companies represent a range of industries 
from Banking and Financial Services to Wholesaling and Retailing, Tourism and 
Information Technology. As at 2015, there were 32 firms listed on the Botswana stock 
exchange. 
Ghana 
Ghana is a West-African country with a population of about 28 million people. It was the 
first African country, south of the Sahara, to gain independence from the British in 1957, 
although the Queen of England continued to serve as the head of state. However, the 
country become a Presidential Republic in 1960, when the Queen seized to be the head 
of state. Since then, Ghana has alternated between military and civilian governments, 
experiencing several coup d etats. The last military government, under the leadership of 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) began in 1981 and ended in 1992, 
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ushering in the 4th constitutional republic and another democratic presidential and 
parliamentary election. Since then, the country has enjoyed a relatively stable political 
environment with peaceful elections and successful transfer of power between different 
governments. 
  
Ghana is currently regarded as a lower middle-income country. As at 2015, GDP 
and GDP per capita were $37b and $1,353.7 respectively. The country is a natural 
resource enriched country with substantial deposits of gold, diamond, bauxite and 
manganese. It also recently became an oil producing country, having discovered oil in 
2007 and beginning commercial production in 2010. The commercial production of oil 
has since become one of the main drivers of growth of the economy. There is also a 
significant reliance on Agriculture, particularly the production and export of cash crops 
such as cocoa. One of the main challenges of the Ghanaian economy, however, is that 
there is a lack of value addition to natural resources as most of these are exported in their 
raw state, making it difficult for the country to dictate prices as a result of weak bargaining 
power. The manufacturing and industrial sectors are relatively undeveloped and are not 
well positioned to convert many raw materials into finished products for exports in order 
to maximise export receipts. The current government, led my Nana Akuffo Addo, in 2017, 
launched a One District One Factory initiative, which is expected to ensure the 
establishment of factories in all the administrative districts of the country. It is expected 
that with the gradual implementation of this initiative, the country would be able to add 
value to most of its natural resources to enhance export revenues. There are also high 
levels of poverty in most rural areas and some urban communities as well. This is largely 
due to inequality in the distribution of resources and poor infrastructural development. 
 
In terms of corporate financial reporting, accounting and auditing requirements, 
companies in Ghana are governed by the Companies Act 1963, which outlines the 
preparation and publication of financial statements by companies. Specialised entities 
such as banks and insurance companies are additionally governed by other laws like the 
Banks and Specialised Deposit Taking Institutions Act 2016, and the Insurance Act 2006 
respectively. The Institute of Chartered Accountants Ghana (ICAG) is empowered by law 
to adopt and adapt accounting standards for use by both government and corporate 
entities. The ICAG adopted the use of IFRS in 2007 by all public companies. Prior to 
that, The Ghana National Accounting Standards, prepared based on GAAP and Statement 
of Standard Accounting Practices (SSAP), were used. 




As far as corruption and its perception are concerned, Ghana has not had a very 
encouraging record, as corruption continues to be very deep rooted. In 2015, the country 
was given a corruption perception score of 47/100 by Transparency International and was 
regarded as the 56th least corrupt country in the world out of a total of 169 countries. The 
high prevalence of corruption in Ghana has been attributed to a variety of factors 
including nepotism, a culture of gift-giving and selective application of sanctions (The 
Institute of Economic Affairs Ghana 2016). Yet the biggest cause is the poor enforcement 
of laws and regulations that have been enacted to prevent corrupt practices. Ghana has 
many good pieces of legislation meant to fight corruption such as the Public Procurement 
Act 2003, the Anti Money Laundering Act 2008, the Financial Administration Act, 2003 
and the Whistle-blower Act, 2006 amongst others. But the inadequate resourcing of 
institutions meant to enforce these laws and a general lack of political will by political 
leaders to fight corruption continues to deepen the canker. In January, 2018, the current 
government established the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which is expected to be a 
truly independent body, devoid of partisan influence, to investigate and prosecute cases 
of corruption by public officials. It is expected that this office will significantly 
complement existing anti-corruption institutions, which by their nature, are heavily 
subject to the influence and direction of the executive. 
 
The corporate governance regime in Ghana is a mixture of statutory law, legislation, 
guidelines and directors (Botchway-Dowuona et al. 2018). The main code of corporate 
governance among listed companies, however, is currently the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance, issued in 2010. The 
Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) listing rules also set out various guidelines on the 
governance of companies such as disclosure obligations, board governance and 
protections in respect of shareholder rights. Overall, the SEC, GSE and The Registrar of 
companies have the primary responsibility of overseeing the corporate governance regime 
of listed companies in Ghana. 
The stock market of Ghana is the Ghana Stock Exchange which was formed in July 
1989, although the idea of establishing a stock market was considered much earlier. It 
was initially established as a private company limited by guarantee under the Companies 
Act of 1963 (Act 179) and later given full recognition as an authorised stock exchange 
under the Stock Exchange Act of 1971(Act 384). Trading began on the floor of the 
exchange on 12th November, 1990, the same day the Council of the exchange was 
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inaugurated. The Ghana stock exchange currently runs an automated trading system that 
came into being in 2009. As at 2015, there were 39 companies listed on the Ghana stock 
exchange 
Kenya  
Kenya is a country located in East Africa, with a population of approximately 48 million. 
Also another former colony of the Britain, the country gained independence from British 
rule in 1963 and became a Presidential Republic a year later. Although the current 
political climate of Kenya may be currently seen as stable, the country has had its fair 
share of political turbulence since attaining independence. Between 1964 and 2002, 
Kenya was led by only two presidents in the persons of Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and 
Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002). Multi-party elections began only in 1992. In 2007, 
violence erupted as a result of the disputed presidential elections resulting in the death of 
about 1,500 people. This eventually led to some electoral reforms and further culminated 
in the establishment of a new constitution in 2010. The new constitution introduced a 
bicameral legislative house, devolved county government and a constitutionally tenured 
judiciary and electoral body (World Bank 2018b). 
 
Although Kenya has one of the largest economies in the East African region, owing 
to a relatively more skilled labour force and better infrastructure, economic performance 
has perhaps not been commensurate (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
2015). As at 2015, GDP and GDP per capita stood at $64b and $1,355 respectively. Kenya 
continues to remain the regional hub for ICT and financial services, and the service sector, 
in recent times, has been one of the highest contributors to GDP growth (African 
Development Bank 2018a).  The tourism sector, which used to be a significant aspect of 
the Kenyan economy, has suffered some decline in recent years, mainly due to security 
concerns and threats. Overall, whilst the Kenyan economy has shown some resilience and 
has also been seen to exhibit a positive outlook over the past few years, a stable political 
climate and improved security would remain crucial to economic growth and how it can 
be sustained going forward.  
Financial reporting, accounting and auditing requirements in Kenya are governed 
by the Companies Act 2015. This act replaced the 2009 revised version of the Companies 
Act of 1948, Act 486. The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK), 
set up by The Accountants Act of 1978 (as amended in 2008), is the recognised 
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accounting and auditing standard setter in Kenya. The use of IFRS was adopted in 
December 1999 without modification, pending the global effective date. The use of IFRS 
is mandated for all public companies whose securities are traded in a public market, 
whether domestic or foreign. The Companies Act also requires financial reports of all 
public companies to be audited by members of the ICPAK, in accordance with ISA, which 
were also adopted in 1999. 
In terms of corruption and its perception, Kenya has one of the worst records, not 
just on the continent, but probably in the world. In the 2015 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index for example, Kenya scored 25/100, and was regarded as the 
139th least corrupt country out of a total of 169 countries world-wide. Corruption has 
continued to persist in Kenya despite the existence of such institutions as the Ethics and 
Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). Thus, corruption in Kenya represents a very deep 
institutional problem whereby institutions that are meant to support the rule of law have 
continuously been undermined (Hope 2014). There is also a system of patronage by 
individuals of people in authority and political power which tends to exacerbate the 
problem of corruption (Hope 2011). Hope (2014) further argues that the increasing size 
of public sector bureaucracy has also created a very fertile ground for corruption to thrive 
as persons in charge of the provision public of services take advantage of their positions 
to make unlawful gains and enrich themselves. 
 
As far as corporate governance is concerned, guidelines on corporate governance, 
prepared by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), were issued in 2002. These guidelines 
are heavily borrowed from the UK Cadbury Report of 1992 and the South Africa King 
Report of 1994 (Waweru 2014). In 2015, the CMA replaced its 2002 corporate 
governance guidelines with a new code of corporate governance, which it considers to be 
more in sync with international best practices and standards. The implementation of the 
new code took effect from March 2016. The new code is seen as an enhancement of the 
2002 code because it provides more clarity on conflicts of interest and also requires more 
disclosure by companies to improve transparency. 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is the official stock market of Kenya, and 
was established in 1954. Between 1963 and 1970, it served as a regional stock exchange 
where a number of companies from Tanzania and Uganda (the three forming an East 
African community) were listed. Changes in political regimes in Kenya resulted in 
decisions that prevented free movement of capital and ultimately led to the delisting of 
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both Tanzanian and Ugandan companies. As of 2015, there were 63 listed firms on the 
exchange with a total market capitalisation of $20b. The NSE runs an automated trading 
system that was introduced in 2006. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with a current estimated population of about 
190 million people. Similar to Botswana, Ghana and Kenya, Nigeria is a former British 
colony. It gained independence in 1960 and became an official Republic in 1963. 
Nigeria’s system of government is a Federal Republic, modelled after the US system, and 
comprises 37 states. Executive power is exercised by a President, with the legislature 
made up of two houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate. A significant 
portion of Nigeria’s political history after independence has been characterised by 
instability as a result of several military interventions that occurred, particularly between 
1970 and 1999. Multiparty democracy was again restored in 1999, leading to the 
promulgation of a new constitution and the holding of elections. Since then there have 
been successful transfers of power from one civilian government to another. Despite the 
improvements in multi-party democracy over the last two decades, ethnic wars and the 
rise of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram have posed and continue to pose a threat to 
the political stability of the country. 
Nigeria is regarded as a middle income country. As of 2015, GDP and GDP per 
capita stood at $480b and $2,655.2 respectively. One of the main drivers of the Nigerian 
economy has been oil, making the economy quite susceptible to volatility in oil prices on 
the world market. The economy suffered a decline in growth between 2015 and 2016 due 
to the decline in the global oil prices but has since shown positive signs of recovery as oil 
prices also continue to rebound (African Development Bank 2018b). Prior to 2015, the 
economy grew at an average of 5.7% per year between 2006 and 2016. Other sectors of 
the economy such as Agriculture, Telecommunications and Services have also remained 
critical to economy. The banking sector has also undergone some recapitalisation within 
the last decade, which has contributed to a relatively stronger and healthy banking system. 
Economic growth, however, and like in most other countries in Africa, has not really 
translated into prosperity for the citizenry as levels of poverty continue to remain high. 
Further, the lack of regular and reliable supply of power poses a significant threat to 
industrial production. 
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With regards to the Accounting and regulatory environment, companies in Nigeria 
are governed by the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2018, which was passed to 
repeal the previous Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990. The Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), established in 2011, is currently tasked with the responsibility of 
developing accounting standards for the preparation of financial statements by 
companies. The FRC replaced the National Accounting Standards Board (NASB), which 
was set up in 1982. The NASB was dissolved and replaced with the FRC to allow for a 
more robust and independent entity that will adequately meet the growing development 
in accounting regulation (Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria 2018). The FRC, 
pursuant to its enabling act, also oversees the auditing environment of companies. 
Financial statements in Nigeria are currently prepared in accordance with IFRS, which 
became effective in 2012. The adoption of IFRS was due to the need to converge Nigerian 
Accounting Standards with high-quality global accounting standards (Umoren and Enang 
2015). 
Nigeria’s record on corruption has been quite abysmal over the years. As can be 
seen from Table 2.1, the country had a corruption perception score of 26/100 in 2015, 
making it the 136th least corrupt country in the world out of a total of 169 countries 
surveyed by Transparency International. Corruption in Nigeria thrives mainly due to the 
need by perpetrators to extract rent from the state and to preserve political power 
(Transparency International 2014a). This is manifested in huge embezzlement of 
resources, bribery, kickback and nepotism amongst others. Corruption is also highly 
prevalent in the public service delivery system, especially in areas such as education, 
health, and water supply. This creates a significant challenge for many citizens to access 
these essential services seamlessly as one form of bribe or another is always demanded 
(Kayode et al. 2013). Another key element underlying corruption in Nigeria is that there 
is a general lack of robust institutions and systems to fight corruption as the canker 
appears to have been institutionalised (Hope 2017). 
In terms of corporate governance, the regime in Nigeria, similar to most other 
African countries, is characterised by a combination of statutory and subsidiary 
legislation.  The general laws include the Companies and Allied Matters Act. In terms of 
specific codes of corporate governance, there exist codes for publicly listed companies as 
well as sector-specific companies. The current code of corporate governance is the SEC 
code of corporate governance 2011, which was developed as a revision to the first code 
that was issued in 2003. There is also the corporate governance for Banks and Discount 
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Houses, and the Guidelines for Whistle-Blowing 2014. In addition, there is also the 
Nigerian Communications Code of Corporate Governance for firms in the 
Telecommunications industry.  
The stock market of Nigeria is the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The Nigerian stock 
exchange is one of the largest stock exchanges and financial centres in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Over the past 50 years, it has contributed immensely to the development of the 
financial system and the country as a whole. In 1993, the market was deregulated. Also, 
in 1995, a number of laws were repealed which created more favorable conditions for 
participation by foreign investors. Since then, foreign inflows have risen substantially.  
South Africa 
South Africa is a country located in the Southern-most part of Africa. South Africa 
operates a presidential republic system of government and has been a republic since 1961. 
South Africa’s political history has been marked by a long period of apartheid which 
involved periods of racial division and segregation. This was because, until 1994, the 
country was ruled by a white minority government. Apartheid was eventually abolished 
in 1994 and the country has enjoyed a relatively more stable political environment.  
The South African economy is one of the largest on the continent. It is also one of 
the most industrialised countries in Africa and an upper-middle country. As at 2015, GDP 
and GDP per capita stood at $320bn and $5,746.7 respectively. It is the only African 
country which is a member of the G-20 group of nations. The main sectors that drive the 
South African economy have been agriculture and mining. South Africa is one of the 
world’s leading mining and minerals processing countries. Its four key exports include; 
coal, platinum and iron ore (African Development Bank 2018c). This therefore also 
makes the country’s economy somehow vulnerable to fluctuations in international 
commodity prices. One of the challenges of the South African economy, however, is the 
inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. Further, corruption, and the lack of 
sufficient skilled labour continue to pose a threat to the economic gains of the country. 
The financial reporting requirements of companies in South Africa are governed by 
the companies Act of 2008. Firms are required to prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange listing rules, which also make 
some provisions for financial reporting and disclosure, has since 2005, required publicly 
listed companies to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS. The Financial 
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Markets Act of 2012 also provides additional disclosure and reporting obligations for 
listed companies. The Independent Regulatory Board for Auditing regulates the audit 
profession and the auditing of South African companies, which is done in accordance 
with International Standard on Auditing. 
South Africa has had its fair share of challenges as far as corruption is concerned. 
Corruption continues to remain prevalent among politicians and government officials. It 
also manifests itself in dealings between the private sector and the government (state 
capture), with the recent Gupta scandal being a classic example. This scandal, in 
particular, involved how a power elite around the then President, Jacob Zumah, managed 
to centralise control in the areas of public services, national treasurer, and the security 
and intelligence service, amongst others (Meyer and Luiz 2018). In the 2015 corruption 
perception index by Transparency International, South Africa had a score of 46/100 and 
was ranked 61 out of a total of 169 countries. For a country that is regarded as one of the 
most developed on the continent, this is perhaps not a very encouraging record.  
In terms of corporate governance, the landscape is regulated by a number of pieces 
of legislation including the Capital Markets Act 2012. However, the main framework for 
corporate governance since 1994 has been the King’s report on corporate governance and 
its subsequent modifications. The first Kings report, King I, published in 1994, is largely 
modelled on the UK Cadbury report of 1992, especially with regards to internal corporate 
governance structures, adopting a more integrated approach that included fairness and 
responsibility (West 2009). In 2002, a new version of the King’s (King II) was published. 
This included new sections on sustainability, the role of the board and issues about risk 
management. It also offered more clarity on how the inclusive approach to corporate 
governance can be implemented (Institute of Directors 2002). A third version of the 
King’s report was introduced in 2009 which extends corporate governance to non-profit 
organisations and included such issues as alternative dispute resolution, risk base audit 
and it governance. The current version of the King’s report, King IV, was published in 
2016 with the view to making it more accessible and applicable to all types of entities and 
across sectors. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange is the largest stock exchange on the African 
continent (FT 2014). As at the end of 2015, there were 395 companies listed (ASEA 
Yearbook 2014). Indeed, The Johannesburg stock exchange is among the world’s 20 
largest exchanges by market capitalisation (ASEA Yearbook 2014). The exchange 
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currently offers a wide array of financial instruments including equities, bonds and 
derivatives. The equity market of the JSE comprises the Main Market (Main Board) and 
Alternative Market (Altx). The main board comprises large and well-established 
companies whilst the Altx is meant to cater for good quality but small to medium-sized 
growth firms. The Johannesburg Stock exchange is equally home to a good number of 
foreign companies who enjoy secondary listing status. Foreign firms were allowed to list 
on the JSE since 2004. Again, through a fast-track policy, foreign are allowed to leverage 
the processes of their primary listing to ensure a smoother and quicker secondary listing. 
Thus, foreign exchange rules, which limit the amount of foreign securities local investors 
can hold, were lifted, making the JSE an even more attractive listing destination. 
2.4 Political, economic and regulatory characteristics of sample markets 
 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of key political, economic and regulatory characteristics 
of the five markets in the sample as at 2015. The year 2015 is used because it represents 
the end of the sample period for this study. As already mentioned earlier in the country 
profiles, and as can be observed from the table, all five countries practise democratic 
systems of government. Botswana and South Africa both practise a parliamentary 
republican system of government with a President who is both head of state and head of 
government, a variation of the parliamentary system where there is a Prime Minister and 
Ceremonial head of state (President). Ghana and Kenya, on the other hand are both 
presidential republics where the President acts as only head of state. Nigeria equally has 
a President who acts as head of state but the system of government practised is that of a 
Federal republic, akin to the system practised in the United States. It is interesting to 
observe these differences although all five countries are former colonies of the Great 
Britain. This perhaps is evidence of the fact that most countries have truly become 
politically independent with the ability to choose a system of government that works well 
for them.  
In terms of the other characteristics, Table 2.1 shows that Nigeria has the largest 
economy amongst the five countries, and indeed in the whole of Africa. South Africa has 
the second largest economy both amongst the five countries and on the continent as well. 
Botswana has the smallest economy amongst countries in the sample. Nigeria recorded 
the largest cumulative growth in GDP between 2005 and 2015 whilst South Africa has 
seen the lowest over the same period. Although Botswana has the smallest level of GDP, 
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it has the highest GDP per capita amongst the five countries. This obviously is due to a 
relatively lower population. South Africa has the second highest GDP per capita whilst 
Ghana has the lowest albeit not significantly lower than that of Kenya. Again, Botswana 
is the only country that has a much better record when it comes to corruption. It is the 
only country among the five countries that had a corruption score of above 50 in the 
Transparency International corruption perception survey, and also has the best ranking. 
Kenya has the worst of all the five countries with Nigeria very much in close succession.  
Further, and as also mentioned earlier, all five countries in the sample have adopted 
IFRS based on which listed companies must prepare their financial reports. Table 2.1, 
however, shows different times for the adoption of IFRS, with Kenya and Nigeria being 
the first and last respectively to adopt. Also, all five countries have corporate governance 
codes, introduced at different times. South Africa, arguably has the most robust corporate 
governance code as it was largely modelled on the UK code of corporate of governance. 
Moreover, because the South African code has been in existence for a relatively longer 
period of time, it has obviously had the benefit of a number of revisions, based on past 
experiences, in order to make it more robust. Botswana was the last country among the 
five to adopt a corporate governance code in 2013, although as already mentioned in the 
country profile section, this code appears to overly focus on the board of directors. 
Companies in all five countries are also required to report their earnings in reasonable 
time after the end of their financial year. Nigeria and Ghana have the shortest of 3 months 
each whilst South Africa has the longest of 6 months. All five countries are also open to 
foreign investors and are covered by Bloomberg. 




Table 2.1: Political, economic and regulatory characteristics of sample markets 
 
 
 This table presents financial, regulatory and development characteristics of countries in the sample. The information is presented as at 2015, and are obtained from various sources. The source of each 
information is indicated in the last column of the table. 
    Botswana Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Source 
1 System of Government Parliamentary Presidential Presidential Federal Parliamentary 
CIA World Fact Book 
  republic republic republic republic republic 
2 GDP ($m) 14,000 37,000 64,000 480,000 320,000 World Bank financial development database 
3 Change in GDP 2005-2015 (%) 41.4 236.4 236.8 336.4 23.1 World Bank financial development database 
4 GDP per capita ($) 
            
6,527.5        1,353.7        1,355.0  
      
2,655.2  
            
5,746.7  World Bank national accounts data file 
5 Change in GDP per capita 2005-2015 (%) 21.9 171.8 161.8 229.1 8.8 World Bank national accounts data file 
6 Corruption perception score* 63/100 47/100 25/100 26/100 44/100 Transparency International 
7 Corruption perception rank (least corrupt) 29/169 56/169 139/169 136/169 61/169 Transparency International 
8 Accounting standards IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS www.ifrs.org  
9 Year of IFRS introduction 2007 2007 1999 2012 2005 www.ifrs.org  
10 Existence of corporate governance code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Websites of SECs/Capital Market Authorities 
11 First introduction of corporate governance code          2013 2010 2002 2003 1994 Websites of SECs/Capital Market Authorities 
12 Reporting time for earnings after financial year 5 months 3 months 4 months 90 days 6 months Companies/Securities Act 
13 Involvement of foreign investors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes World Bank 
14 Coverage by Bloomberg terminal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bloomberg 
* Lower scores mean higher perceptions of corruption 
 





The above characteristics and the accompanying comparisons may have some 
implications for stock return synchronicity and/or earnings informativeness in these 
markets. Firstly, and as already mentioned in Chapter 1, the conventional wisdom on 
stock return synchronicity had been that stock returns in more developed markets are less 
synchronous than those of developing countries as better developed political and legal 
institutions help to generate the availability of more reliable firm-specific information 
(Hasan et al. 2014). Based on this premise, it would reasonable to expect a high level of 
stock return synchronicity in these five markets as the size of their economies and 
challenges in the regulatory environment may create  difficulty for the availability of more 
reliable firm-specific information. Perhaps an exception could be made for South Africa 
based on the early introduction of corporate governance codes. However, and as earlier 
alluded to, this study is motivated by a counter but intuitively appealing argument that 
stock return synchronicity can be high in more developed markets and conversely low in 
less developed markets. To that effect, it may not be completely surprising to observe 
averagely low levels of stock return synchronicity across all five countries and even lower 
for the relatively smaller and less developed among these five markets. 
Secondly, the strength of the political and regulatory system may also be reflected 
in the levels of the perception of corruption. As can be seen from Table 2.1, Botswana 
and South Africa appear to have the best record in terms of corruption. Although this 
figure represents a one-year record, the same trend is actually observed for all years 
throughout the sample period. Thus, one may argue that Botswana and South Africa have 
more effective systems for legal and regulatory enforcement. This would have the impact 
of enhancing the information environment of firms and increase the reliability of firm-
specific information, leading to lower levels of stock return synchronicity. However, the 
reverse may be also true in that an enhanced information environment, stemming from 
lower levels of corruption perception, could also mean that investors are more able to 
accurately predict events and therefore act with less surprise when these effects occur. 
This creates a situation where stock return synchronicity could be averagely lower for 
firms in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. 
Thirdly, and with respect to earnings informativeness, all countries currently adopt 
IFRS. All else equal, this would be expected to contribute to enhancing the credibility of 
accounting information and the information content of earnings. However, whether the 




adoption of IFRS lead to greater informativeness of earnings relative to the pre-adoption 
IFRS period, is an empirical question which the third empirical analysis of this thesis 
(Chapter 7) aims to answer. However, and as already mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
literature on the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings informativeness has largely agreed 
that IFRS can only be effective in influencing earnings only in an atmosphere of proper 
legal and regulatory enforcement. This is based on the simple premise that capital market 
implications of IFRS can also be affected by country-specific characteristics. This may 
therefore have the implication of leading to no significant improvement in earnings 
informativeness following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in these countries, where 
regulatory enforcement still poses a great challenge. On the other hand, the presence of 
corporate governance codes and stock listing rules (which are later discussed in this 
chapter) would help to provide an avenue for corporate information such as earnings to 
be disclosed and might therefore lead to some level of earnings informativeness. 
It is also instructive to reiterate the participation of foreign investors in these 
markets. Indeed, developing and emerging markets, including those in Africa, have been 
considered as means to enable both foreign portfolio and foreign direct investment (Hearn 
et al. 2010). Hasan et al. (2014) further argue that foreign investors are better skilled at 
collecting and trading on firm specific information. Therefore, and all else equal, the 
presence and participation of foreign investors in these markets can contribute to 
reduction in stock return synchronicity and also improve earnings informativeness. The 
coverage of firms in these countries by Bloomberg may also make these markets more 
open to international investors and also contribute to the price discovery process. 
However, differences in the time of reporting earnings information among countries 
might also cause variations in the informativeness of earnings. Both Nigeria and Ghana 
have the shortest length of time for companies to report their earnings. However, it 
remains to be seen whether this is reflective of the actual amount of time companies 
actually take to report their earnings. This obviously will equally be a matter of regulatory 
enforcement and chapter 6 of this thesis looks more closely at the reporting lag, which 
measures the number of days between the fiscal year end of firms and the actual date of 
their earnings announcement. 
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2.5 Operational and developmental characteristics of sample stock markets 
 
Table 2.2 compares some institutional, operational and development characteristics of 
stock markets in the sample. The South African stock market is the oldest among the five 
stock markets and is also the market with the largest number of listed firms. As at 2015, 
there were 395 listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Botswana and 
Ghana both have the youngest stock exchanges although the Botswana stock exchange 
has the smallest number of listed firms (32 as at 2015 whilst Ghana had 39). The Kenyan 
and Nigerian stock exchanges have been in existence for a relatively longer period of 
time, having been established in 1954 and 1960 respectively. Kenya has however 
witnessed the highest percentage increase in the number of listed firms between 2005 and 
2015. The South African stock exchange is also the largest among the five countries with 
a total market capitalisation of about $756bn as at 2015. Botswana, on the other hand, has 
the largest market capitalisation to GDP ratio. This is not surprising since Botswana has 
a relatively lower level of GDP compared to the rest of the four countries. The length of 
existence and size of this markets may have some implications for the size and age of 
firms. All things being equal, it would be expected that firms in the larger and older 
markets like South Africa and Nigeria would also be older and larger. This can then affect 
their information environment and by extension, the level of synchronicity of their stock 
returns. Chapter 5 of this thesis examines the impact of age and firm size on stock return 
synchronicity more closely. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange is also the most liquid of all the five markets.  It 
had the largest volume of shares traded as at 2015 of about 74 billion shares whilst Ghana 
had a total volume of shares traded of about 246 million shares in 2015. Between 2005 
and 2015, the Botswana Stock Exchange experienced the largest percentage increase in 
volume of shares traded. The value of shares traded in each of the five countries some-
how mimic their volume of shares traded in that South Africa equally had the largest 
volume of shares traded whilst Ghana had the smallest value of shares traded as at 2015. 
Similarly, Botswana experienced the greatest percentage increase in the value of shares 
traded over the sample period. Thus, overall, South Africa is largest and most liquid of 
all markets in the sample. Kenya and Nigeria and by the number of listed firms, volume 
of shares and value of shares traded, represent mid-sized stock markets. Ghana and 
Botswana on the other hand, and given the data presented in Table 2.2, could still be 
classified as small and relatively illiquid, although Botswana has a high market 
capitalisation, owing largely to the presence of blue chip companies from South Africa.  
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Generally, one can argue that most African stock markets, perhaps with the exception of 
South Africa, are relatively small and still suffer from challenges about illiquidity. The 
liquidity of each of this markets may also have implications for the trading frequency of 
companies and the ability of stocks to incorporate firm specific information such as 
earnings.  
Also, all five stock markets operate a five-day trading week (Monday to Friday). 
However, the number of trading hours per day varies on each stock exchange. South 
Africa has the longest trading hours of 8 per day whilst Ghana and Kenya both have the 
lowest of 5 each with Botswana and Nigeria having trading 6 hours each per day. With 
the exception of South Africa, the current number of trading hours in each of the other 
four countries represents an increase from the past. As at 2007, (see Ntim et al. 2011), the 
Botswana Stock Exchange operated a 1 hour trading day whilst those of Ghana, Kenya 
and Nigeria operated 2 hour trading days each. Like most other markets on the continent, 
all five stock markets in the sample operate automated trading systems, with some 
introducing these systems only more recently. For example, Botswana was the latest 
among the five countries to introduce an automated system in 2012. Both South Africa 
and Kenya introduced automation before the advent of the 21st century. All stock markets 
currently operate a T+3 clearing and settlement for equities. This is largely consistent 
with international standards, although some advanced countries are moving to shorter 
cycles such as T+2. Again, with the exception of South Africa, where derivatives trading 
is allowed, all other four stock exchanges do not have mechanisms for the trading of 
derivative instruments. Furthermore, as part of efforts to integrate these markets 
internationally, all five stock markets are members of the African Securities Exchanges 
Association (ASEA), but only Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are members of the World 
Federation of Exchanges. Finally, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa have circuit breakers 
of ±10%. This causes trading of a security to be temporarily suspended when there is a 
more than 10% change in the price of the security. Ghana, on the other hand, has no rule 
on circuit breakers whilst Botswana has a variable rule. Thus, all else equal, we are more 
likely to observe higher price changes in Ghana and probably Botswana, than in the other 
three countries. 




Table 2.2: Operational and developmental characteristics of sample stock markets  
  
 This table presents the institutional, operational and developmental characteristics of stock markets in the countries used for this study. The information is presented as at 2015, and are obtained from 
various sources. The source of each information is indicated in the last column of the table. 
  Characteristic Botswana Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Source 
1 Year of establishment 1989 1989 1954 1960 1887 Stock exchange websites 
2 Number of listed firms 32 39 63 184 395 www.african-exchanges.org  
3 Change in listed firms 2005-2015 (%) 14.3 25.8 31.3 -14 1.8 www.african-exchanges.org  
4 Market Cap ($m) 37,477.8 15,030.8 20,000.0 49,457.0 756,836.5 www.african-exchanges.org  
5 Change in market capitalisation 2005-2015 (%) 179.3 147.7 225.7 120 33.3 www.african-exchanges.org  
6 Market capitalisation to GDP ratio % 267.70 40.62 31.25 10.30 236.51 Author's computation 
7 Change in market capitalisation to GDP ratio 2005-2015 % 96.3 53.63 4,363.70 -49.5 8.49 Author's computation 
8 Volume of shares traded (millions) 1,603.3 246.4 6,996.8 70,078.1 74,406.0 www.african-exchanges.org  
9 Change in volume of shares traded 2005-2015 (%) 3,530.30 202.73 700.3 162.5 36.3 www.african-exchanges.org  
10 Value of shares traded ($m) 428.0 65.2 2,045.0 3931.5 992615.4 www.african-exchanges.org  
11 Change in value of shares traded 2005-2015 (%) 807.8 28 323 70.9 114.2 www.african-exchanges.org  
12 Number of trading days 5 5 5 5 5 www.stockmarketclock.com  
13 Number of trading hours 6 5 5 6 8 www.stockmarketclock.com  
14 System of trading Automated Automated Automated Automated Automated stock exchange websites 
15 Year of automation 2012 2009 2006 1999 1996 stock exchange websites 
16 Clearing and settlement for equities T+3 T+3 T+3 T+3 T+3 Stock exchange websites 
17 Derivatives trading No No No No Yes Stock exchange websites 
18 Member of African Security Exchanges Association (ASEA) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes www.african-exchanges.org  
19 Member of World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) No No Yes Yes Yes www.world-exchanges.org 
20 Price band and circuit breakers Variable based on BSE N/A ± 10% ± 10% ± 10% Stock listing rules 
 
 





Taken together, the above comparison of the institutional, operational and 
development characteristics of the sample markets reveal whilst all five months are 
currently similar in terms of some characteristics (i.e. automated trading, number of 
trading days), there are also still remarkable differences in other characteristics such as 
size, volume of trading and value of trading which, as already indicated, can then have 
different implications for stock return synchronicity and/or earnings informativeness.  
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 depict the evolution of three major stock market 
characteristics of the five markets namely; number of listed companies, market 
capitalisation and volume of shares traded, respectively. These are presented over the 
sample period (2005-2015). As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the stock exchanges of 
Botswana, Ghana and Kenya have consistently had less than 100 listed firms. Both 
Botswana and Kenya have had their number of listed firms ranging from about 25 to 40 
over the sample period whilst that of Kenya has ranged between about 48 to 65. This 
represents a relatively persistent low number of companies. One of the major reasons for 
the low level of patronage of stock markets by domestic firms in these markets is the 
extensive nature of information disclosure requirements and the fear of losing control and 
ownership rights (Acquaah 2015). Only Nigeria and South Africa have had over 100 firms 
listed on their stock exchanges over the sample period. However, Figure 2.1 shows what 
appears to be a noticeable decline in the number of listed companies in both Nigeria and 
South after 2011. This situation has been mostly due to delisting as a result of issuers of 
securities being unable to keep up with listing requirements. With respect to Figure 2.2, 
the market capitalisation of the stock exchanges of Ghana and Nigeria to a large extend 
mirror the trend in the number of listed companies. However, in the case of Botswana, a 
sharp decline can be observed between 2007 and 2008. This may have been partly due to 
the financial crisis as the Botswana stock exchange also plays host to a good number of 
firms from South Africa, a more developed market that will be more susceptible to the 
impact of global factors such as the financial crisis. Finally Figure 2.3 shows the trends 
in the value of share traded. Most notable movements in the value of shares traded across 
all countries appear to have occurred during the period of financial crisis, except in the 
case of Kenya, where there was a noticeable decline in the value of shares traded between 
2013 and 2015. 
 






 Figure 2.1: Number of listed companies 
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2.6 Framework for disclosure for listed companies 
The dissemination of information by companies in Africa was mostly made in their annual 
reports. Thus market participants rely mostly on published annual reports to access 
information for investment and other decisions. It is therefore not surprising that many 
studies that have tried to measure corporate governance disclosures by African countries 
have usually done so by conducting content analyses of annual reports published by these 
companies (eg. Tsamenyi et al. 2007, Ntim et al. 2012b, Samaha and Dahawy 2010). This 
situation has however improved over time. Many stock markets in Africa now have 
electronic trading systems that enable investors and other market participants to obtain 
information on a real-time basis. In 2014 for instance, the Botswana Stock exchange 
launched its News Service, a platform to disseminate information about companies in real 
time. According to Jefferis and Smith (2005), the introduction of these electronic systems 
enhances the price formation process as they are more associated with greater efficiency 
of information dissemination. Also, the websites of African stock exchanges contain 
sections for company announcements most of which are described by existing legislation 
and regulations as being price sensitive (e.g NSE amendments to stock listing rules). 
The main thrust of investor protection is to ensure the establishment and 
implementation of a legal framework that will govern financial markets in order to attract 
and retain investors. Studies such as McLean et al. (2012) argue that investor protection 
increases external finance and facilitates efficient investments. However, one crucial 
element is the existence of a framework that mandates firms to disclosure information to 
investors. This section presents the various relevant pieces of legislation that require firms 
to disclose value relevant information to market participants. 
Botswana 
The major regulatory framework for company disclosure in Botswana is enshrined in the 
Botswana Stock Exchange Listing requirements (1999). According to Section 3.3 of the 
document, companies are required to, and without delay, publish announcements giving 
details of: 
(a) “circumstances or events that have or are likely to have a material effect on 
the financial results, the financial position or cash flow of the issuer and/or 
information necessary to enable holders of the issuer's listed securities and the 
public to avoid the creation of a false market in its listed securities 




(b) “any new developments in its sphere of activity which are not public 
knowledge and which may by virtue of the effect of those developments on its 
assets and liabilities or financial position or on the general course of its business, 
lead to material movements in the ruling price of its listed securities.” 
 
Ghana 
The stock exchange listing rules (2006) of the Ghana Stock exchange under Part VII 
provide quite an elaborate framework based on which companies listed on the Ghana 
stock exchange must provide information to all relevant stakeholders.  Section 53(b) of 
the rules requires companies to “fully disclose to the public, the information necessary to 
make informed investment decisions.” Under section 53(c), companies are expected to 
make the immediate release of any information which might be reasonably expected to 
have a material effect on the company’s activities and the price of its shares. Similarly, 
all information about the affairs, events or conditions in the market for a company’s share 
which might have a material impact on its share price and will be considered as important 
by a reasonable investor in making his investment decisions and taking investment actions 
must be disclosed (cf. Section 54(1b) and 54(1c)). 
 
Kenya 
The Nairobi Securities exchange listing manual, approved by the Capital Markets 
Authority (CMA) in 2013, stipulates in section 10.1, the general obligations of listed firms 
to disclose information and make announcements on items of material nature. Section 10 
states that:  
“An issuer shall, as soon as possible but not later than twenty-four hours, release 
an announcement giving details of:  
 
i. “Circumstances or events that have or are likely to have a material effect on 
the financial results, the financial position or cash flow of the issuer and/or 
information necessary to enable holders of the issuer’s listed securities and 
the public make informed decisions on the issuer’s performance and 
operations.” 
ii.  “New developments which impact on the issuer’s operations, trading and 
financial performance or any information whatsoever considered by the issuer 











In Nigeria, the Stock Exchange listing rules of 2014 (as amended) makes adequate 
provision for the disclosure of corporate information by listed companies. For example, 
Section 1 states that: 
 
“Every Issuer shall ensure that investors and the public are kept fully informed of 
all factors which might affect their interest and in particular, that immediate 
disclosure is made of any information concerning their interest which might 
reasonably be expected to have material effect on market activity in, and the 
prices or value of, listed securities.” 
 
Companies are also required by Section 2 to provide immediate information about any 
circumstances that are likely to affect its financial condition materially. Again, significant 
changes in the nature of the business require timely and adequate disclosure and this is 
captured in Section 5.1 which states that: 
“An Issuer is obliged to immediately disclose the details of any major changes in 
its business or other circumstances relating to the Issuer which are not directly 
specified in these Rules, but which are not public knowledge and which may, by 
virtue of their effect on the Issuer’s assets, liabilities, operations or reputation, 
affect the price of its listed or traded securities.” 
Companies are also guided by Sections 2 and 5.2 which focus on insider information and 
the disclosure of information to third parties respectively. Whilst section 2 enjoins 
companies to deny access to information to persons other than those who require it to 
exercise their functions within the company, section 5.2 enjoins companies to deny 
information to third parties without the prior notification of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
South Africa 
There are a number of pieces of legislation and regulations that govern companies and 
the financial markets in general in South Africa. These include: 
1. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (as amended by the Companies Act 3 of 2011) 
2. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange rules 1 of 20051. 
3. Financial Markets Act no 19 of 2012 
4. The King report on Corporate governance 
The Financial and Markets Act of 2012 makes express provisions that require listed 
companies to disclose relevant corporate information. According to Section 14(1a) of the 
Act, issuers of listed securities (companies) are required to disclose to the Johannesburg 
                                                          
1 This has been amended regularly between 2007 and 2018 with the latest amendment being on 26th 
January, 2018 




Stock Exchange any information about their affairs. Also in Section 14(1b) companies 
are required to disclose information to registered holders of their securities. But even 
more importantly and of interest is that where information to be disclosed can have an 
impact on the firm’s securities, such information must be disclosed publicly (cf. Section 
14(2)). 
2.7 Nature of corporate ownership 
A number of studies of African markets have examined the nature of corporate ownership 
structure, particularly with regards to the levels of ownership concentration. In South 
Africa for instance, although the South African market is the most developed on the 
African continent, ownership of firms appears to be relatively concentrated in comparison 
to other developed markets in the western world. Ntim (2009) finds ownership 
concentration to range from 7% to 99% with an average of 60% in a sample of 100 listed 
firms between the 2002-2006 periods. He also reports a significant percentage of 
institutional holdings averaging about 70% between the same periods. The South African 
market was characterised by pyramidal ownership structures and complex cross-
shareholdings. However, more rigorous listing requirements by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange have helped in decreasing the incidence of this. But overall, dispersion of 
ownership is relatively low. 
In Nigeria ownership of firms was mainly in the hands of foreigners prior to 
independence. But with the passing of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree in 1972, 
provisions were made to prohibit 100% foreign ownership of Nigerian companies 
(Ahunwan 2002). This led to major divestitures. The majority of the divested shares were 
acquired by the government, state institutions and a few wealthy individuals. To date, this 
trend continues to characterise the Nigerian corporate ownership landscape where 
Government, foreign institutions, and individual block holders dominate. In a cross-
country study conducted by Abor and Fiador (2013) ownership concentration in Nigeria 
is equally substantial. Approximately 48% of shares of listed companies are held by 
institutional investors. This is a followed by significant holdings by individuals and 
government. 
Ownership concentration is equally high within the Kenyan corporate sector and is 
characterised by significant levels of block holdings particularly by the government 
(Kiruri and Olkalou 2013). In a study involving Kenyan banks, they find that the 




percentage of block ownership among these firms is about 52% with the lowest and 
highest being 43% and 75% respectively. Aside government, foreign owners hold the 
higher amount of shares. Ongore et al. (2011) in broader analysis find the average level 
of ownership concentration across five industries in Kenya to be about 61%. Thus overall, 
Kenya’s situation seems not to be too different from other African countries and most 
developing countries in general. 
As a developing country, Ghana’s corporate climate is characterised by relatively 
higher levels of ownership concentration, consistent with the postulations of La Porta et 
al (1999), that, developing countries tend to be characterised by weaker minority 
shareholder protection which then leads to higher levels of ownership concentration. 
Tsamenyi et al. (2007) find evidence in support of this assertion. In a survey of 22 listed 
firms (which in present terms amount to over 50% of the total number of listed firms on 
the Ghana Stock exchange), they find that for each of the 22 firms the average percentage 
of shares held by the largest shareholder is approximately 50% with the highest being 90 
% and the lowest being 24%. Also, the top three shareholders for each firm hold on 
average 73% of the shares of each firm. Over 50% of firms also had foreign ownership, 
mostly through institutional investors, and this accounted for an average of 60% in each 
firm. An average of 22.69% of the total shares held by the top three shareholders in 14 
out of the 22 firms was owned by Government and state-owned enterprises. Families and 
individuals held, on average, 31% of the shareholdings in only 4 out of the 22 firms. The 
highest percentage of shares held by families and individuals in a single company was 
found to be 88%.  
The above findings are very much consistent with the views of Abor and Fiador 
(2013) who also argue that ownership concentration is high in Ghana but more tilted 
towards foreign institutional investors and the Government, and less towards 
families/individuals. Indeed, a corporate governance country assessment conducted by 
the World Bank shows that significant stakes are held in listed companies by the 
government through the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), the state 
pension fund and main domestic institutional investor. According to the report, SNNIT 
has stakes in over 20 of the under 40 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange with at 
least 20% stake in eight of these firms. 





This chapter has highlighted the development, challenges and features of African stock 
markets with particular focus on the markets used in the study. The gradual increase in 
the breadth and depth of stock markets in the continent increasingly makes them a setting 
for capital markets research. The issues discussed in this chapter with regards to 
information disclosure, informational efficiency and ownership structure will facilitate 
the empirical analyses contained in this thesis in better context. Although the stock 
markets of the above countries are relatively small in comparison to developed countries, 
there appears to be some growth in the size of these markets and could be a reflection of 
the role stock markets could play in promoting economic growth. A major issue and 
rightly highlighted by many studies is that these markets are less liquid. But overall, there 
appears to be a reasonable regulatory framework within which companies must operate 
as well as disclosure material information that may have an impact on their share price 
and to guide investors in their decisions.  


















3 Literature Review 







This chapter provides a critical review of the related literature to the study. There has 
been significant attention devoted to the study of stock return synchronicity, earnings 
informativeness and the influence by institutional factors on market pricing in different 
countries. Section, 3.2, discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis focusing 
mainly on market efficiency and information asymmetry. Section 3.3 discusses the 
relevant empirical literature related to stock return synchronicity, earnings 
informativeness and institutional development. Section 3.4 identifies the gaps to be 
address and also shows the interrelationship between the three main strands of the 
literature; stock return synchronicity, earnings informativeness and institutional 
development. Section 3.5 concludes with the chapter with a summary. 
3.2 Theory 
This section presents the theoretical concepts that underpin the thesis. They include 
market efficiency, investor protection, and information asymmetry. 
3.2.1 Market efficiency 
The view that stock markets are efficient implies that publicly available information is 
fully reflected in stock prices at all times. It also implies that stock prices reflect the 
fundamental values of companies, i.e the expected future cash flows from the company 
to the shareholder. Hence by holding past or current information, no investor can earn a 
return beyond what is already offered by the market as this information would have 
already been impounded into stock prices. According to Ball (1996), this publicly 
available information is meant to be accessible to all market participants at no cost. Once 
the cost of having such information is zero, at a competitive equilibrium where cost equals 
revenue, the return of holding such information should also be zero, implying that prices 
have already adjusted to such information. 
Hence in his review of the market efficiency literature, Fama (1970) finds that for 
a market to fully reflect all available information there should be among others: no 
transaction costs in trading; costless availability of information; and an agreement on the 
impact of the current information on both the current and future prices by all investors. 





But he also asserts that these conditions, although sufficient, are not necessary because 
they are quite untypical of markets in practice. For instance, if not all, but a sufficient 
number of investors have access to available information, markets could still be efficient. 
Again, unless some investors can make better assessments of information beyond the 
value such information should have, a disagreement among investors should not strictly 
imply market inefficiency. Finally, markets could still be efficient in the presence of 
transaction costs to the extent  that the marginal benefits of using available information 
are equal to the marginal cost of acting on the information (Jensen 1978). 
Market efficiency thrives within a context of market equilibrium or a model that 
specifies expected returns, leading to the problem of the joint hypothesis (Fama 1970; 
Summers 1986). This market equilibrium is of the type where prices reflect all available 
information. However and often so, market equilibrium is also expressed in terms of 
expected returns. Therefore, a simple model proposed in Fama (1970) is given as; 
 
                E = (P̃ j,t+1|ϕt) = [1 + E(řj,t+1|ϕ)]P̃jt                                                3.1 
 
Where  is an expected value operator; 1,
~
 tj  is the price of a security j at a time t+1 
which usually takes the form of a random variable; tjr 1,
~  is the expected return in t+1, rt  
is the current price of the stock (at time t); and  is the set of information for which the 
price should fully reflect. From the above equation, Fama (1970) argues that , which is 
the information, is used fully to determine the expected return and therefore, the price of 
the security would equally reflect all the information. 
 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) propose an interesting dimension to the theory of 
market efficiency. Unlike Fama (1970) and others, they argue that information is not 
costless and as such prices cannot reflect all available information. This is because some 
investors spend resources to acquire information for which they should be compensated. 
Such compensation would normally come about when informed investors use their 
information to take better trading positions than informed investors. Based on this, they 
conclude that the informativeness of the price system largely depends on the number of 
investors who are informed. Prices therefore only reflect information of informed 
investors (who are able to acquire information). However, by, the actions these informed 
investors take based on their information, the uninformed investors also become informed 
through the price system. 





Market microstructure (the market mechanisms on transacted prices) has also had 
implications for the efficiency of stock markets (Ball 1996, Dimson and Mussavian 1998, 
Easley et al. 2010). An intuitive explanation is put across by Bagehot (1971) in his article 
“the only game in town”, using the example of a market maker. He argues that not all 
investors trade based on information because some are motivated by liquidity (wanting 
to convert securities into cash and vice versa). Liquidity motivated investors are usually 
exploited by market makers to offset losses they make from trading with information 
motivated traders. Market makers lose to information motivated investors because they 
will usually refuse to trade if there is a wide bid-ask spread of the market maker.  This 
concept of the microstructure of financial markets seems not have been captured by the 
initial proponents of the theory of market efficiency. 
Studies such as Vega (2006) claim that, whether the information is private or public 
is quite immaterial to market how efficient stock markets should be. Instead, she argues 
that what is important is whether the information is concentrated or diffused. If for 
instance, public information is more associated with noise traders rather than informed 
traders, markets are less likely to be efficient. Also, some private signals are sometimes 
triggered by public information which only a sophisticated or skillful investor can notice. 
Thus, the distribution of information is more critical to making markets more efficient, as 
opposed to the availability of information. 
Another dimension to the theory of market efficiency is vividly argued by Ball 
(1996) who claims that information is not a commodity that is necessarily of the same 
value to all investors as the theory suggests. Indeed, investors treat the same information 
differently and this could lead to reactions that are inconsistent with market efficiency. 
The values different investors place on the same information could also depend on the 
cost they incur in acquiring and processing that information. The fact that markets react 
to publicly available information, as implied by the theory, suggests that information is 
costless. However, he argues that, even if information were costless to obtain as the theory 
suggests, it is not costless to interpret. This therefore implies that markets can be efficient 
only to the extent to which it costs investors to process the information they obtain. 
Whether the benefits of holding this information will compensate for this cost of 
interpretation may, however, be an empirical question. 
One of the best direct evidences of market efficiency is provided through event 
studies as they give an indication of the adjustment of stock prices to new information 





(Brown and Warner 1980, Fama 1991). Brown and Warner (1980), for example posit that, 
when prices quickly adjust to fully reflect new available information about a firm, there 
should be no persistent non-zero abnormal returns to investors. This view is more 
consistent with short run event studies as long run event studies sometimes find a 
continuous drift in prices after the event dates, which some argue, cast doubts on the 
existence of market efficiency (Summers 1986). However, Fama (1998) describes 
continuous drifts in prices after event dates as anomalies that are a result of either chance 
or the techniques used. He further argues that, as long as most long run studies find an 
overreaction to the price which is apparently equal to underreaction, market efficiency 
still stands. Although through event studies, evidence has been provided to show that 
asset prices indeed respond to fundamental information, there have also been some 
studies that have actually found little evidence to support this view (eg. Foster et al. 1984, 
Bernard and Thomas 1990, Mitchell and Mulherin 1994, Bhattacharya et al. 2000, 
Tetlock 2007) . The key argument from this strand of literature is that movements in stock 
prices are characterised by irrational noise trading or are affected by private information. 
This could therefore suggest that the issue of whether stock prices reflect fundamental 
values in terms of incorporating publicly available information may not be fully resolved. 
Boudoukh et al. (2013), however, propose an interesting dimension to this debate. They 
suggest that the inability of stock prices to react corporate news is not necessarily 
symptomatic of market inefficiency but only implies that the news in question may not 
be relevant information about company fundamentals.  
3.2.2 Investor protection and market efficiency  
The link between investor protection and market efficiency, particularly its relation to 
financial development, is not trivial especially considering that market efficiency is 
strongest in an environment of fair, accurate and timely disclosure of information (Ball 
1996). From the theoretical framework of La Porta et al. (2002), there is usually a 
tendency for majority shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. This tendency 
could include keeping minority shareholders less informed about company activities by 
depriving them of information. It is for this reason that the provision of material 
information about companies to all investors is largely a matter of law in most countries. 
Such information (disclosure) reduces the information gap between informed investors 
and uninformed investors. It also reduces the gap between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors and, even more importantly, the gap between majority 





shareholders and minority shareholders. However, the nature of compliance with laws 
and regulations is greatly influenced by the legal origins of the country in question (La 
La Porta et al. 1998, La Porta et al. 2000). Thus, within an investor protection setting, 
whether countries adopt common law (English law based on judicial precedents), civil 
law (based on statutes on codes) or mixed legal regimes (a combination of both common 
and civil law) could have a bearing on the level of how efficient their markets are.2 
Again, the links between investor protection, corporate governance and market 
efficiency lie in the fact that differences in the levels of market efficiency could have 
implications for the severity of agency problems (Larcker and Tayan 2015). When 
markets are efficient, they act as a mechanism for disciplining corporations in that 
companies are held to the market’s standard of performance. These standards include 
good corporate practices. Companies that do not meet these standards are punished with 
a reduction in share price and over time, their poor performance could subject them to the 
market for corporate control as they become acquisition targets. It is for this reason that 
studies such as La Porta et al. (1997) find that investor protection is greater in countries 
with more valuable and efficient stock markets.  Further, when markets become efficient 
prices are expected to reflect information available to market participants. This 
phenomenon is most likely to compel management of companies to make rational 
decisions on how capital is allocated. Accordingly, La Porta et al. (2002) observe higher 
valuations of firms in countries with better protection of minority investors.  
Further, in the absence of stock markets, companies turn to other sources of 
financing (Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999). These may include large families, large 
financial institutions, and government. Although such capital providers provide their own 
discipline mechanism by way of active monitoring to safeguard their interest, they may 
not necessarily provide an effective disciplinary mechanisms compared to that offered by 
efficient markets. This is because such large shareholders could use their position to 
extract the private benefits of control by for example, minimizing or delaying the 
disclosure of information (Attig et al. 2006). 
Berkman et al. (2010) argue that in countries where judicial enforcement of laws is 
weak, the stock market can play an effective role in mitigating the agency problem. This 
                                                          
2 In Section 4.2.1 of the next chapter, some reasons are provided for why there may be differences in 
capital market development between countries of different legal systems. 





view seems to be shared by Klapper and Love (2004) who also argue that in such 
countries, firms might still want to adopt good corporate governance practices as they 
will attract and be rewarded by investors through the stock market. These good corporate 
governance practices involve the disclosure of relevant material information on how the 
firm is being run. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) argue that good corporate governance 
practices, such as disclosure, reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
owners which ultimately lower the firm’s cost of capital. On the other hand, lack of 
disclosure reduces the interest of investors in trading the firm’s securities which 
diminishes liquidity and raises the cost of capital. Using data of publicly listed Chinese 
companies, Berkman et al. (2010) find that firms with weak corporate governance 
(measured by the value of related party transactions) experience greater abnormal returns 
when new regulations that prohibit related-party transactions of majority shareholders are 
announced as compared to firms with strong positive governance.  
More recently, trust has been argued to be a major determinant of how investors 
perceive and react to corporate information and by extension, how efficient markets can 
be (Pevzner et al. 2015). They argue that although there are different dimensions to the 
national culture that help explain capital markets reaction to firm disclosures, trust has 
been identified to be most significant because it fundamentally underlies most economic 
transactions (Duarte et al. 2012). This strand of literature argues that trust has a positive 
relationship with investors’ reaction to corporate information. For countries with weaker 
investor protection mechanisms and disclosure requirements, this relationship is even 
more pronounced as trust could proxy for more formal mechanisms. Again, consistent 
with the idea that trust can play a crucial role in poorer information environments, investor 
reaction to corporate information in an atmosphere of trust may still be high even in the 
presence of higher firm-level information asymmetry. 
Efficient stock markets process information to enhance allocation of capital 
towards the best possible use (Morck et al. 2000). This information can either be at the 
market-wide level or at the firm-specific level. But more specifically at the firm level, 
Morck et al. (2000) assert that in countries where investors are poorly protected from the 
activities of corporate insiders, firm-specific information may not be very useful to risk 
traders. This could hamper the absorption of such information into stock prices and will 
ultimately lead to noise trading, where capital is allocated poorly thereby making markets 
inefficient. Further, in countries with both weaker corporate governance systems and 





investor protection mechanisms, there is a tendency for information provided by firms 
and some market players to be inaccurate, which could impact adversely on market 
efficiency. Indeed, such practices according to Huang and Cheng (2015), lead to 
distortion of prices and the hindering of price discovery. They also refer to this as 
information–based manipulation, which involves the release of inaccurate information 
and misleading rumors. Intuitively, investors perceive information coming from people 
with privileged information as credible and will always want to act on such information 
when taking their investment decisions. But some available evidence suggests that some 
information may be put out for the consumption of the investing public as only part of a 
“pump and dump” or “poop and scoop” strategy, which does not augur well for market 
efficiency (Benabou and Laroque 1992, Huang and Cheng 2015). 
Finally, there is a general notion that prices of better-governed firms are more 
informationally efficient than those of poorly governed firms. This is because, and as 
identified by Lee et al. (2016), better-governed firms have a greater likelihood of making 
timely value-relevant information available since their better governance structures will 
minimize the incentive for managers to withhold such information. This is also reflected 
in the fact that, with better disclosure and greater transparency emanating from improved 
governance structures, investors and other market participants can easily arbitrage away 
any mispricing to make prices reflect fundamental values. 
3.2.3 Information asymmetry, disclosure and market efficiency 
Information asymmetry problems are a major bedrock of firm information disclosure. 
Indeed, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the demand for firm disclosures have mostly 
emanated from information asymmetry problems and agency conflicts. When information 
problems are not corrected through disclosures, it becomes costly for potential 
shareholders to invest in companies and this can ultimately lead to an increase in a firm’s 
cost of capital. Again, information asymmetry problems lead to the inefficient allocation 
of capital resources through a process similar to Akerlof (1970) lemon’s problem which 
is also described succinctly by Healy and Palepu (2001). It therefore goes without saying 
that, disclosures contribute to lowering a firm’s cost of capital and ensuring the efficient 
allocation of resources. The main forms of disclosures made by firms are in annual reports 
and regulatory filings. However, these are mandatory.  
 





Disclosures may also be made voluntarily by companies, and this mostly takes the 
form of management forecasts, conference calls, corporate reports, announcements and 
press releases. Information intermediaries such as analysts, industry experts, and rating 
agencies have also proven to be a good source of company information. Although the 
essence of these disclosures (in whatever form they take) is to reduce information 
asymmetry problems, their effectiveness depends on how investors receive and act on 
them, for which reason market efficiency plays an important role. 
Information asymmetry has implications for market efficiency because, and as 
explained above, the idea of efficient markets is about how responsive markets can be to 
information. As such, a lack of information arising out of non-disclosure does not create 
the opportunity for markets to be efficient in the first place. Jiang et al. (2011) argue that 
of great importance to the level of information asymmetry and disclosure is the level of 
ownership concentration among firms. Generally, they find that there is a positive 
association between the levels of ownership concentration and information asymmetry, 
which they measure using the bid-ask spread as in most studies (eg. Armstrong et al. 
2011, Amiram et al. 2016). More specifically, they also argue that information asymmetry 
is positively related to ownership structures involving financial institutions and 
management, as it is perceived that they are more likely to be in possession of private 
information which they can use to expropriate other (usually minority) shareholders. This 
could deepen the adverse selection problem identified by Akerlof (1970). 
Figure 3.1 shows the interconnectedness of intermediaries within capital markets. 
The left-hand side of the figure depicts how capital flows from savers (investors) to 
businesses. This is mostly done through financial intermediaries such as banks although 
it can equally be done directly.  The right-hand side of the figure shows the flow of 
information from business to investors, who are the providers of capital. Again, although 
firms can communicate directly to investors through corporate press releases and 
financial reports, they can equally do so through information intermediaries such as 
financial analysts. But within the framework of information transmission, regulators and 
other players like auditors play an important role at ensuring that information provided 
by businesses to investors is of sufficient breadth and quality to help reduce problems of 
information asymmetry. 
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Further, a major contributory factor to the existence of agency problems is 
information asymmetry between owners and managers. Zalewska (2014) provides two 
reasons for this. First, she argues that the increasing complexity of organisational forms 
of many large firms today makes activities within these organisations quite obscure. She 
also attributes information asymmetry to the progress of information technology which 
has led to more information available, and due to this information overload, investors 
rather find it more difficult to extract relevant information. Easley et al. (2010) argue that 
asset returns, and by extension, asset prices are affected by the risk of information 
asymmetry. Uninformed investors are not able to optimally diversify their portfolios 
because they are unable to choose the correct weights of assets to hold in their portfolios. 
As a result, they are likely to hold too few or too many of particular assets in their portfolio 
subjecting the investor to excess information risk. 
The need to reduce information asymmetry forms one of the fundamental principles 
governing financial markets. That is to say, in every financial market, buyers must have 
a basic knowledge before making investments and should continue to have basic facts 
about those investments throughout the period they hold them. In as much as investors 
owe it as a duty to themselves to engage in due diligence, firms also owe it as an obligation 
to make relevant information available based on which investors can make their decisions. 
The depth and frequency of how information is disclosed plays a very significant role in 
reducing information asymmetry. Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2013) argue that information 
asymmetry is reduced in firms who release news frequently. Using two different kinds of 
investors; informed investors (investors who are able to access private information) and 
uninformed investors (investors who cannot afford costly private information and have to 
rely on public news), they find that an increase in the frequency of news releases raises 
the intensity of trading by uninformed investors (Myers and Majluf 1984). Similarly, 
Rahman and Debreceny (2010) find that investors in firms with frequent information 
disclosures possess better information sets than investors in firms who disclose 
information less frequently. In many developing markets, uninformed investors usually 
constitute a larger proportion of the investing public and therefore the frequency of how 
information is released may just be as important as the quality and content of such 
information. 
  





Tetlock (2010) asserts that public news helps to resolve the problem of information 
asymmetry. This even goes a long way to enhance the liquidity of stock markets as well. 
He presents a theoretical model that suggests that before any information is made public, 
there is always a group of investors who appear to be more informed as they possess 
superior information. On the other hand, there is another group of investors who are 
relatively uninformed and depend entirely on public information. Despite the superior 
information possessed by the informed group of investors, they face a liquidity problem. 
But when information is made public and uninformed investors become informed, the 
risk aversion of the uninformed reduces, allowing them to provide liquidity to the 
informed investors and the market in general. This model is quite similar to that of Holden 
and Subrahmanyam (2002).  
3.2.4 Corporate ownership as a structure of corporate governance  
Corporate ownership and its structure represent a key governance structure within                                                                                                                                    
companies because it is a major source of potential agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983, Morck et al. 1988). The nature of such agency 
problems usually depends on the levels of ownership concentration (Fan and Wong 2002) 
In diffuse ownership structures, most agency problems revolve around the conflicts of 
interest between managers and outside shareholders. In this vein, and as identified by Ang 
et al. (2000), agency costs increase with the number of shareholders who are not managers 
and are also inversely related to the amount of manager ownership. On the other hand, in 
concentrated ownership structures, a more important source of agency problems lies in 
the conflict of interest between majority or controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. This phenomenon leads to entrenchment, where the actions and decisions 
of controlling shareholders are unfavorable to those of minority shareholders. In an 
atmosphere of weaker legal systems and poor corporate governance mechanisms, the 
problem gets exacerbated (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1999).  
Although ownership structure has been explained to represent a source of agency 
conflicts, it could equally serve as a tool for reducing agency problems. In diffuse 
ownership structures where the conflicts of interest are mostly between owners and 
managers, the free rider problem presents an impediment to mitigating agency problems 
by any single proactive shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). But large shareholders 
able to carry out monitoring due to the incentive of their higher stakes in the company. 





This, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), is largely because the returns on the shares 
of larger controlling shareholders more than compensate for any cost they incur in 
monitoring.  More recently, Dhillon and Rossetto (2014) assert that ownership structure 
can also be used to reduce conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. In their theoretical paper, they argue that because the preferences 
of investors over their risk profile are endogenously dependent on their level of 
shareholding, higher shareholding leads to a lower preference for risk exposure and vice 
versa. This creates a potential conflict of interest between large shareholders and minority 
dispersed shareholders in a sense that any investment decisions championed by the 
majority shareholder might be seen by small shareholders (who may have little or no 
voting right) as not being in their interest. But with the emergence of block holders who 
would be equally pivotal, by virtue of being able to vote, the large shareholder will have 
a commitment to shift his choice of risk in a direction that becomes more favorable to 
smaller shareholders. 
The early work of Berle and Means (1932) paints a picture of a corporation where 
ownership is widely dispersed among many shareholders. Nonetheless, control of such 
firms will be vested in the hands of a few professional managers. In their view, dispersion 
of ownership among companies is a continuous and inevitable development that will 
occur especially as companies grow larger. A major contributory factor to this 
development is the participation in ownership by both customers and employees. 
Although this arguably creates an ideal image of a modern corporation, evidence as 
reflected in many subsequent studies, shows much more concentrated ownership (La 
Porta et al. 1999). In a survey of 27 nations across the world,  La Porta et al. (1999) 
observe that many of these countries have companies that are not widely held, with a few 
exceptions in countries where there is stronger investor protection. Indeed, in many of 
these firms, they find significant cases of a controlling shareholder(s) who have control 
rights that are greater than their cash flow rights and usually achieve this through the use 
of pyramidal and other complex ownership structures as will be discussed subsequently.  
The analysis of ownership of firms across the literature identifies a number of 
dominant players relevant to the African markets in this study. 





3.2.4.1 Government ownership 
Government ownership entails ownership of companies by the state mostly through 
Government agencies. The rationale for government’s involvement in economic activities 
in general and corporate ownership, in particular, has been the subject of some theoretical 
debate. Two of the most important views that have been discussed in the literature  are 
the development view and the political view (La Porta et al. 2002). Under the 
development view, government ownership of firms is important to propel development 
in strategic economic sectors especially where the private sector is very much incapable 
(Gerschenkron 1962). The political view, on the other hand, asserts that government 
acquires firms as a way of providing employment and benefits to supporters in return for 
votes. Evidence indeed shows that corporate ownership by the government is very 
common and pervasive especially in less developed countries, (La Porta et al. 2002). In 
their study (which was restricted to banks), they argue that government ownership is 
higher in countries with lower levels of per capita income, poorer financial systems and 
weaker protection of property rights. In support of the assertion that government 
ownership is higher in countries with weaker protection of property rights, Tian and Estrin 
(2008) claim that in such situations, concentrated ownership in the hands of a controlling 
shareholder, such as the government, is necessary to ensure that managerial agency costs 
are reduced. Borisova et al. (2012) claim that government ownership has been given more 
prominence because of the interventions most governments had to make worldwide 
following the recent financial crisis. They, however, find that government ownership of 
firms is negatively related to the quality of corporate governance, especially in civil law 
countries. 
3.2.4.2 Family/individual block holders 
Evidence of families and individual block holders controlling significant portions of 
companies in countries are quite well documented in the academic literature (Morck et 
al. 2005, La Porta et al. 1999). Such families and individuals, wealthy as they are, are able 
to grow their wealth by acquiring control over multiple companies. This extends to a 
situation where even a large amount of economic activity within these countries could be 
attributed to families and individuals Most of the time, the commonest way to amass such 
extensive control has been through the use of control pyramids as identified by La Porta 
et al. (1999). Indeed, they find that, with the exception of the US, countries around the 
world have many large corporations that are controlled by wealthy individuals and 





families rather than dispersed ownership. Specifically, La Porta et al. (1999) document 
that with a control threshold of 20%, about 30% of large firms in an average country are 
family-controlled. These findings were subsequently confirmed by Claessens et al. (2000) 
in a similar study conducted in Asia as well as Faccio and Lang (2002) who studied only 
European countries. 
3.2.4.3 Institutional investors 
Over the years, the growth in asset management firms and pension funds has led to 
increased institutional ownership as many of these institutions continue to look for 
companies with growth prospects to invest in. Research has shown that a number of 
factors determine the choices institutional investors make when selecting their portfolios 
of stock. These include stocks with higher market liquidity and lower volatility (Huang 
and Shiu 2009), stocks with better corporate disclosures (Bushee and Noe 2000), stocks 
that pay dividends or engage in share repurchases (Grinstein and Michaely 2005) and 
stocks that with stronger managerial performance (Parrino et al. 2003). Another important 
factor in institutional ownership, which has been discussed by Chung and Zhang (2011), 
is the quality of firms’ corporate governance mechanisms. This is especially so for 
countries with weak legal protection of investors as it is believed that good firm-level 
governance could serve as a substitute. Whilst some have argued that institutional 
investors usually seem not to be assertive in the governance structure because they have 
many holdings across firms and general protection of market liquidity, others also see the 















3.3 Empirical evidence 
This section provides a review of prior related empirical literature of the key issues 
covered in this study. 
3.3.1 Stock return synchronicity  
This section provides of review of stock return synchronicity by discussing the meaning 
and implications of stock return synchronicity. It also discusses the determinants of stock 
return synchronicity at both the institutional and firm levels. 
3.3.1.1 Meaning and implications of stock return synchronicity 
Stock return synchronicity measures the extent to which stock prices are influenced by 
market-wide forces and has been the subject of a significant strand of literature (eg. 
Wurgler 2000, Durnev et al. 2003, Durnev et al. 2004, Chan and Hameed 2006, Dasgupta 
et al. 2010, Chan et al. 2013, Chan and Chan 2014). It reflects the ability of stock prices 
to incorporate firm-specific information. The idea of stock return synchronicity suggests 
that stock prices are mainly driven by two factors— market factors and factors that are 
idiosyncratic to the firm (Li et al. 2004). The impact of market-wide forces entails how 
individual stock prices move in response to movements of the market index. On the other 
hand, idiosyncratic factors concern how individual stock prices move in response to 
corporate information that is specific to the firm.  Stock return synchronicity can also be 
explained as how stocks move in the same direction over a period of time (Morck et al. 
2000). However, both definitions of synchronicity imply the ability or otherwise of stock 
prices to incorporate firm-specific information. Indeed, Roll (1988) argues that the ability 
of stock prices to move together is determined by the relative amounts of firm-specific 
and market-wide information that stock prices are able to absorb.  Empirically, the 
classical measure of stock return synchronicity was introduced by (Morck et al. 2000). 
This measure involves computing the ratio of the number of stocks that move in the same 
direction over a period to the total number of stock movements within the same periods. 
This measure, however, is more concerned with giving an indication of a market level of 
synchronicity. A more popular measure, which captures synchronicity for individual 
firms, and based on Roll (1988), uses the R2 from a regression of the return of a stock on 





the returns of the market. A larger R2, which indicates higher synchronicity, implies that 
most variations in the returns of a stock are driven by variations in market returns. 
 Despite the definition of synchronicity given above, there appears to be two 
schools of thought regarding its implications for stock price informativeness. The first 
school of thought suggests that stock return synchronicity is inversely associated with 
stock price informativeness. Firms with lower R2 exhibit higher levels of stock price 
informativeness. Durnev et al. (2003) for example, find that for firms with lower R2, 
current stock prices are more informative about future earnings. This is because lower 
synchronicity implies that higher firm-specific variability is facilitated by the activities 
and trading of arbitrageurs. The other school of thought, however, argues that there is a 
positive relationship between synchronicity and stock price informativeness. Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2004) use analyst data to show that stocks with higher synchronicity are 
more informative because analysts are able to increase the amount of industry information 
impounded into stock prices though industry information transfers. Chan et al. (2013) 
provide an interesting view. They argue that stocks with higher synchronicity are 
associated with higher price informativeness because market participants are able to infer 
more information about the company when it has a higher co-movement with the market. 
This also implies that such stocks will be more liquid. 
3.3.1.2 Factors influencing stock return synchronicity 
The literature on the factors that influence stock return synchronicity have focused on 
both country level and firm-specific factors. With respect to country-specific factors, 
Morck et al. (2000) find that stock return synchronicity is greater in countries with weak 
protection of property rights, which also tend to be characterised by lower levels of 
transparency. This discourages more informed trading by arbitrageurs who usually find 
information either unattractive or less useful. This ultimately results in a slower 
incorporation of firm information into stock prices. Jin and Myers (2006) extend the 
findings of Morck et al. (2000) by arguing that stock return synchronicity is higher in 
countries with less transparency as insiders in these countries tend to have more firm 
information, whilst outsiders face more market-wide risk. In a relatively more recent 
study on China, Hasan et al. (2014) find that stock return synchronicity is lower in 
provinces with better developed legal and political institutions as this reduces uncertainty 
and increases the reliability of firm-specific information. Further, in a study of 48 





countries across the world, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) observe a decrease in stock 
return synchronicity following the first time enforcement of insider trading laws as the 
elimination of insider trading helps to ensure that stock prices reflect the true value of the 
firm. They, however, argue that this effect is only present for countries with stronger legal 
institutions. Finally, Wurgler (2000) and Durnev et al. (2004) draw a connection between 
synchronicity and the efficient allocation of capital within countries. Better allocation of 
capital leads to proper functioning markets which in turn, increases the ability of stock 
prices to incorporate firm specific information. 
In spite of what appears to be the conventional wisdom that stock return 
synchronicity is lower in countries with better developed legal, financial and political 
institutions, another strand of literature argues to the contrary. One of the key papers 
holding this view is Dasgupta et al. (2010), who argue that more developed markets have 
an enhanced information environment. Accordingly, investors are more able to predict 
future events about the firm, and when these events eventually occur, there is little 
surprise and lower reactions to such corporate information about such events. They test 
their hypothesis using seasoned equity offerings and cross listings, two corporate events 
where the information environment of firms will naturally be improved. They find that in 
the 2 years following the above two events, stock return synchronicity increases. Xing 
and Anderson (2011) introduce another interesting dimension by arguing that stock return 
synchronicity can be low in either a strong or weak market. This is because, stock prices 
incorporate both public and private information. Therefore, in a less developed market 
where private information might be high, stock return synchronicity could still be low as 
returns will incorporate firm-level private information. It is important to reiterate that 
these two papers provide an interesting twist to the literature on synchronicity. 
Accordingly, in Chapter 5, this thesis investigates whether, on the basis of Dasgupta et 
al. (2010), stock return synchronicity in a sample of less developed markets, like those in 
Africa, could be low. 
With regards to the firm-level determinants of stock return synchronicity, one of 
the main issues that has engaged the attention of the empirical literature is the nature of 
corporate ownership. Indeed, stock markets take a firm’s ownership into account when 
reacting to news (Fidrmuc et al. 2006). Reaction substantially varies according to the 
degree of outside ownership, type of outside owners and the degree of insider ownership. 
Firms with shareholders who play a strict monitoring role are more likely to reduce 





information asymmetry and have lower levels of synchronicity. On the other hand, firms 
whose shareholders do not play a significant monitoring role to reduce information 
asymmetry may experience less substantial market reactions emanating from the higher 
information content of announced events. Hence different types of ownership structure 
of firms affect the level of synchronicity of their stocks. For example, higher ownership 
concentration causes more opaqueness and leads to lower incorporation of firm level 
information which results in higher stock return synchronicity (Gul et al. 2010). 
Brockman and Yan (2009) examine block ownership in a sample of Chinese firms and 
report that, because blockholders are in a better position to access more precise firm 
information at a lower cost than non-block or diffuse shareholders, stock prices of 
companies with substantial blockholders exhibit less synchronicity. Finally, firms with 
large shareholders, who have excess control (more control rights than cash flow rights), 
are also associated with stock return synchronicity as controlling shareholders, in their 
attempt to conceal opportunistic tendencies, would reveal less information, leading to 
high stock return synchronicity (Boubaker et al. 2014). 
The literature on the firm-level determinants of stock return synchronicity has also 
looked at the impact of institutional investors and financial analysts. For instance, 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) argue that trading by institutional investors quickens the 
incorporation of the firm-specific component of corporate information such as earnings 
news. This obviously suggests that firms with higher institutional ownership exhibit lower 
stock return synchronicity. An and Zhang (2013) also assert that institutional investors 
have a greater incentive to monitor managers by virtue of their longer investment horizons 
and larger states. This results in more disclosure of firm-specific information and leads to 
lower stock return synchronicity. However, they also argue that for institutional investors 
who are transient, the relationship between stock return synchronicity and institutional 
ownership is positive. Using a sample of Taiwanese companies, Ting and Wang (2011) 
also observe a negative relationship between synchronicity and institutional ownership. 
They also find this relationship to be stronger where the level of foreign ownership is 
higher as also observed by He et al. (2013). 
On the impact of financial analysts, Chan and Hameed (2006) use data from a 
sample of emerging markets to test two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, analysts 
would have a greater incentive to generate more firm-specific information because of the 
benefits to the market of having more information in markets that are relatively less 
transparent. Thus, there should be a negative relationship between stock return 





synchronicity and analyst coverage. On the other hand, poor investor protection in 
emerging markets discourages informed arbitrage which may then discourage financial 
analysts from generating more specific information as opposed to market and industry-
wide information. This would suggest a positive relationship between analyst coverage 
and stock return synchronicity. Their findings support the latter hypothesis as they find 
that returns of firms with greater analyst coverage are more synchronous. Although in a 
different setting, their findings are also consistent with those of Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004), who argue that analyst generate more industry-wide information through intra-
industry transfer and are therefore associated with greater stock return synchronicity. 
However, Crawford et al. (2012) posit that analyst coverage is positively associated with 
stock return synchronicity only in situations where the firms in question had no prior 
analyst coverage. 
It is also important to mention that the role of firm size and age have engaged the 
attention of the empirical literature. Larger firms act as leading market indicators by 
signalling macroeconomic trends. They are also more diversified in terms of markets 
(Roll 1988), and are therefore more subject to the effect of market-wide movements than 
smaller firms. Hence their stock returns are more synchronous. Returns of older firms are 
also more synchronous because and as argued by Dasgupta et al. (2010), the market learns 
more about the time-invariant qualities of firms as they grow older, and this leads to the 
incorporation of more market-wide information into their stock prices, resulting in greater 
synchronicity. Chapter 5 of this thesis explores the role of firm size and age in more detail. 
3.3.2 Earnings informativeness 
This section provides a review of the relevant literature on earnings informativeness by 
discussing the information content of earnings announcements, the different measures of 
earnings informativeness, determinants of earnings informativeness and the concept of 
post earnings announcement drift. 
3.3.2.1 The information content of earnings announcements 
The information content of earnings and the market reaction to earnings announcements 
is perhaps one of the most studied corporate information in both the finance and 
accounting literature. In deed there is a large empirical literature that shows earnings 





announcements carry information content (eg. Beaver 1968, Kothari 2001, Neuhierl et al. 
2013, Chambers and Penman 1984, Defeo 1986, Bamber 1986, Cready and Gurun 2010). 
As such, the market reaction to earnings announcements (both quarterly and annual) is 
well established in the literature. Earnings are an important mechanism for ensuring 
accountability. But they also give an indication of the future earnings of companies. If the 
value of a company is the sum of discounted future earnings then information on the value 
of future earnings is required for markets to price firms accurately. To be more precise, 
the value of a company is the discounted value of future cash flows and earnings are 
simply the operating cash flows after accounting adjustments. Yet Dechow et al. (1998) 
indicate that historical earnings may be a more accurate predictor of future operating cash 
flows than historic cash flows. The importance of earnings announcements as a major 
form of corporate news and a source of market movements has been further demonstrated 
in a recent study by Boulland and Dessaint (2017) who find that investors react not only 
to earnings announcements but even to press releases by firms to give notice of their 
upcoming earnings announcement dates. 
 New information conveyed by earnings to the market causes investors to actively 
seek information during the pre-event window (Park and Lee 2014). This results in 
information asymmetry as investors vary in their ability to acquire and process 
information. Park and Lee (2014) also report that different types of investors, particularly 
institutional investors, trade profitably around earnings announcements. This trading 
takes place around both negative and positive earnings surprises. New information about 
future earnings will affect the demand for stocks and hence the market value of the firm. 
Berkman et al. (2009) argue that earnings announcements help to reduce variation in 
opinions among investors which ultimately increases the accuracy of valuations. In an 
extensive study of how markets react to different categories of press releases by US firms, 
Neuhierl et al. (2013) find that reporting of weak financial results are accompanied by 
negative market reactions on average whilst stronger financial reports trigger positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). These findings are not only intuitive but also 
consistent with the literature on positive earnings surprises (Kothari 2001, Vega 2006).  
One important aspect of the literature on earnings informativeness is the variation 
of earnings informativeness over time, with the evidence pointing to a rise in the 
information content of earnings announcements. Landsman and Maydew (2002) first 
documented an increase in the information content of earnings announcements between 





the early 1970s and the 2000. Whilst no reason was provided for this trend, Francis et al. 
(2002), in a follow up study, argue that the increasing informativeness of earnings is due 
to the expansion of the amount of concurrent information that is provided together with 
earnings press releases over time. Thus, more detailed disclosure from GAAP-based 
earnings had been the major contributory factor to the increasing informativeness of 
earnings over the three decades in question. But Collins et al. (2009) depart from the 
arguments of Francis et al. (2002) by asserting that the increase in the information content 
of earnings announcements is rather attributable to street earnings as opposed to GAAP-
based earnings because street earnings excludes many non-recurring and extraordinary 
items and are therefore more disseminated by analysts and clearing houses. In a very 
recent study, Beaver et al. (2018) also observe increasing patterns of earnings 
informativeness between 1971 and 2011 and find this to be more pronounced after 2001. 
They also observe increasing pattern of informativeness for more profitable firms, larger 
firms and firms with greater analyst coverage. 
The amount of information embedded in earnings announcements has however not 
been without some debate. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that on average, earnings 
announcements contain approximately only 1% to 2% of the total information available 
in the stock market, indicating that the amount of incremental information revealed by 
earnings announcements is modest at best. They suggest three reasons for this 
phenomenon. Firstly, whilst the revision in share prices occurs at a relatively higher 
frequency, accounting earnings by their nature are low frequency. Secondly, earnings 
releases, unlike other firm information, are not discretionary and are released regardless 
of whether or not there is new information to report. Finally, unlike other corporate 
information, earnings information is backward rather than forward-looking. These views 
are discussed further by Ball (2013) who argues that as opposed to providing substantial 
new information, earnings provide ‘confirmation’ of the firm’s financial reporting 
framework in order to discipline insider activities by managers i.e. earnings provide little 
new information but are primarily a mechanism for ensuring accountability.  
3.3.2.2 Measures of earnings informativeness 
Across the empirical literature on earnings informativeness, various measures have been 
used to capture how earnings announcements affect stock returns. This section of the 





chapter provides a review of the main measures of earnings informativeness, some of 
which are subsequently used in the empirical analyses. 
Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns are arguably the most popular measure of capturing the information 
content of earnings and how markets react to earnings announcements. Abnormal returns 
are mostly computed based on event studies as introduced by Fama et al. (1969). Event 
studies assess the impact of corporate events on stock returns over a window of time 
(Fama 1998). Abnormal returns are therefore the difference between the actual stock 
returns after the occurrence of the event and what the stock returns would have been, had 
the event in question not occurred (expected return). This goes without saying that 
abnormal returns depend largely on the method by which the expected return is 
determined.3 Abnormal returns to earnings announcements are based on the idea that 
earnings will have information content if they can cause a changes in the assessment of 
investors about the probability distribution of future returns, leading to a change in the 
equilibrium value of the market price of the firm’s stock (Beaver 1968). Significant price 
changes during the period of the earnings announcements will therefore suggest 
information content. Intuitively, abnormal returns provide an appealing measure of 
capturing information content and have therefore been used in many previous studies on 
earnings informativeness (eg. Hotchkiss and Strickland 2003, Collins et al. 2009, Kaniel 
et al. 2012, Neuhierl et al. 2013).  
 
Abnormal return variance 
Abnormal return variance, also sometimes called abnormal return volatility, provides 
another way of measuring earnings informativeness. This measure is similar in spirit to 
abnormal returns in that it is also based on the concept of an event study. For a given 
event window, abnormal return variance is the mean of the squared market model 
abnormal returns during the event window divided by the variance of the market model 
abnormal returns in the non-event window (see Landsman and Maydew 2002, DeFond et 
al. 2007, Collins et al. 2009, Landsman et al. 2012, Pevzner et al. 2015, Beaver et al. 
2018). Abnormal return variance mainly captures the magnitude of price movements in 
response to information contained in the earnings announcement. However, and as would 
be observed from the previous studies that have used this measure, abnormal return 
                                                          
3 Chapter 4 of this thesis provides some details on the different models for computing expected returns. 





variance is largely based on the use of the market model for estimating the expected return 
for each firm.  
 
Earnings response co-efficient 
As a measure of earnings informativeness, the Earnings Response Co-efficient (ERC) 
captures the relationship between stock returns and unexpected earnings (Collins and 
Kothari 1989). The earnings response coefficient is based on a regression equation where 
the dependent variable is risk adjusted stock return, cumulated over a period, and the 
explanatory variable is the unexpected earnings (actual earnings less forecast earnings). 
The significance of the coefficient and the power of R2 provide useful inferences about 
the informational value of earnings for stock returns. The use of the ERC dates back to 
the early work of Ball and Brown (1968). Unlike the event study approach which gauges 
the actions of investors around earnings announcement, mostly over short windows of 
time, the ERC typically focuses on relatively longer periods of time. Collins and Kothari 
(1989) further argue that the rationale for using regression to determine the ERC is to not 




The reaction to earnings announcements is not restricted to price changes around the 
earnings announcement, as price changes do not reflect the entirety of investors’ reactions 
to the earnings announcements (Barron et al. 2016). Trading volume around 
announcement dates provides an alternative approach to determining if earnings 
announcements or other financial disclosures affect trading behavior (Bamber et al. 
2011). Moreover, since investors may have individual expectations prior to earnings news 
releases, the arrival of new information elicits a revision of their individual expectations 
(Beaver 1968). Increased trading would be expected as investors rebalance portfolios 
(Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Atiase and Bamber (1994) conclude that trading volume of 
investors around earnings announcements is positively related to the level of pre-
disclosure information asymmetry whilst Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and 
Pearson (1995) argue that investors use different techniques to analyse the same 
information, which is likely to generate trading activity, especially when the information 
is material. Overall, and as mentioned by Beaver (1968), the impact of earnings 
announcements on investor behaviour is mainly either a test of price changes or trading 
volume. 





3.3.2.3 Firm level determinants of earnings informativeness 
Across the empirical literature on earnings informativeness, a number of factors have 
been proposed as explanations for the variations in earnings informativeness among 
firms. Similar to the firm level determinants of synchronicity, one of these factors is the 
nature of corporate ownership. This is unsurprising as the market reaction to earnings and 
other firm-specific information may be a reflection of the level of stock return 
synchronicity of firms. One of the early studies of the impact of ownership structure on 
earnings informativeness is Warfield et al. (1995) who find that managerial ownership is 
positively associated with earnings informativeness. This is because increased managerial 
ownership reduces the likelihood that managers would engage in non-value maximising 
behaviour thereby making accounting disclosures such as earnings more credible. They 
arrive at this conclusion by interacting earnings with managerial ownership in a 
regression equation that determines stock returns. Their findings are consistent with 
subsequent findings by Jung and Kwon (2002), who study a sample of Korean firms, and 
observe that earnings are more informative in firms where there is a majority shareholder 
who is also a manager as managerial ownership creates an alignment of interests. In 
contrast, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between earnings 
informativeness and managerial ownership in a sample of Danish companies. This finding 
is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis where it is believed that 
insiders, in an attempt maintain their hold of the firm, may engage in practices that create 
less transparency. But Yeo et al. (2002) and Sánchez‐Ballesta and García‐Meca (2007) 
introduce an interesting twist to this debate by observing a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness. Using data from Singapore 
and Spain respectively, they find that managerial ownership is positively associated with 
earnings informativeness only at lower levels of managerial ownership. At higher levels 
of managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect sets in and the relationship reverses to 
a negative one. 
With respect to other aspects of ownership structure, there has also been some focus 
on ownership concentration, institutional investors and blockholders. For example, Fan 
and Wong (2002) argue that earnings are less informative in firms with concentrated 
ownership because the credibility of earnings is reduced as minority shareholders suspect 
that controlling shareholders would manipulate earnings for their self-serving interest. 
Moreover, concentrated ownership in regions such as Asia, which they study, may also 





be for the purposes of concealing firm-specific knowledge from competitors, which 
ultimately results in greater opaqueness and less earnings informativeness. In terms of 
institutional investors, Jung and Kwon (2002), assert that earnings are more informative 
in firms with more institutional shareholders and blockholders, consistent with the view 
that these type of shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor managers effectively 
in order to bring about greater transparency of relevant accounting disclosures.  
Another strand of the empirical literature on earnings informativeness has also 
examined the impact of firm size (Atiase 1985, Bamber 1987, Freeman 1987, Ro 1988, 
Atiase et al. 1989). The general consensus from these studies is that market reactions to 
earnings announcements are more pronounced in smaller firms that in larger firms. Atiase 
(1985) provides one of the pioneering works on the impact of firm size on earnings 
informativeness by arguing that compared to smaller firms, there is a greater incentive 
for information agents to collect and generate more private and public information about 
larger firms, even ahead of the disclosure of annual earnings. Consequently, investors are 
likely to be more interested in the earnings of smaller firms since relatively little is known 
about these firms prior to earnings announcements. Indeed, Atiase et al. (1989) argue 
further that the size effect mitigates the delay effect in that, whilst delayed earnings 
announcements would be expected to trigger smaller market reactions, this relationship 
is reversed when the firms in question are small in size. Thus, although big firms disclose 
their earnings information much earlier than small firms, they still trigger smaller market 
reactions compared to smaller firms.  These conclusions on firm size are however 
contrasted in a much later study by Chan et al. (2005), who investigate a sample of 
Australian companies and find that firm size effect is either non-existent or positive for 
Australian firms. They attribute this to the size of the Australian market and the lack of 
analyst following which implies that smaller firms below a certain threshold would be 
operating in a highly poor information environment and would therefore not generate any 
market reactions to their earnings. It is however important to mention that, most recent 
studies of earnings informativeness continue to observe a negative co-efficient for firm 
size in multivariate analyses of the measures of earnings informativeness (eg. Pevzner et 
al. 2015, Landsman et al. 2012) 
Finally, Zhang et al. (2013) attribute the market reaction to earnings news to the 
impact of information risk and transaction costs among firms. They argue that 
information risk increases the relative significance of public news announcements which 





makes traders react more strongly. Thus the initial market reaction to earnings 
announcements is greater for higher information risk firms. On the other hand, transaction 
costs, which are partly induced by information risk, mitigate the initial market reaction to 
earnings leading to higher subsequent post-earnings announcement drift.  
3.3.2.4 Post-earnings announcement drift 
According to Hung et al. (2014 p.1), Post Earnings Announcement Drift or PEAD is “a 
significantly positive relation between currently announced earnings surprises and 
subsequent stock returns”. It is arguably one of the strongest anomalies that challenge the 
principle of market efficiency (Fama 1998). Thus it can be logically argued that the 
existence or otherwise of Post Earnings Announcement Drifts provides evidence of the 
extent to which markets can be efficient. A major factor that explains the phenomenon of 
Post-Earnings Announcement Drift is that it reflects a delayed response to earnings 
information (Bernard and Thomas 1989). They argue that this delay in response is largely 
due to the presence of investors who fail to understand and appreciate the full implications 
of earnings news. As a result, such investors are not able to form objective expectations 
of future earnings immediately when current earnings information becomes available.  To 
confirm this, Bartov et al. (2000) find that institutional holdings are negatively associated 
with post earnings announcements reactions. They use institutional holdings data as a 
proxy for how well a firm’s owners can understand and process information. They 
conclude that post-earnings announcement drift and the general predictability of returns 
is explained by the presence of unsophisticated investors who are not likely to fully 
appreciate earnings information. 
Again, the literature proposes that Post Earnings Announcement Drift is influenced 
by mispricing in the market (Bernard and Thomas 1989). This mispricing is evident in 
the underreaction to earnings news due to such factors as limited arbitrage  (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Studies such as Mendenhall (2004) find that Post Earnings Announcement 
Drift is higher in firms with greater limits to arbitrage. But in an interesting twist, Hung 
et al. (2014) argue that PEAD can also be higher when there are lower limits to arbitrage. 
This happens when the abundance of firm specific information sends irrelevant signals 
and causes investor inattention. They make this claim because, in their view. Post 
Earnings Announcement Drift is “an equilibrium outcome of various factors that are 





jointly determined by a country’s institutional environment, which can affect PEAD in 
opposite directions” (p.2). 
Post Earnings Announcement Drift has sometimes been attributed to market 
anomalies in financial markets that arise from behavioral biases among market 
participants (Liang 2003). Two popular models that have been put forward in this regard 
are found in Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998). Barberis et al. (1998), using 
two judgment biases- representativeness and conservativeness, argue that investors 
underreact or overreact to earnings changes because they place too much emphasis on 
recent patterns in data or are slow to change their models in the light of new information.. 
Daniel et al. (1998), on the other hand, use overconfidence and self-attribution bias to 
argue that investors have incomplete reactions to earnings announcements. This means 
that prices react and continue to change in the same direction during the post-event period 
as the event period. According to Fama (1998), although the above two models are 
premised on different behavioral factors, they make similar predictions. 
3.3.3 Institutional development 
This section discusses the concept of institutional development, particularly highlighting 
the two measures of institutional development examined in this thesis: IFRS adoption and 
corruption. It also discusses the links between institutional development and earnings 
informativeness. 
3.3.3.1 Meaning and measures of institutional development 
There is rarely a single definition that captures the essence of institutional development 
in its entirety. Israel (1987), however, explains institutional development as where the 
ability of institutions to make effective use of both human and financial resources is 
enhanced. Buyck (1991) adds to this definition by asserting that institutional development 
is not only limited to the building and strengthening of institutions but also includes 
rationalisation of costs and expenditures to fully achieve development objectives. But 
operationally, institutional development is demonstrated in the improvement of public 
financial management, internal organisational structures, inter-institutional relationships, 
the legal framework and government regulations and procedures (McGill 1996). Further 
and equally importantly, institutional development is also viewed from the perspective of 





the quality of property rights, the proper functioning of financial markets and how these 
help to allocate resources efficiently (Acemoglu et al. 2005). One of the obvious 
conclusions in the literature on institutional development is that institutional development 
is lower in less developed countries than in developed ones. Countries with higher 
institutional development tend to have more open, trustworthy and transparent institutions 
(Shaner and Maznevski 2011). Chapter 7 of this thesis focuses on how two important 
aspects of institutional development, the adoption of IFRS and corruption impact the 
informativeness of earnings. But it’s necessary to provide an explanation of how they 
constitute institutional development. 
IFRS Adoption  
The adoption of IFRS represents an aspect of institutional development because 
accounting standards in various jurisdictions are also influenced by the political, 
economic and social factors related to those jurisdictions (Lasmin 2011). One of the main 
objectives for introducing IFRS was to enhance the quality and comparability of 
accounting information across firms and countries (Hail 2010).  IFRS adoption allows for 
the application of a single set of high-quality standards (Florou and Kosi 2015). 
Therefore, a transition from local accounting standards, which could be easily influenced 
by poor political and economic factors, to a set of single high-quality standards that have 
a wider global acceptability, may be an important first step in ensuring an improvement 
in the accounting system. The improvement in the comparability of financial statements 
by countries that adopt IFRS has been confirmed in studies such as Yip and Young 
(2012). Another aspect of IFRS adoption which makes it a matter of institutional 
development is the concept of enforcement. The enforcement of these standards can only 
succeed if mandated institutions, tasked with the responsibility of ensuring compliance, 
function effectively. The quality of institutions with respect to their ability to effectively 
enforce, provides perhaps the greatest source of variation in the implications and benefits 
of IFRS across countries. It is therefore not surprising that most studies that have 
investigated the impact of IFRS on such factors as liquidity (Christensen et al. 2013); 
(Landsman et al. 2012); cost of capital (Daske et al. 2008) and earnings quality (Houqe 
et al. 2012), all posit that the positive implications of IFRS adoption for these firm 










As a concept, corruption is quite hard to define. But a largely consensus definition  of 
corruption has to do with how people in authority use their position  and power for 
personal and other selfish gain (Drobetz et al. 2010). Jain (2001) identifies three ways by 
which corruption can manifest. The first relates to corruption whereby political executives 
exploit their power by altering national policies to serve their selfish interests. The second 
is where public bureaucrats including the judiciary and other law enforcement agencies 
try to extract private benefits in their dealings with others. The third and final leg is where 
the voting and decision-making behaviour of legislators can be influenced unethically to 
achieve an outcome desired by special interest groups. Corruption represents an important 
aspect of institutional development because it is also an indication of the strength of a 
country’s political, legal and economic institutions (Svensson 2005). It therefore arises 
and thrives when there is the presence of weak institutions that are susceptible to bribes 
(Djankov et al. 2002). It is important to also mention that when it comes to corruption, 
the emphasis, and perhaps justifiably so, has always been on the public sector. However, 
corruption can also occur in the private sector through collusion between firms or misuse 
of corporate assets that hurt the interest of consumers and shareholders (Svensson 2005). 
Most of the empirical studies on corruption have focused on its impact on country-level 
outcomes such as economic growth (eg. Mauro 1995, Mo 2001, Ehrlich and Lui 1999), 
foreign portfolio investment (Knill 2013) and foreign direct investment (eg. Habib and 
Zurawicki 2002, Egger and Winner 2005, Voyer and Beamish 2004). At the firm level, 
the impact of corruption has focused on corporate liquidity (Chen 2011), cash holdings 
(eg. Smith 2016, Thakur and Kannadhasan 2019), and corporate misconduct (Liu 2016). 
 
3.3.3.2 Institutional development and earnings informativeness 
Cross-country studies of the market reactions to earnings announcements reveal 
substantial variation between countries. These differences have mostly been attributed to 
different aspects of institutional development. Griffin et al. (2011) examine market 
reactions to earnings in an international sample and find that firms in countries with better 
news transmission mechanisms, stricter insider trading laws and better accounting quality 
have more informative earnings. Bhattacharya et al. (2000) argue that since insiders trade 
on private information, prices are likely to incorporate value relevant information before 
such information is made public which ultimately leads to fewer or no market reactions 
to firm announcements. Given the lack of new information in such cases, market reactions 





would be expected to be small. Consistent with this view, DeFond et al. (2007) also find 
that in countries with stronger enforcement of insider trading laws and general investor 
protection mechanisms, earnings announcements have greater information value. 
Another influence of the information content of earnings is the quality of the 
financial reporting system. Landsman et al. (2012) find that the information content of 
earnings increased after the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Similarly, firms in IFRS adopting countries exhibit greater information 
content of earnings when compared to non-IFRS adopting countries. The effect becomes 
more pronounced when IFRS adoption is combined with strong enforcement of 
regulations.  Landsman et al. (2012) further suggest that the informativeness of earnings 
after the adoption of IFRS is driven by the reduction in the reporting lag, increased analyst 
following and increased Foreign Direct Investment. 
Pevzner et al. (2015) examine international differences in the information content 
of earnings and find trust to be an important determinant of how investors react to 
corporate earnings announcements. Although there are different dimensions of national 
culture that explain market reactions to firm disclosures, Pevzner et al. (2015) identify 
trust as the most significant because it fundamentally underpins many economic 
transactions. They argue that trust is positively associated with investors’ reactions to 
corporate earnings announcements. For countries with weaker investor protection 
mechanisms and disclosure requirements, the relationship between trust and market 
prices is more pronounced as trust could substitute for more formal mechanisms. 
3.3.4 Studies of market efficiency in Africa 
 
Most studies of market efficiency in Africa have been limited to testing of the weak form. 
In a study conducted to assess the informational efficiency of stock markets of seven 
Middle Eastern and North African countries (MENA) which included Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2008) find that  three of these markets were not  
as weak-form efficient as the remaining four countries which were non-African countries. 
Using a combination of random walk tests and technical trading rules, they find that stock 
market size and liquidity had a significant explanatory power on how efficient markets 
were, which are consistent with the findings of Smith (2008) who uses a sample of eleven 
African countries. Smith et al. (2002) use variance ratio analysis for a sample of eight 





African countries and find that with the exception of South Africa, all markets in the 
sample exhibit serial correlation in their indexes which is inconsistent with the weak-form 
of market efficiency. These results are consistent with those of Nwosu et al. (2013) 
although Nwosu et al. (2013) argue that the South African market is equally weak-form 
inefficient. Ntim et al. (2007) find no evidence of weak-form efficiency in Ghana. In a 
subsequent study Ntim et al. (2011) do not find evidence of weak form efficiency in a 
sample of eight national stock indices including Ghana. However, when compared to 
continent-wide indices, they find evidence of weak form efficiency. 
The low level of efficiency of many African stock markets has been attributed to 
factors that prevent the flow of information and some institutional underdevelopment 
(Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey 2008). For example, in many of the most developing 
countries, there is a lack of market markers mainly as a result of government interference 
in economic activities.  Again, short selling in most markets is not permitted due to low 
disclosure requirements (Appiah-Kusi and Menyah 2003). Chordia et al. (2005) further 
argue that liquidity hinders the ability of the market to accommodate orders whilst 
Magnusson and Wydick (2002) assert that dominant players could arise in markets with 
low competition who could cause movements in stock prices at the expense of less 
dominant players. Yartey and Adjasi (2007) also attribute the level of efficiency to a 
relatively higher number of poorly informed investors and poor regulatory framework. 
Another characteristic of African stock markets which impedes efficiency is the problem 
of thin trading.  
Thin trading is a potential source of serial correlation among stock returns which 
leads to the rejection of the weak-form hypothesis (Appiah-Kusi and Menyah 2003). 
Unlike most other studies, they adopt a non-linear approach to testing the weak-form 
efficiency of eleven African stock markets. Their rationale for adopting such an approach 
was that investors sometimes overact to bad news and underact to good news, which could 
cause non-linearity in stock returns. After accounting for thin trading in their model, they 
find that six of the eleven markets are inefficient. 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the main studies of weak form efficiency in 
African stock markets. The table also shows the various methodologies that were used in 
arriving at the conclusions across each of the countries involved. 





Table 3.1: Summary of studies of market efficiency in African markets 
 
PANEL A. STUDIES THAT DO NOT FIND AFRICAN STOCK MARKETS TO BE WEAK-FORM EFFICIENT 
Study Methodology Botswana Tunisia Egypt SA Kenya Nigeria Ghana Mauritius Zimbabwe Morocco 
Magnusson and 
Wydick (2010) 
Autocorrelation           




          
Segot and Lucey 
(2008) 
Unit roots test and 
variance ratio test 
          
Nwosu et al (2013) Autocorrelation, 
unit root test and 
          
Simons and Laryea 
(2006) 
Autocorrelation 
and Variance ratio 
test 





          
Ntim et al(2011) Variance ratio 
tests 
          
PANEL B. STUDIES THAT FIND AFRICAN STOCK MARKETS TO BE EFFICIENT 
Study Methodology Botswana Tunisia Egypt SA Kenya Nigeria Ghana Mauritius Zimbabwe Morocco 
Magnusson and 
Wydick 2010 
Autocorrelation           




          
Simons and Laryea 
(2006) 
Autocorrelation 
and Variance ratio 
test 





          





A number of studies, however, find that African stock markets are weak form 
efficient. For example, Magnusson and Wydick (2002) find evidence of weak form 
efficiency for six out of eight African countries in their study, although they add that for 
these six countries, it might be possible to predict volatility based on past prices. This 
implies that such countries only meet a minimum hurdle for being weak form efficient, 
i.e. only returns cannot be predicted from past price information. Jefferis and Smith 
(2005) also test the efficiency of African stock markets. Unlike other studies, they adopt 
a GARCH model with time-varying parameters, allowing them to ascertain whether the 
efficiency of stock markets evolved during their sample period (1990-2001). They find 
that the South Africa market remained efficient throughout the period whilst the Egypt, 
Morocco, and Nigeria evolved from being inefficient to being efficient over time. 
However, the remaining three markets (Kenya, Mauritius and Zimbabwe remained 
inefficient throughout the period.  
3.4 Research gaps and linkages 
 
From the review of the extant relevant literature, a number of gaps have been identified 
which this thesis aims to fill. Firstly, the counter argument provided by Dasgupta et al. 
(2010) that stock return synchronicity can be high in a strong information environment 
provides an avenue to conjecture as to whether the reverse may be observed in a weak 
information environment. African countries provide a useful setting for this analysis, not 
only because of the dearth of studies of stock return synchronicity in these markets but 
also (and as already identified in Chapter 1), they bear characteristics that make them 
underdeveloped. Therefore, the first empirical analysis of this thesis, contained in Chapter 
5, investigates the level of stock return synchronicity in the sample of African markets 
and also seeks to ascertain the factors that help to explain variations in stock return 
synchronicity among firms in each of these countries. 
 Secondly, and as shown from the literature review, most studies of market 
efficiency in Africa have been confined to weak form tests. Although the findings have 
been mixed, this appears to be due to differences in methods and time periods. But as 
African countries continue to improve the operational capacity of their stock markets 
through the adoption of automated trading systems and reducing settlement times, it is 
timely to carry out a more extensive analysis of whether markets indeed react to corporate 
information such as earnings, given their level of stock return synchronicity. As already 
mentioned earlier, the few studies of semi-strong efficiency in African markets that have 





examined the market reactions to corporate events, including earnings announcements, 
have been constrained by the lack of sufficient data. The second analysis of this theses, 
contained in Chapter 6, uses a larger set of annual earnings announcements and a variety 
of measures to investigate the informativeness of earnings announcements in the sample 
of African markets. 
  Finally, and as already identified, most studies that have examined the capital 
market benefits of IFRs adoption, including earnings informativeness, argue that these 
capital market benefits can only be realised in the presence of strong enforcement. Most 
of these studies however to not study countries with weak enforcement exclusively. 
Further, although many studies have studied the relationship between country factors and 
earnings informativeness in both developed and developing markets, the impact of 
corruption which may be of particular importance to African countries, is still developing. 
Only  Haw et al. (2012) attempt to account for corruption by including a corruption proxy 
in the construction of an index when determining the impact of investor protection on 
stock price informativeness of future earnings.  The third and final analysis of this thesis, 
contained in Chapter 7, investigates role of institutional development on earnings 
informativeness by focusing on the adoption of IFRS and the perception of corruption. 
 Although the empirical analyses conducted to address the above research gaps are 
separate, they are also interrelated. Figure 3.2 provides a framework that shows the inter-
relation between stock return synchronicity, earnings informativeness and institutional 
development. As can be observed from the figure, this thesis begins by first determining 
the level of stock return synchronicity. A low and high level of stock return synchronicity 
should have some implications for earnings informativeness. Whilst a low level of stock 
return synchronicity would ex-ante suggest that earnings would be informative, a high 
level of stock return synchronicity would ex-ante suggest the opposite. Establishing some 
level of earnings informativeness leads to an investigation as to whether the level of 
institutional development, reflected in the adoption of IFRS and the perception of 
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This chapter has provided a review of the theoretical literature underpinning the thesis. It 
has also provided a review of the relevant empirical literature highlighting on the three 
key strands of stock return synchronicity, earnings informativeness and institutional 
development. The review of both the theoretical and empirical literature presented here 
shows that the informational efficiency of stock markets is of key significance to investors 
and other market participants. However, differences in institutional settings of various 
countries, reflected in investor protection, corporate governance, and economic 
development are equally germane in accounting for variations in the informational 
efficiency of stock markets and the ability of stock prices to incorporate firm specific 
information. Based on this literature review, the research gaps have been identified. 
Further, a framework has been provided to illustrate how the three strands, although 
separate, are interrelated.  The next chapter discusses the data and also gives an overview 













4 Data and Overview of Methodology






This chapter provides a description of the data used in the study and gives an overview 
of the methods used to answer the research questions. The chapter begins with a 
description of data sources and the screening procedures used to arrive at the final sample 
for analyses. Details of how variables are constructed are also provided. The rest of the 
chapter is organised into four sections. Section 4.2 gives details of how the sample of 
African firms was obtained. Section 4.3 describes the sources of the data. Section 4.4 
explains how the variables used in each of the three empirical analyses are constructed. 
Section 4.5 provides an overview of the various methodologies used for answering the 
research questions.4 
4.2 Sample selection  
The sample selection process of firms began with the compilation of a list of all listed 
companies in each of the five countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa) from Datastream. In order to address concerns about survivorship bias, the list is 
made up of both active and dead companies. In all, a total list of 1801 companies was 
initially obtained from the five countries. 
The sample period selected is 2005-2015.  The choice of this period is motivated 
by the need to examine the impact of recent structural improvements in most African 
stock markets could have had on informational efficiency and price discovery. As stated 
in Chapter 2, most African stock markets now have electronic and automated trading 
systems. For example, Nigeria introduced automated trading systems in 1999. Ntim et al. 
(2011), however, argue that the introduction of such mechanisms could take some time 
before their impact can be felt. On that basis, a sample period beginning in 2005 is 
considered to be appropriate. Further, although the introduction of automated trading 
systems in Botswana and Kenya took place after 2005, there were other significant 
developments that took place during the sample period, such as the increase in the number 
                                                          
4 More detail is provided on specific aspects of the methodology in the respective empirical chapters. 




of trading hours. Taken all these together, the choice of 2005-2015 is suitable for the 
purpose of this study. 
In the process of collecting (downloading) data on the accounting variables, some 
firms did not return any data at all, and are therefore excluded. Where data is available 
for any given variable, the observation was maintained within the sample. This resulted 
in a total of 616 unique firms and 4,728 firm-year observations for whom data can be 
obtained for at least one variable. Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of the number of firms 
by country and industry. Industry classification is done according to the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) of the FTSE International. The ICB classifies firms into 
10 industries. The number of firms in the sample for each country reflects the size of the 
market as shown in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. South Africa has the largest number of firms 
in the sample (404). It is followed by Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana which have 121, 49 and 
27 respectively. Botswana has the smallest number of firms (15). The empirical analysis 
is generally carried out on a country by country basis although, in some cases, a combined 
sample is used. Given the disproportionately higher number of firms in the South African 
sample relative to other countries, separate models are generally presented for South 
Africa and the rest of the sample. Consequently, the number of observations for some 
models is small for some markets. Table 4.1 also shows that in each country the industry 
with the highest number of firms is the financial industry.  Also South Africa is the only 
country in the sample to have at least one company in each of the 10 ICB industry groups. 
The inclusion of financial companies in the sample is done because although 
financial companies are generally regarded as more heavily regulated than other firms, 
the framework which provides for the disclosure of corporate information to enhance the 
stock price discovery process for listed companies apply equally to both financial and 
non-financial firms. For example, in Chapter 2, the listing rules and companies Acts 
which require listed firms to disclose information that may be material to the value of its 
stock do not really discriminate between financial and non-financial firms. Thus, the extra 
regulation that financial companies may experience would not necessarily be one that 
would impact on stock return synchronicity and earnings informativeness. Also the non-
exclusion of financial firms is consistent with some studies of both stock return  
 





Table 4.1: Distribution of firms  
 
This table presents the distribution of firms by country and industry for the sample period 2005-2015 
 Botswana  Ghana  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
 N= 15  N=27  N=49  N=121  N=404 
  Number %   Number %   Number %   Number %   Number % 
Basic Materials 1 6.7  2 7.4  1 2.0  9 7.4  61 15.1 
Consumer Goods 3 20.0  6 22.2  14 28.6  22 18.2  33 8.2 
Consumer Services 1 6.7  1 3.7  6 12.2  7 5.8  45 11.1 
Financials 8 53.3  10 37.0  17 34.7  46 38.0  112 27.7 
Health Care           - -  2 7.4  - -  4 3.3  11 2.7 
Industrials 1 6.7  2 7.4  5 10.2  22 18.2  102 25.3 
Oil & Gas           - -  3 11.1  2 4.1  7 5.8  2 0.5 
Technology 1 6.7  1 3.7  1 2.0  2 1.7  31 7.7 
Telecommunications           - -  - -  1 2.0  2 1.7  6 1.5 
Utilities -   -   -   -   2 4.1    - -    1 0.3 
Source: Datastream and author’s computations 




synchronicity (eg. Chan and Hameed 2006, Feng et al. 2016) and earnings 
informativeness (eg. Griffin et al. 2011, Landsman et al. 2012, Pevzner et al. 2015). This 
can therefore help to facilitate a more meaningful comparison of the results of this study 
with those of previous studies. However, to ensure that results are not biased by the 
inclusion of financial firms, they are also later excluded in the cross sectional regressions 
in Chapter 5 (see Appendix 5.3 of chapter 5). The results provided in the appendix show 
that the inclusion of financial companies in this study is not problematic as both results 
are very much the same.  
4.3 Data sources  
This section provides a description of the sources from which data were obtained.   
4.3.1 Firm-level data (stock returns and accounting data) 
All firm-level data are obtained from Datastream. These include stock returns and firm 
financial data (accounting variables).5 Daily stock returns (excluding weekends) are used. 
Both general and country-specific holidays are also excluded by referring to the holidays’ 
Acts of the countries in the sample and verifying that the stock markets do not operate on 
such days. In some countries, when a holiday falls on a weekend, the next working day is 
made a holiday. Where this is the case, such working days are equally excluded. Panel B 
of Appendix 4.2 presents analyses of a panel unit root tests of firm stock returns for each 
country, which shows that stock returns are largely stationery. 
4.3.2 Earnings announcement dates 
Annual earnings announcement dates between 2005 and 2015 are obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream.6 A total of 4,088 earnings announcements across the five 
countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) was initially obtained. 
However, 17 of these firms which together generated 81 announcements over the period 
                                                          
5 Accounting variables for all firms in each country are collected in US $ for more meaningful 
comparison. 
6 This is a data type called Earnings Report Date – Fiscal Period End. It is the source date for the earnings 
reported by the company for the corresponding period. Due to availability constraints we are unable to 
obtain announcements dates from Bloomberg and I/B/E/S as done in some previous studies. However, a 
number of earnings announcements which were obtained from the websites of some of the countries’ stock 
markets matched the dates obtained from Datastream, and we are therefore certain of their accuracy.    




did not have return data at all. As such these announcements and their corresponding 
firms were dropped. A further 16 announcements were dropped due to contamination 
(confounding events). These confounding events were detected when trying to cross 
check the Datastream earnings announcements dates from corporate releases published 
on the stock exchange websites of countries in the sample. Most studies that employ an 
event study methodology try to preserve the integrity of their sample by excluding 
wherever, possible, other events that occur around the same time as the event of interest 
(Fox and Opong 1999, Jones et al. 2004) . This resulted in a sample of 3,991 annual 
earnings announcements.  
One major feature of most developing stock markets, particularly those in Africa,  
is the problem of thin trading and illiquidity (Mlambo and Biekpe 2005). However, in 
order to capture the impact of information on stock prices, it is desirable that stocks are 
actively traded as the problems of thin trading and illiquidity could have negative 
implications for any model of abnormal computing returns (Strong 1992). For an 
announcement to be selected for analysis in this study, a procedure used by Griffin et al. 
(2011) was adopted. This required the corresponding stock to have price changes in at 
least 50% of the trading days in the prior year. This measure of liquidity was introduced 
by Bekaert et al. (2007) and is less subject to estimation problems than other measures of 
liquidity due to its straightforward nature. After applying this filter, trading by firms in 
two of the sample countries (Botswana and Ghana) was insufficient to pass the threshold 
for inclusion in the final sample. Hence the remaining sample comprised data from the 
three remaining African countries. The surviving sample comprised 1,762 earnings 
announcements from companies in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Although this 
approach results in a reduction in sample size in terms of both announcements and 
countries, the final sample provides a more appropriate basis to examine how stock prices 
react to corporate information in these markets. 
Bartholdy et al. (2007) study how event studies can be conducted in small markets 
and recommend that results should be presented separately for highly traded stocks and 
less traded stocks. Consistent with this approach, the selected announcements are split 
into categories by using thresholds of the percentage of non-zero returns. These categories 
are highly traded stocks (HTF) which includes announcements where the corresponding 
stocks had a price change on at least 75% of trading days in the previous year and medium 
traded stocks (MTV) representing announcements where the corresponding stocks had a 
price change on between 50% and 75% of the trading days in the previous year.  




It is important to note that because most firms have more than one earnings 
announcement in the sample, the classification is conducted in relation to the 
announcements and not firms. This implies that, in respect of any particular 
announcement, a firm could be regarded as either HTF or MTF depending on its threshold 
of non-zero returns in the year prior to when the announcement in question was made. 
Table 4.2 presents the number of announcements by country and year whilst  Table 4.3 
presents the number of announcements according to trading frequency categories. 
Table 4.2 Number of earnings announcements 
This table presents the number of earnings announcements by country and by year.  
Year  Country 
  Kenya Nigeria South Africa Total 
2005 3 1 77 81 
2006 8 5 120 133 
2007 16 15 130 161 
2008 24 14 149 187 
2009 29 9 158 196 
2010 29 12 130 171 
2011 32 45 128 205 
2012 33 28 123 184 
2013 22 29 119 170 
2014 28 32 140 200 
2015 17 28 29 74 
Total 241 218 1303 1762 
Source: Datastream and author’s computations 
 
 Table 4.3 Earnings Announcements by country and by price changes 
This table presents the number of earnings announcements categorized according to price changes in the previous 
years (percentage of non-zero returns in the previous year). ≥75% represents announcements where the concerned 
firms had a price change in at least 75% of trading days in the previous year. 50%-74% represents announcements 
where the concerned firms had a price change of between 50% and 74% of trading days in the previous year 
Country Category    
  HTF MTF TOTAL 
Kenya 19 222 241 (14%) 
Nigeria 36 182 218 (12%) 
South Africa 133 1170 1303 (74%) 
TOTAL 188 (11%) 1574 (89%) 1762 




4.3.3 Ownership data 
Ownership data, on a yearly basis over the sample period, is collected from the Osiris 
database. This database provides ownership and financial information for over 55,000 




firms across the world. For each company, a list of all shareholders and the percentage of 
shares directly held is provided. Further, for each shareholder, an indication of the type 
of shareholder (i.e banks, mutual funds, government agency) is given. This makes it 
possible to classify shareholders into different categories such as institutional 
shareholders or government shareholders. With this raw data, ownership variables are 
then generated in Stata. These are then matched with data obtained from Datastream. 
4.3.4 Country-level data 
At the country level, data on return indices are also collected from Datastream. For each 
country, the S&P Broad Market Index (BMI) is used. These indexes are computed based 
on domestic publicly listed companies to reflect at least 80% of the domestic market 
subject to size and liquidity criteria. Return indexes account for dividends and as such 
reflect a better measure of performance. Panel A of Appendix 4.2 and Appendix 4.3 
present unit root test results of stock indices and time series plots of stock indices 
respectively. Data on the quality of auditing and reporting standards are obtained from 
the Global Competitiveness Index report, which is constructed based on a survey 
conducted by the World Economic Forum in conjunction with partner institutions in the 
various countries. Annual scores on perceptions of corruption are obtained from 
Transparency International which is an international body that conducts surveys on 
corruption across countries.  Details of corruption data and data on auditing and reporting 
standards are discussed further under section 4.4.3 of this chapter. 
4.4 Variable construction 
This section of the chapter explains how both dependent, explanatory and control 
variables are constructed. The section is further divided into three parts. Section 4.4.1 
provides details of the variables used in the first empirical analysis of the thesis which 
focuses on ascertaining the level and determinants of stock return synchronicity in the 
sample markets. Section 4.4.2 defines the variables used in the second empirical analysis 
which investigates the informativeness of earnings and whether earnings informativeness 
is influenced by trading frequency or the fundamentals of the firm. Section 4.4.3 provides 
details of the variables used in the third and final analysis, which examines the impact of 
institutional development on earnings informativeness. 




4.4.1 Stock return synchronicity in African markets 
 
The objective of this analysis is to examine the level of stock return synchronicity and to 
ascertain the main determinants of stock return synchronicity among firms in African 
markets. 
4.4.1.1 Dependent variable 
Synchronicity  
The main measure of firm level synchronicity in previous studies is the 𝑅2 of a regression 
of stock returns on a market index which determines the variation of stock returns 
explained by variations in market returns (eg. Morck et al. 2000, Gul et al. 2010, Chan 
and Hameed 2006). This implies that 1 − 𝑅2 represents the variations of stock returns 
explained by information relevant to the firm itself. Typically 𝑅2  is obtained from the 
regression equation below: 
              𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                        4.1 
                                              
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the stock return for firm i in period t and 𝑅𝑀𝑡 is the market return in period 
t. Studies such as Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) include industry indices in the 
estimation of the above equation to determine synchronicity. But as argued by Chan and 
Hameed (2006), including an industry index is problematic in the case of developing and 
emerging markets because these markets are usually dominated by few industries and 
thus disentangling the industry effect from the market effect becomes difficult. They 
further argue that industry returns are more likely to reflect firm-specific information 
rather than industry information when the industry is made up of a few firms. Moreover, 
in this study, data on industry indices for countries in the sample is hardly available.  
The computation and interpretation of 𝑅2 implies that it is bounded within an 
interval of [0, 1]. Typical of most studies, this measure of synchronicity is logistically 
transformed to in order to circumvent the challenge of using it as a dependent variable. 
Synchronicity is thus computed as: 
   𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
)            4.2 
For robustness purposes in Chapter 5, synchronicity is also computed by including 
the lagged market index and a  world market index. 




4.4.1.2 Independent variables 
 
Firm Size 
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, consistent 
with Chan and Hameed (2006), Boubaker et al. (2014) and Pevzner et al. (2015). Some 
studies, however, use the natural logarithm of total assets (Gul et al. 2010, Hasan et al. 
2014). A recent study by Dang et al. (2018) compares the three most widely used 
measures of firm size in the finance literature namely: total assets, total sales and market 
value. They posit that different measures of size capture different characteristics about 
the firm and will therefore have different implications, whether as a key variable or a 
control variable. For instance, they argue that total assets is more suitable for measuring 
size when one intends to capture the resources available to the firm. Total sales is more 
appropriate when one aims to measure size in relation to the product market competition 
of the firm. Market value however is more advantageous when measuring size in relation 
to the equity market conditions of the firm.  Based on this premise, the choice of market 
value as a proxy for firm size is appropriate for this study. Following Pevzner et al. (2015), 
market value at the beginning of the year is used. Shares of larger firms are more 
frequently traded compared to smaller firms (Roll 1981). Based on this, one may expect 
stock prices of larger firms to incorporate more specific information and be less 
synchronous. However, studies such as Roll (1988) observe a positive relationship 
between firm size and stock price synchronicity implying that the prices of larger firms 
do not incorporate firm-specific information. 
 
Age 
Age is computed as the difference between every current firm-year and the Base date of 
the firm in Datastream (Guest 2009, Galema et al. 2008, Kohl and Schaefers 2012). The 
base date is the date on which a firm is first listed in Datastream. For most firms, this is 
the date when the firm became public. This measure is quite similar to other standard 
proxies of firm age used in the literature including; the number of years since a firm’s 
incorporation (Oswald and Zarowin 2007), and number of years since a firm’s initial 
public offering (Dasgupta et al. 2010). It is therefore highly unlikely that a younger 









Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Fama and French 2002, 
Leary and Roberts 2005). Total debt is computed as the sum of short term debt and long 
term debt. From an agency theory and governance perspective, Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
argue that total debt is a more suitable measure of debt as it is not affected by non-
financing components. Given that this sample includes a mixture of financial and non-
non-financial companies, this measure is suitable. Most studies involving only financial 
companies usually use the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Nguyen et al. 2015, 
Hagendorff et al. 2018). However, given that total debt is a subset of total liabilities, it 
makes for a more meaningful comparison of both financial and non-financial firms. But 
as earlier indicated, the inclusion of financial firms does not bias the results of the 
empirical analyses since the same results are obtained when financial firms are excluded. 
With regards to its potential impact on synchronicity, leverage transfers more value of the 
firm from equity holders to debt holders. On that basis, firms with higher leverage can be 
expected to be less responsive to corporate information in general and earnings in 
particular. However, Hutton et al. (2009) argue that the risks transferred from equity 
holders to debt holders are of an idiosyncratic nature which makes firms with higher 
leverage less synchronous. Further, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) argue that stock 
returns of firms with greater leverage are more volatile due to higher financial distress.  
 
Profitability  
Profitability is measured as operating profit scaled by total assets (Liu 2016, Liu et al. 
2017). This measure of profitability signals the ability of a firm to generate income from 
normal and routine business activities. There is a strand of literature which argues that 
firm stock returns are influenced by profitability (Balvers et al. 2017, Hirshleifer et al. 
2017). Based on this understanding, we can expect profitability to also have an impact on 
synchronicity. Indeed, Dasgupta et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between 
profitability and synchronicity.  
 
Non-Zero Return Days 
Non-Zero Return Days is measured as the number of days a firm has a non-zero return 
divided by the total number of trading days in the year. This is used as an indication of 
liquidity (Lesmond et al. 1999). Although there are other measures of liquidity such as 
turnover (Rouwenhorst 1999) and the ratio of daily absolute return to dollar trading value 
(Amihud 2002), Hearn and Piesse (2013) find that non-zero return days is a better 




approach of capturing liquidity in a sample of African countries which include all the 
countries used in this study. Furthermore, Lesmond (2005) argues that this measure gives 
a comprehensive estimate of liquidity as it implicitly includes spreads, commission costs, 
a portion of expected price impact cost and a possible opportunity cost of informed 
trading.  
 
Firms in Industry 
This is computed as the log of the number of firms in the same industry in which a firm 
operates. Firms in Industry is used in Chapter 5 to control for the differences in 
synchronicity that may have arisen from differences in the industry size in which firms 
operates (Durnev et al. 2003). 
 
Trading Volume 
Trading volume is computed as the natural log of the volume of shares traded of a firm 
in a given year (Devos et al. 2015, Feng et al. 2016).  Trading volume affects the speed 
of stock price adjustments and it’s therefore likely to affect stock returns (Chan and 
Hameed 2006). They further argue that returns of frequently traded stocks are more 
synchronous with market movements as they react to market information on a timely 
basis. On the other hand, returns of infrequently traded stocks result in lower stock return 
synchronicity.  
 
Ownership structure variables  
Four ownership structure variables are used to test how stock return synchronicity may 
be affected by the nature of corporate ownership: These are Top 5 Shareholders, 
Government ownership, Institutional Ownership and Families and Individuals. Top 5 
shareholders is the percentage of shares directly held by the largest 5 shareholders of each 
company in a year and is used as a measure of ownership concentration (Prowse 1992, 
Hovey et al. 2003). Government ownership is computed as the percentage of shares 
directly held by Government or Government related institutions (Gul et al. 2010). This 
captures how state involvement in financial markets affects the informativeness of stock 
prices. Institutional Ownership is the percentage of shares directly held by Institutional 
Investors (An and Zhang 2013). Finally Individuals and Families is measured by the 
percentage of shares directly held by families and individuals. 
 




4.4.2 Earnings informativeness: Fundamentals or trading frequency? 
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the information content of earnings 
announcements and to determine whether earnings informativeness are influenced by 
fundamentals or trading frequency. 
4.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)   
Abnormal returns are computed using a standard event study methodology which 
compare actual returns of a stock to expected returns relative to the event in question 
(Fama et al. 1969). This implies that the model of computing abnormal returns is crucial 
to an event study estimation. By far the most popular model has been the market model 
which is given as  
   𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)   4.3 
Where 𝛼 and 𝛽 that are parameters usually obtained from an OLS regression of a firm’s 
stock on its market index. One problem however with the market model is that there is a 
tendency for model parameters to be misstated and this problem becomes even more 
pronounced with the presence of thin trading (Armitage 1995). In this study, alphas and 
betas are found to be unrealistic when using market model estimation (see Appendix 4.6) 
Hence, in order to avoid this issue, the simpler index model (market-adjusted return 
model) is adopted where: 
   𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀𝑡      4.4 
The abnormal returns are obtained by subtracting the market index return from the stock 
return. This model assumes ex-ante that expected returns for all securities are the same 
and thus helps to circumvent the misspecification of the market model parameters. 
Studies such as Strong (1992) and Brown and Warner (1985) argue that the index model, 
although a relatively simpler model, performs equally well as other models deemed to be 
more sophisticated. As part of preliminary analysis for the event study, Appendix 4.4 
presents raw, index and abnormal returns across the main event window by year. 
Appendix 4.5 shows the average stock returns of firms over the main event window. 
 
 




Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV) 
As indicated in Chapter 3, trading volume provides a good reflection of the actions of 
investors around the announcement of a corporate event. Thus, revisions of investors’ 
expectations resulting from the arrival of new corporate information would be expected 
to lead to more or less trading volume. The informativeness of earning is therefore also 
measured by abnormal trading volume (ATV), where ATV is computed as  
 
         𝐴𝑇𝑉 = (
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(−10,+10)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(−70,−11)
)                     4.5 
Consistent with previous studies, trading volume in equation 4.5 is scaled by number of 
shares outstanding (DeFond et al. 2007, Landsman et al. 2012, Pevzner et al. 2015). 
4.4.2.2 Independent variables 
   
Earnings  
Earnings is measured as the income available to common shareholders reported on 
DataStream. The reaction of a firm’s stock price to earnings announcements could be 
influenced by the size of the earnings reported relative to the firm. Earnings is therefore 
computed. The early work of Beaver (1968) shows earnings as an important component 
of the valuation of a firm’s common stock. This is especially true as the value of common 
stock is determined by future cash flows which primarily come from earnings. But as he 
observes, central to this relationship between earnings and stock returns is the fact that 
earnings should have information content.  Thus in any framework for determining the 
informativeness of earnings, the relative magnitude of earnings could influence the 
market reactions associated with the release of earnings information. To account for the 
resources available to a firm in generating its income, the earnings variable is scaled by 
total assets.  
 
Earnings Growth 
Most studies of earnings informativeness measure change in earnings or earnings growth 
by comparing actual earnings to forecasted earnings by analysts. Using analyst forecasts 
is a widely accepted and appealing measure of capturing expected earnings as analysts 
incorporate a wider variety of useful and more meaningful information into their forecast 
and are also able to do so in a more timely fashion (Collins and Hopwood 1980, Imhoff 
and Pare 1982, Brown et al. 1987, O'brien 1988). However, due to the unavailability of 
obtaining analyst forecast data on African companies, earnings in the previous year are 




used as an indication of what should be expected at the very least, and compared to current 
earnings in order to determine growth in earnings. Another alternative for determining 
expected earnings is is to employ statistical techniques of forecasting earnings such as the 
first-order autoregressive model of Foster (1977). However, unlike analyst forecasts, 
many factors may be neglected in this process and such forecasted earnings may therefore 
depart from the economic reality. Since the aim  in this context is to determine how actual 
earnings reported will differ from what would otherwise be expected by investors, 
earnings growth is computed as: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡−1        4.6 
 
Positive to Negative earnings /Negative to Positive 
Positive to Negative is an indicator variable that equals 1 if earnings change from a 
positive earnings figure to a negative earnings figure and 0 otherwise. Negative to Positive 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings is from negative to positive 
and 0 otherwise. These two dummy variables are constructed to help capture asymmetric 
reactions to changes in earnings. Bartov et al. (2002) and Kasznik and McNichols (2002) 
argue that there are differences in reactions between negative and positive surprises to 
earnings news.  The change in earnings dummies may also indicate a behavioural 
response to the earnings news or a form of new information content.  
 
Firm Size 
Similar to the previous analysis, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity, consistent with Chan and Hameed (2006), Boubaker et al. (2014) 
and Pevzner et al. (2015). This measure of firm size is considered appropriate for this 
analysis because it also characterises the firm in relation to its equity market condition 
Dang et al. (2018), which in this case, relates to earnings informativeness. Again and 
consistent with Pevzner et al. (2015), market value at the beginning of the year is used. 
The impact of firm size on earnings informativeness may either be negative or positive 
As already noted in previously, shares of larger firms are more frequently traded 
compared to smaller firms (Roll 1981). Based on this, one may expect stock prices of 
larger firms to incorporate more specific information and be associated with greater 
earnings informativeness. On the other hand, stock returns of larger firms may be more 
synchronous, implying that they incorporate less firm specific information, which 
suggests that firm size would be negatively associated with earnings informativeness. 





As already mentioned under section 4.4.1, Age is computed as the difference between 
every current firm-year and the Base date of the firm in Datastream (Guest 2009, Galema 
et al. 2008, Kohl and Schaefers 2012). The base date is the date on which a firm is first 
listed in Datastream. For most firms, this is the date when the firm became public. This 
measure is quite similar to other standard proxies of firm age used in the literature 
including; the number of years since a firm’s incorporation (Oswald and Zarowin 2007), 
and number of years since a firm’s initial public offering (Dasgupta et al. 2010). It is 
therefore highly unlikely that a younger publicly listed firm will have an earlier base date 
in Datastream than an older one.  
 
Leverage 
Similar to the analysis contained in the first empirical chapter, Leverage is measured as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets (Fama and French 2002, Leary and Roberts 2005). 
Total debt is computed as the sum of short term debt and long term debt. From an agency 
theory and governance perspective, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that total debt is a 
more suitable measure of debt as it is not affected by non-financing components. The 
theoretical relation between leverage and earnings informativeness are somewhat similar 
to the relationship between leverage and stock return synchronicity. As leverage moves 
more value of the firm to debtholders, stock returns may become relatively less responsive 
to corporate information and as such leverage would have a negative impact on earnings 
informativeness. On the other hand however, firms with higher leverage can be less 
synchronous since the risk transferred from equity holders to debt holders are of an 
idiosyncratic nature (Hutton et al. 2009).  
 
Trading Frequency 
Trading frequency is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
HTF category (earnings announcements for which the corresponding firm had a 
percentage of non-zero return days of >= 75% in the previous year of trading) and 0 if in 
the MTF (earnings announcements for which the corresponding firm had a percentage of 
non-zero return days of greater than 50% but less than 75% in the previous year of 
trading). As earlier stated in section 4.3.2 of the chapter, the sample of earnings 
announcements is divided into two based on the percentage of non-zero return days in the 
previous year of trading. The various measures of earnings informativeness are then 
presented for each of this subsamples consistent with Bartholdy et al. (2007). However, 




in order to test the impact of trading frequency in the cross-sectional analyses, this 
indicator variable is included to capture the two sub-samples. 
  
Synchronicity 
Synchronicity is measured as the R2 from a market model regression of the returns on 
each stock on the returns of its corresponding market index. Synchronicity is included in 
this analysis to control for the impact low or high synchronicity may have on earnings 
informativeness. Based on the extant literature, this relationship may be ambiguous 
especially for less developed markets like those in Africa. On the one hand, synchronicity 
may have a negative relationship with earnings informativeness since higher 
synchronicity could imply that stock returns incorporate less firm-specific information 
such as earnings (Morck et al. 2000, Wurgler 2000, Durnev et al. 2004). On the other 
hand, synchronicity may have no impact on earnings informativeness because it may be 
found to be averagely low in developing markets which are characterised by weaker 
information environments (Dasgupta et al. 2010). Since synchronicity is being used as an 
independent variable in this analysis, the non-transformed version is used.  
 
Reporting Lag 
Reporting Lag is the number of days between the fiscal year end of the firm and the 
earnings announcement date (Velury and Jenkins 2006, DeFond et al. 2007, Landsman et 
al. 2012, Pevzner et al. 2015). It is considered as an important indication of the timeliness 
of the earnings report (Chambers and Penman 1984). Givoly and Palmon (1982) argue 
that increased delay in announcing financial results causes greater uncertainty and could 
also lead to sub-optimal decision making by investors. Therefore, the reporting lag 
usually has an impact on the information content embedded in firm in earnings 
announcements with most of the studies cited above finding this impact to be negative.  
 
4.4.3 Earnings informativeness: The role of institutional development 
 
The objective of this chapter is to test for the impact of two measures of institutional 
development— the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the perception of corruption on 
earnings informativeness. 
 




4.4.3.1 Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables used for this empirical analysis are Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) and Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV). These are defined and constructed 
in conformity with Section 4.4.2 of this chapter. 
4.4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
IFRS 
IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 in the post IFRS adoption year 
and 0 otherwise (Landsman et al. 2012, Chua et al. 2012). As the purpose of the analysis 
in this chapter is to investigate whether earnings have become more informative following 
the mandatory adoption, the post IFRS adoption year is the year immediately following 
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption? Given that the sample period for this study begins 
in 2005, the analysis contained in this chapter is limited to only countries that mandated 
the adoption of IFRS after 2005. 
Corruption 
Corruption is the transparency international corruption index in year t for each country. 
The transparency international corruption index is a composite index constructed from 
corruption related surveys that are conducted by a number of independent institutions 
including; The African Development Bank; The World Bank Group and the world 
economic forum (Transparency International 2010). These surveys are based on the views 
of experts and members of the business community. Before 2012, the corruption scores 
ranged from 0 to 10. The new scale from 2012 ranges from 0 to100. As the sample period 
for this study covers the 2005-2015 period, the 2012-2015 scores have been rescaled to 
make them consistent with the scale used in the pre-2012 period. In both periods, a higher 
score implies less corruption. To make interpretation of the results much easier, the 
inverse value of each score is used where 1 is divided by the score. Thus, a higher score 
would imply a higher level of corruption. Although the Transparency Corruption Index 
is quite a subjective view of experts, they capture many important conceptual, and socio-
economic constructs and are correlated with other national polls conducted by citizens of 
the respective countries (Lee and Ng 2009). It is thus a widely accepted measure of 
corruption and has been used in many previous studies (eg. Mauro 1995, Ades and Di 
Tella 1999, Fisman and Miguel 2007, DeBacker et al. 2015).  
 




Auditing and Reporting Standards 
This is measured as a country’s yearly score in the Global Competitiveness Index 
compiled under the sub-heading “Strength of Auditing and Reporting Standards” 
(Krishansing Boolaky 2011, Boolaky and Cooper 2015). The Global Competitiveness 
Index is compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and is based on the Executive 
Opinion Survey which seeks the views of business leaders on a wide range of subjects on 
which data is always hard to find (World Economic Forum 2010). Under this sub-section 
of the survey, business leaders are asked to rate how strong financial, reporting and 
auditing standards are in their respective countries. The scores range from 1 to 7 with a 
higher score indicating stronger reporting and auditing standards. Griffin et al. (2011), 
who also use the same data, argue that income statements are considered to be more 
trustworthy when the quality of financial reporting is greater, which leads to stronger 
valuation signals.  
 
Other independent variables 
The other independent variables used for this empirical chapter are Earnings, Earnings 
Growth, and Negative to Positive, Positive to Negative, Firm Size, Age, Leverage, 
Trading Frequency, Synchronicity and Reporting Lag. These variables are as defined and 
constructed under section 4.4.2.2. 
 
Table 4.4 presents definitions of all the variable used in this thesis. The distribution of 
each variable are also presented in the chapter appendix (see Appendix 4.1).  Overall, the 
distribution   of the variables   do not pose any difficulty for the empirical analyses.

















Synchronicity Measured as the R2 from a market model regression of daily stock returns for stocks in 
each year against the market returns for the corresponding year. 
 
Stock returns and Index returns 
from Data Stream 
Morck et al (2000), Chan and 
Hameed (2006) 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return computed from the Market Adjusted Model. It is the sum of 
abnormal returns realized by a firm during the event window. 
Event dates from Datastream Brown and Warner (1985) Jones 
et al (2004) 
ATV Abnormal Trading Volume. This is computed as the average trading volume of a stock 
during the event window divided by average trading volume during a period prior to the 
event window. Trading volume is scaled my shares outstanding 
 
Trading volume and number of 
shares outstanding from 
Datastream 
Defond et al. (2007) Landsman 
et al. (2012) Pevzner et al. 2015 
Earnings Earnings of the company scaled by total assets. 
  
Earnings reported from 
Datastream 
Beaver (1968), Neurhierl et al. 
(2012) 
Earnings Growth Change in Earnings which is computed as the earnings in current year minus earnings in a 
previous year. 
 
Earnings reported from 
Datastream 
Landsman et al. (2012) 
Positive to Negative An indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in Earnings was from a positive earnings 
figure to a negative earnings figure, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Earnings reported from 
Datastream 
Bartov et al (2002), Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002) 
Negative to Positive An indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in Earnings was from a negative earnings 
figure to a positive earnings figure, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Earnings reported from 
Datastream 
Bartov et al. (2002), Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002) 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. 
  
Datastream Chan and Hameed (2006), 
Boubaker et al. (2014), Pevzner 
et al. (2015) 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
 
Datastream Fama and French (2002), Leary 
and Roberts (2005) 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Trading Frequency An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm experienced price changes in its 
stock at least 75% of trading days in the previous year and 0 if it experienced price 
changes in its stock at of 50% but less than 75% of trading days in the previous year.  
 
Stock returns from datastream  
Batholdy et al. (2007) 
Age The log of the number of years since the base date of the firm in DataStream 
 
Datastream Guest (2009), Galema et al 
(2008), Khol and Schaefers 
(2012) 
Profitability Operating profit scaled by Total Assets Datastream Liu et al. (2016) 
Trading Volume Volume of shares traded in each year scaled by shares outsanding at the end of the year. Datastream Devos (2015), Feng (2016) 
Reporting Lag The number of days between the fiscal year end of the firm and the earnings 
announcement date. 
 
Datastream Velry and Jenkins (2006), 
Landsman (2012), Pevzner et 
al. (2015) 
Ownership structure variables 
Top 5 Shareholders Percentage of shares directly held by the top 5 shareholders in each company. A measure 
of ownership concentration 
Osiris Prowse (1992), Hovey et al. 
(2003) 
Government Ownership Percentage of shares directly held by government or government agencies Osiris Gul et al. (2011) 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares directly held by institutional investors Osiris An and Zhang (2013 
Families and Individuals Percentage of shares directly held by families and individuals Osiris Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
Country-level Variables   
Corruption The inverse value of a country’s yearly transparency international index score  Transparency International Mauro (1995), Ades and Di 
Tella (1999), Fisman and 
Miguel (2007), DeBacker et al. 
(2015) 
Auditing and Reporting Standards A country’s score in the Global competitiveness report sub=section “Strength of Auditing 
and reporting standards” 
Global Competitiveness Report Krishansing and Boolaky 
(2011), Boolaky and Cooper 
(2015), Griffin et al. (2011) 





4.5 Overview of methodology 
This section gives a general overview of the main methods used in the analyses contained 
in the thesis. Details of the various econometric models and specifications are, however, 
presented in the relevant empirical chapters. As already mentioned in section 4.4.1 of the 
chapter, an event study methodology is used for the purpose of computing abnormal 
returns for analyses on earnings informativeness.  The Market Adjusted Model is used to 
compute abnormal returns by subtracting the return on the market index (expected return) 
from the return on the stock (actual return) on any given day within the event window.  
In cross sectional and regression analyses across all three empirical chapters, the 
main estimation method used is the Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The use of 
the OLS regression technique is consistent with both the literature on synchronicity (eg. 
Gul et al. 2010, Hasan et al. 2014, Devos et al. 2015, Feng et al. 2016) and the literature 
on earnings informativeness (eg. DeFond et al. 2007, Landsman et al. 2012, Pevzner et 
al. 2015). In Chapter 5, the dependent variable is stock return synchronicity (Synch) 
whilst in chapters 6 and 7 the dependent variables are Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) and Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV). The OLS estimator tests the linear 
relationship between a dependent variable and independent variables by estimating the 
parameters in a manner that minimizes the sum of the squared errors (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2010). Specification of the various models used in the empirical analysis are 
presented in the respective chapters. Bivariate correlations in each empirical chapters 
show that there is no high correlation among independent variables. This was further 
confirmed by variance inflation factor of less than 10 for each independent variable as 
part of regression diagnostics during the analyses. Also, all regressions are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors consistent with the previous studies 
identified above. To control for any unobserved heterogeneity at the industry-level, 
industry dummies are included in all regressions in line with most of the previous studies 
already identified above. Hou and Robinson (2006) argue that firms in more concentrated 
industries experience lower returns because of high risks, arising out of their inability to 
engage in more innovation. Thus, one is likely to expect differences in synchronicity and 
market reactions to earnings between firms in different industries. Finally, to also, capture 
the impact of different time periods year dummies are included. This is especially 




necessary as the sample period encapsulates the period of the recent Global Financial 
Crisis. 
In Chapter 5, which focuses on stock return synchronicity, Fama-MacBeth 
regressions are also used to test the robustness of the results from the OLS regressions.  
This is because one concern with using the pooled OLS regression in that type of analysis 
is the problem of cross-sectional dependence. Problems of cross-sectional dependence 
are quite pervasive in finance and market-based accounting studies, especially in studies 
that relate stock returns or variables obtained from stock returns to accounting variables 
(Bernard 1987). According to Baltagi and Hashem Pesaran (2007), cross-sectional 
dependence emanates from spatial effects, spillover effects or unobservable common 
factors. A pooled OLS regression typically ignores issues of cross-sectional dependence 
by assuming that errors are uncorrelated across observations. Hence, the presence of this 
phenomenon in a pooled OLS regression could result in biased standard errors and lead 
to incorrect inferences (Collins and Dent 1984). A widely used approach to addressing 
the problem of cross-sectional dependence is the application of the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) two-step regression procedure. In the first step of this process, cross-sectional 
regressions are carried out for each year. The second step computes a time series average 
of the coefficients from the first step. In this analysis, and similar to OLS regressions, 
industry effects are included. Statistical significance is calculated using T-statistics which 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are computed based on Newey and West (1987) 
auto-autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Auto-correlation correction follows a first 
order auto-regressive process (Jin and Myers 2006, Haggard et al. 2008).  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the sources of data, and how the final sample of firms was 
determined. With the exception of South Africa, data from the other five countries are 
relatively smaller in terms of the number of listed companies. This provides a further 
premise to carry out the analysis on a country by country basis. The chapter has also 
provided details of how each variable was constructed most of which has been done with 
intuition from the extant literature. An overview of the methodology used in the study has 
also been provided with more details to be provided in the respective empirical chapters. 
The next chapter presents the first empirical analysis which focuses on synchronicity. 





Appendix 4.1: Variable distributions 
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  Appendix 4. 2: Unit root tests 
 

























































































































This table presents results for tests of unit root. Panel A presents unit root tests for the stock indexes. The tests are 
carried out using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests at levels with a lag length of 3. The lag length of 3 is 
chosen based on pre-estimations of AIC to determine the appropriate lag length. Panel B presents unit root tests for 
stock returns. Given that stock returns are organized as a panel data set, the Fisher type unit root tests with ADF 
regressions are used. 
 
 Panel A: Unit root tests of stock indices 
  Co-efficient   t-stat   p-value 
Botswana -0.906  -9.18***  (0.000) 
Ghana -0.7834  -7.66***  (0.000) 
Kenya -1.101  -11.72***  (0.000) 
Nigeria -0.7444  -14.48***  (0.000) 
South Africa -1.146  -15.45***  (0.000) 
MSCI -0.98137  -13.24***  (0.000) 
Panel B: Unit root tests of stock returns  
  Botswana Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Inverse chi-squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inverse normal (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inverse logit  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Modified inv. chi-
squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 




 Appendix 4.4 
Raw, index and abnormal returns across event window (by year) 
  Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa 
Year Returns 
Index  Abnormal  Returns 
Index  Abnormal  Returns 
Index  Abnormal 
Returns  Returns   Returns  Returns   Returns  Returns 
2005 25.000% 3.816% 21.184%**  -4.000% 0.403% -12.473%  4.675% 0.248% 4.675%*** 
2006 -4.500% 0.431% -4.931%**  -4.200% 0.001% -4.228%  3.442% 0.071% 3.442%*** 
2007 -9.250% -5.840% -3.410%  1.933% 0.220% -2.682%  -1.892% 0.468% -1.892%* 
2008 -0.208% 1.563% -1.771%  -0.643% -0.064% 0.710%  -3.517% 0.089% -3.517%*** 
2009 -0.310% -3.536% 3.226%  9.667% 0.191% 4.377%  2.709% 0.766% 2.709%** 
2010 5.862% 3.921% 1.941%  2.000% 0.115% -0.416%  1.992% 0.714% 1.992%* 
2011 -1.871% -0.552% -1.318%  -5.556% 0.006% -5.691%***  1.625% -0.073% 1.625% 
2012 2.848% 5.861% -3.013%  3.107% 0.260% -2.362%  1.634% 0.084% 1.634% 
2013 7.864% 4.925% 2.938%  2.586% 0.082% 0.873%  1.176% 0.166% 1.176% 
2014 2.214% 2.971% -0.757%  -2.188% 0.013% -2.466%  -0.464% 0.050% -0.464% 
2015 -7.235% 2.444% -9.679%***   8.286% 0.564% -3.566%   -3.414% 0.359% -3.414%* 
 
APPENDIX 4.5: Average returns over event window 
AVERAGE RAW RETURNS 
  HTF   MTF 
 KY  NG  SA  KY  NG  SA 
  Return   Return   Return   Return   Return   Return 
-10 0.737%  -0.500%  0.203%  0.027%  0.060%  0.003% 
-9 -0.211%  -1.389%**  0.444%  0.113%  -0.005%  0.057% 
-8 0.263%  -0.083%  -0.113%  0.045%  0.115%  0.164% 
-7 -1.000%*  0.472%  -0.737%  0.077%  0.203%  0.291% 
-6 -0.947%*  -0.500%  0.015%  -0.207%  -0.027%  0.046% 
-5 0.526%  -0.389%  -0.865%**  0.054%  -0.165%  0.128% 
-4 -0.263%  -0.028%  0.105%  0.126%  -0.429%*  -0.016% 
-3 -0.789%  -0.361%  0.068%  0.149%  -0.011%  0.094% 
-2 -0.368%  0.000%  -0.421%  0.180%  0.209%  0.182%** 
-1 -0.105%  0.389%  0.180%  0.297%  0.588%***  -0.009% 
0 -0.526%  0.833%  0.023%  -0.577%**  0.110%  0.168% 
1 -1.000%  -0.444%  0.421%  0.027%  0.143%  0.091% 
2 -0.105%  0.083%  -0.293%  0.212%  0.247%  0.046% 
3 -0.211%  0.083%  -0.729%**  -0.041%  0.440%*  0.023% 
4 -1.526%**  0.139%  0.038%  0.054%  -0.176%  -0.066% 
5 0.632%  0.500%  0.639%  0.333%  -0.170%  -0.143% 
6 0.158%  -0.611%  -0.090%  -0.068%  0.033%  -0.026% 
7 0.368%  0.472%  0.737%  0.153%  0.154%  0.032% 
8 0.158%  -0.306%  0.068%  0.194%  0.093%  -0.071% 
9 -0.105%  0.000%  -0.361%  -0.041%  -0.308%  -0.113% 












Panel A:Summary statistics of alphas and betas 
  
Panel B: Distribution of Betas 
  alpha  beta Interval Percent 
Kenya      
Mean 0.0008 0.3869 <0 15% 
Standard Deviation 0.0035 0.7044 0—0.009 3% 
Kurtosis 46.1601 120.6965 0.01—0.09 10% 
Skewness 5.8297 9.0997 0.1—0.5 44% 
Minimum -0.0059 -1.0771 0.6—1.0 20% 
Maximum 0.0361 10.3564 >1.0 7% 
Nigeria       
Mean 0.0005 0.3625 <0 15% 
Standard Deviation 0.0029 0.4068 0—0.009 10% 
Kurtosis 75.1718 0.3834 0.01—0.09 11% 
Skewness 6.4980 0.8073 0.1—0.5 35% 
Minimum -0.0066 -0.8907 0.6—1.0 22% 
Maximum 0.0358 1.8106 >1.0 8% 
TOTAL      100% 
South Africa      
Mean 0.0025 0.2801 <0 18% 
Standard Deviation 0.0290 2.6675 0—0.009 2% 
Kurtosis 1199.6617 950.3710 0.01—0.09 10% 
Skewness 31.9142 7.1013 0.1—0.5 50% 
Minimum -0.0210 -81.4141 0.6—1.0 15% 
Maximum 1.2066 94.2829 >1.0 5% 














5 Stock Return Synchronicity in African 
Markets 






The aim of this chapter is to examine the general level of stock return synchronicity in 
African markets. It is motivated by the arguments in prior literature that emerging markets 
tend to exhibit higher levels of stock return synchronicity than their developed counterparts 
(eg. Morck et al. 2000). Despite this widely held view, there has been the lack of a 
comprehensive analysis as to whether African markets are synchronous or not. Some of 
the reasons which studies attribute to why developing countries may exhibit higher levels 
of synchronicity than developed countries include the fact that poor protection of property 
rights discourages trading, which then leads to slower incorporation of firm-specific 
information into stock prices (Morck et al. 2000). Another reason may lie in the nature of 
corporate ownership. For example, Gul et al. (2010) find that firms with generally higher 
levels of ownership concentration tend to have a lower level of firm-specific information 
incorporated into their stock prices. 
Although African countries might generally be seen as having weak protection of 
property rights, it remains to be seen as to whether this could account for the levels of 
synchronicity. There is a school of thought which proposes that more developed countries 
with better transparency and protection of property rights might be associated with higher 
levels of synchronicity whilst countries with poorer transparency and weaker protection of 
property rights may exhibit lower levels of synchronicity (Dasgupta et al. 2010, Kelly 
2014). This is because, in more developed markets, information may be rapidly and 
frequently incorporated into stock prices ahead of being announced and when such 
information is finally announced, there is little new information content. As such returns 
of such stocks might exhibit higher levels of R2. 
Taken the above together, this chapter seeks to answer three main questions. First, 
what is the level of stock return synchronicity in African markets? What firm 
characteristics are important in explaining stock return synchronicity? Finally, is stock 
return stock return synchronicity affected by ownership structure? The findings in this 
chapter reveal an averagely low level of R2 implying lower synchronicity. This is 
consistent with the alternative view expressed by Dasgupta et al. (2010). Synchronicity 
also appears to have remained persistently low over the sample period. Thus contrary to 
conventional wisdom, firms in African markets on average do not exhibit high levels of 




synchronicity. This provides support for the arguments that synchronicity can be relatively 
low in a poor information environment. Further, regression results show that the main 
driver of synchronicity within firms and across all five countries is firm size. Larger firms 
are associated with higher levels of synchronicity, consistent with the argument that large 
firms act as leading market indicators by signaling macroeconomic trends which have the 
potential to trigger similar aggregate markets movements to smaller firms in a market 
(Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Finally, no evidence is found to support the view that 
synchronicity is influenced by ownership structure. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter contribute to the literature on stock return 
synchronicity by providing evidence in support of the theoretical arguments by Dasgupta 
et al. (2010) that developing markets, usually characterised by weak information 
efficiency, may not always fit the stereotypical view that they are synchronous. Across 
different measures of stock return synchronicity, the evidence in this chapter shows that 
the average level of synchronicity of firms in each of the five countries is less than 10%. 
This implies that market movements account for less than 10% for the movement in stock 
returns on average. The highest level of synchronicity of 8% is observed in the Nigerian 
sample. South Africa has the second highest of 7%, with Ghana having the lowest of 4%. 
Botswana and Kenya have 6% and 5% respectively. In a poor information environment, 
market valuations may be highly inaccurate, the cost of capital will rise to reflect increased 
risk and valuable investment will be discouraged. Nonetheless, this chapter argues that in 
a low synchronicity environment, stock market reactions to corporate events, which carry 
new information about the firm value, will be the primary source of price efficiency.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 develops the hypothesis 
to be tested. Section 5.3 presents the empirical design. The results are presented in Section 
5.4 including summary statistics, univariate tests and cross-sectional models of 









5.2 Hypothesis development 
This section formulates the hypothesis to be tested in this chapter. 
Are African markets synchronous? 
Since Roll (1988), there have been a number of studies on synchronicity which use R2 as 
the primary measure. For most studies that have examined this in a cross-country context, 
the consensus has generally been that more developed markets are associated with less 
synchronicity than less developed countries (Morck et al. 2000, Jin and Myers 2006). At 
the forefront of this strand of literature is Morck et al. (2000) who argue that weak 
protection of property and investor rights adversely affect how investors react to corporate 
information and thus leads to lower incorporation of firm-specific information into stock 
prices. Jin and Myers (2006) attribute higher synchronicity in less developed countries to 
opacity or lack of transparency i.e. a weak information environment. Generally poor 
corporate governance practices which encourage practices such as controlling shareholders 
(Boubaker et al. 2014) and director interlocks (Khanna and Thomas 2009), could bring 
about reduced firm-level transparency leading investors to rely on higher levels of stock 
return synchronicity. A relatively recent study, however, departs from these previous 
studies by arguing that stock return synchronicity can be low in less developed countries 
and high in more developed countries with higher transparency (Dasgupta et al. 2010). 
They argue that most often, stock prices react to news that has not been anticipated by the 
market. Therefore, in an improved information environment, the market is able to make 
predictions about future events due to the availability of information. Consequently, when 
these events occur, there is little surprise and thus lower firm-specific variation. 
Conversely, in a weak information environment, the inability to accurately value firms 
leads to greater information shocks from new information and can lead to higher firm-
specific variation i.e. lower synchronicity. As noted in Chapter 2, despite the presence of 
some regulatory framework and codes of corporate governance, African markets are still 
challenged with problems of enforcement and lack of transparency. This implies the 
information environment is still relatively weak, which leads to the first hypothesis that; 








Determinants of synchronicity: the impact of firm size and age  
In examining the factors that may account for stock return synchronicity among firms, two 
issues deserve particular attention for their theoretical and intuitive significance—firm size 
and age. This is because these two variables have the potential to greatly affect the firm’s 
information environment which would then have implications for stock return 
synchronicity. For example, Atiase (1985) argues that the amount of information 
production and dissemination is a function of firm size. Based on his “differential 
information” hypothesis, he argues that the amount of unexpected information conveyed 
to the market by corporate information such as earning reports is related to the market 
capitalisation of firms. Based on this premise, size may have implications on stock return 
synchronicity as stock return synchronicity is equally a function of a firm’s information 
environment.  The impact of firm size on stock return synchronicity, however, impact may 
be quite ambiguous. On the one hand, larger firms may be associated with more 
shareholders and investors who could trade more often to incorporate firm information into 
stock prices (Roll 1981). Thus larger firms may be associated with lower synchronicity. 
On the other hand, Roll (1988) observes a positive relationship between firm size and R2 
arguing that larger firms may be less susceptible to systematic risks that do not arise from 
the market as a whole. On this note, one may expect a significant and positive relationship 
between firm size and synchronicity. Further as can be observed from Chapter 2, most 
African markets are relatively small in size which also implies that most firms are also 
small. Therefore larger firms in African markets are more likely to act as leading market 
indicators by signalling market movements which means that their returns are more likely 
to be synchronous. 
The age of a firm also plays an important role in its information envirnoment as older 
firms have less information uncertainty due to greater historical performance records 
available to the market (Lu et al. 2010). This longer trading history and reduced 
uncertainity also makes it easier for the market to predit the asset value of such firms. 
Further, Dasgupta et al. (2010) posit that the market learns more about the intrinsic qualities 
of a firm as it grows older. Hence, based on their framework, it should be easier for market 
participants to accurately predict future events about older firms leading to less surprise 
when these events eventually occur. Hence, older firms will be associated with higher stock 
return synchronicity. As shown in Chapter 2, most stock markets in the sample are 
relatively young, with the exception of South Africa. This can largely be said for most other 
stock markets across the continent. For example the stock markets of Ghana and Botswana 
are currently less than 30 years old. Thus, firms in African countries would equally be 




young as firm firm age mostly measures the period of time from which a stock was publicly 
listed. Based this and the preceding discussion on how firm age affects a firm’s information 
environment, one would expect returns of firms to be less synchronous as the market knows 
little about such firms and would therefore act with greater surprise when corporate 
information is released. However, as these firms grow older and information uncertainity 
about them reduces, there should be lower surprise about information and consequently 
resulting in higher stock return synchronicity.  
H2: Larger firms in African markets exhibit higher levels of synchronicity. 
 
H3: Older firms in African markets exhibit higher levels of synchronicity. 
 
Ownership structure and synchronicity 
 
Concentrated ownership 
When ownership concentration is high, the perception that the majority of shareholders 
will have the tendency to hold up incentives to expropriate minority shareholders heightens 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Corporate information is therefore likely not to have any 
informative value. Fan and Wong (2002) make this argument using earnings 
announcements. Based on the entrenchment effect argument of ownership concentration, 
elaborated upon by Morck et al. (2005) and Fan and Wong (2002), in the presence of 
controlling shareholders, the credibility of corporate information in general, and 
accounting information in particular, is reduced because outside investors assume that such 
information is usually reported out of the self-interest of the controlling owner, who can 
manipulate earnings numbers for expropriation purposes. Similarly, Fan and Wong (2002) 
advance another argument, the information argument, which claims that the need to keep 
proprietary information within a company in order to maintain a competitive advantage 
may result in higher concentration of ownership. Consequently, this might lead to tight 
information flows and a decrease corporate transparency. Gul et al. (2010) find a 
statistically significant association between ownership concentration, measured as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, and stock return synchronicity. They, 
however, find this relationship to be concave. Boubaker et al. (2014) find a positive 
relationship between ownership by large controlling shareholders and stock return 
synchronicity whilst Brockman and Yan (2009) make a similar conclusion involving block 
holders. As observed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, ownership concentration is relatively high 
in both the sample markets and other markets on the continent. And thus it can be expected 
that this would have an impact on stock return synchronicity. 
 





H4: Firms with higher levels of ownership concentration in African markets are associated 
with greater stock return synchronicity. 
 
Government Ownership 
Shleifer (1998) posits that governments take advantage of their control of state firms to 
transfer wealth to people who are sympathetic to them. This obviously makes such firms 
inefficient. Consistent with this view, Gul et al. (2010) argue that government ownership 
of firms is likely to result in weak corporate governance and poor protection of minority 
shareholders. This means that the entrenchment effect of corporate ownership is greater 
when government ownership is higher. They find that prices of stocks which have 
government as the largest shareholder are less informationally efficient since these stocks 
exhibit greater synchronicity. Similarly, Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014) find that state 
ownership is linked with lower informativeness of stock prices because state ownership 
tends to be characterized by less transparency which demotivates investors from trading in 
order to facilitate the incorporation of information into stock prices. The establishment of 
most African stock markets has, over time, led to a reduction in the role of government as 
most governments divest their shares in state owned entities that get listed. However, like 
many other developing countries, there is still the presence of some government ownership. 
For example, as noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, some studies such as Tsamenyi et al. 
(2007) document government ownership of up to 22% in Ghana. This situation and the 
accompanying lack of transparency that tends to characterise government ownership of 
firms across the world might cause firms with high levels of government ownership to be 
associated with greater stock return synchronicity. 
 
H5: Firms with higher government ownership are associated with greater stock return 
synchronicity. 
Institutional Ownership 
According to Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), informed market participants such as 
institutional investors also affect a firm’s institutional environment. However, they argue 
that the relation between trades of institutional investors and how stock prices incorporate 
firm-specific information is ambiguous. This is because, whilst large trades are more likely 
to be driven by information, small trades could merely be for the purposes of rebalancing 
and other liquidity considerations. Boehmer and Kelley (2009), however, find that stocks 
with a greater level of institutional holdings follow a random walk implying that such prices 
are more informationally efficient. They base their findings on the premise that institutional 




investors engage in significant trading which helps to eliminate mispricing in the market. 
Their results are consistent with the views of Bartov et al. (2000) that institutional holdings 
help to mitigate stock market anomalies. Shu (2013) draws a distinction between 
institutional trading and institutional ownership as two components of institutional investor 
participation. Whilst overall, institutional investor participation decreases stock market 
anomalies, the effect of institutional trading is stronger. Further, An and Zhang (2013) 
claim that institutional investors, by virtue of their relatively larger stakes, have a greater 
incentive to monitor. This helps to mitigate the extraction of private benefits by managers 
and ultimately leads to a reduction in firm-specific risk absorbed by managers. As such, 
stock prices of such firms tend to be less synchronous. As can be noted from Chapter 2, 
there is a good amount of institutional ownership of firms in markets in the sample. If these 
institutional investors, both local and foreign, play their monitoring role as expected, there 
is likely to be greater transparency and therefore stock returns of such firms should be 
associated with less synchronicity. 
 
H6: Firms with higher institutional ownership are associated with less synchronicity. 
Families and individuals 
The information environment of firms and its consequent impact on stock return 
synchronicity is also affected by the nature of ownership of families and individuals. Chau 
and Gray (2002) argue that family-controlled firms have little incentive to voluntarily 
disclose information because the demand for disclosure by such companies is weak. They 
find evidence of this using a sample of firms in both Hong Kong and Singapore. Abdallah 
and Ismail (2017) also observe that one of the main governance issues around family-
controlled firms is that of poor transparency and accountability. Equally, issues of family 
ownership are of relevance to African firms. One of the main reasons why owners of firms 
in African markets are reluctant to go public is the requirement that will be placed on them 
to be transparent in line with regulations of listed companies (Acquaah 2015). This implies 
that, for listed companies that are family controlled, there is still likely to be a residual 
inertia by owners and management to engage in full and proper disclosure. Taken these 
together, one may expect that stock returns of firms that have a huge amount of family and 
individual ownership will be highly synchronous. 
 
H7: Firms with higher family and individual ownership are associated with higher stock 
return synchronicity.  




5.3 Empirical design 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, R2 from a regression of a firm’s return on a market 
index, proposed by Roll (1988) and further developed by Morck et al. (2000), is a widely 
used measure of the level of stock return synchronicity. Three versions of this estimation 
are used in this chapter. The first is based on Chan and Hameed (2006), where 
synchronicity is determined from the R2of a market model regression as follows; 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     5.1 
where for each firm i, R is the return on day t and RM is the corresponding 
contemporaneous market return on day t. 
The second estimation includes a lagged value of the market index RM to help address 
potential problems associated with non-synchronous trading (Boubaker et al. 2014, 
Brockman and Yan 2009, Feng et al. 2016, Chan and Chan 2014).  
 
  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    5.2 
 
The third estimation includes the world market return in line with Hasan et al. (2014). 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             5.3 
 
Where World Return is the corresponding return on the MSCI World Index on day t. In the 
spirit of Morck et al. (2000), and in line with most previous studies on synchronicity, the 
R2 is logistically transformed to enable it to range from negative infinity to positive infinity 
for the purpose of carrying out regressions. Using the transformed version as a dependent 
variable is problematic since it is bounded within the unit interval. Therefore, 
Synchronicity, denoted as either Synch1, Synch2 or Synch3 is computed as: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑅2
1−𝑅2
)     5.4 




Where 𝑅2 is derived from estimating equations 5.1 (Synch1), 5.2 (Synch2) and 5.3 
(Synch3). 
 
To ascertain the determinants of synchronicity, the following equation is estimated: 
 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         5.5          
 
Where for each firm i, Synch is either Synch1 Synch2 or Synch3 at time t, Firm Size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. 
Log (Age) is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  
Leverage is computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Profitability is measured as Income scaled by total assets. Non-zero return days is the 
number of days a firm has non-zero returns in the previous year. Log (Firms in Industry) 
is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume 
is the total trading volume of a firm in each year scaled by the number of shares outstanding 
at the year-end. 
To test the influence of ownership structure, a set of ownership variables are introduced 
into equation 5.5 above: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                        5.6   
 
Where for each firm i, Ownership includes Top 5 Shareholders, Institutional Ownership, 
Government Ownership, and Families and Individuals. Top 5 shareholders is the 
percentage of shares directly held by largest 5 shareholders. This serves as a proxy for 
ownership concentration. Institutional Ownership is the percentage of shares directly held 
by institutional investors. Government Ownership is the percentage of shares directly held 
by Government and Government Agencies whilst Families and Individuals is the 




percentage of shares directly held by families and individual investors. All other variables 
are as defined in equation 5.5. 
5.4 Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. It begins with summary statistics 
and correlations and then proceeds to both univariate and multivariate analysis of stock 
return synchronicity. 
5.4.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of the data and variables used in this chapter. It 
reports on a country by country basis, firm-year observations (count), mean, standard 
deviation, minimum values, median and maximum values. Panel A reports those of 
Botswana, Panel B reports those of Ghana. Panels C, D and E report summary statistics of 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa respectively. 
For all firm-year observations in all five countries, the mean synchronicity value for 
all three measures of synchronicity is below 10%, implying that firms in these countries, 
on average, exhibit low levels of synchronicity. This is consistent with Dasgupta et al 
(2010) who argue that synchronicity in less developed countries can be lower compared to 
more developed markets. This argument will be considered in more detail in subsequent 
sections of the chapter. Maximum values of synchronicity across five countries suggest 
that some firms may exhibit high synchronicity with market movements. In Botswana, the 
maximum value is around 70% for all three measures. In the case of Ghana, the maximum 
value is about 83% for all three measures whilst in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, the 
maximum values are 69%, 75%, and 74% respectively. 
With respect to other variables, the mean (median) value for firm size is $185m 
($80m) for Botswana, $129m ($43m) for Ghana, $238m ($70m) for Kenya, $537m ($73m) 
for Nigeria and $806m ($114m) for South Africa. Intuitively, countries in the sample which 
have larger stock markets on average have larger firms. Values of firm size are highly 
skewed. For this reason, the natural logs are used in regressions. The mean median Age is 
3(3) for Botswana, 3(3) for Ghana, 15(17) for Kenya, 3(3) for Nigeria and 12(12). The 
mean (median) value of leverage is 14 % (8%) for Botswana, 21% (13%) for Ghana, 16 % 
(12%) for Kenya, 20% (15%) for Nigeria and 22%(17%) for South Africa. The figures 




suggest that firms in these countries do not use high levels of debt in their capital structure. 
In terms of profitability, firms in Ghana are ranked lowest with mean profitability of 3%. 
Firms in Botswana exhibit the highest level of profitability with the mean figure of 10%. 
The mean profitability figure for Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are 6%, 5%, and 4% 
respectively. As expected, firms in more developed markets exhibit greater liquidity. The 
average non-zero return days is highest for firms in Kenya (53%), followed by South Africa 
(44%) and Nigeria 35%. Botswana has a mean value below 10% whilst Ghana on average 
has about 10%. Finally, and equally intuitively, firms in South Africa have larger trading 
volume, consistent with the idea that it is a more developed market. The mean trading 
volume figure is 0.4. The mean trading volume for Nigeria is 0.1 and that of Kenya 0.13. 
The mean trading volume figures for Botswana are 0.04 and 0.2 respectively. As would be 
expected, this shows that trading activity is higher in South African than in the rest of the 
countries. Not quite surprisingly, trading Activity is lowest in Botswana than in the other 
four countries. The picture presented by the data is one of differing levels of financial and 
institutional development. Importantly, markets considered here have distinguishing 
characteristics which will allow modelling to be conducted to assess the factors which 
determine the level of synchronicity. And some common factors are also present allowing 
some combination of markets when conducting hypothesis testing. 
Table 5.2 presents bivariate correlations of variables used for each country. Panel A 
presents those of Botswana, Panel B presents those of Ghana whilst Panels C, D and E 
presents those of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Generally, the correlations 
in across all five countries depict low to moderate correlations. For example, in terms of 
correlations between independent variables, the highest correlation observed in Botswana 
is between Firm Size and Firms in industry (0.601). In Ghana the highest correlation figure 
between a pair of independent variables is between Leverage and Profitability (0.636). In 
Kenya, this is can be observed between Firm Size and Non-Zero return days (0.413). In the 
case of Nigeria the highest correlation among independent variables is between Non-zero 
returns days and trading volume (0.428), whilst in South Africa this can be noted for the 
correlation between Non-zero return days and Firm Size. Several of the correlations among 
independent variables are less than 0.2. The low to moderate level of correlations among 
variables implies that multicollinearity does not pose a challenge to the use of OLS 
estimations in the multivariate regression analysis. 
 





 Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of variables used. It reports the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum value, median value and maximum values. In order to minimise the effects of outliers, continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. For variables that are log transformed, the non-log transformed 
version is reported in this table.   
Panel A: Botswana 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Synch1 103 0.050 0.141 0.000 0.003 0.707 
Synch2 103 0.054 0.142 0.000 0.007 0.709 
Synch3 103 0.058 0.141 0.000 0.010 0.709 
Firm Size($million) 88 184.973 223.556 0.920 79.620 861.070 
Age 103 2.952 1.997 0.000 3.000 6.000 
Leverage 73 0.141 0.131 0.002 0.082 0.449 
Profitability 100 0.102 0.090 -0.120 0.086 0.415 
Non- Zero return days 103 0.075 0.064 0.000 0.058 0.319 
Firms in Industry 103 2.500 2.810 1.000 1.000 8.000 
Trading Volume 100 0.042 0.054 0.000 0.020 0.329 
Panel B: Ghana 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Synch1 235 0.027 0.076 0.000 0.002 0.833 
Synch2 235 0.032 0.078 0.000 0.005 0.834 
Synch3 235 0.035 0.078 0.000 0.009 0.837 
Firm Size ($million) 119 129.429 185.528 0.400 43.340 805.210 
Age 161 3.087 1.992 0.000 3.000 7.000 
Leverage 174 0.217 0.266 0.001 0.131 1.172 
Profitability 206 0.033 0.153 -0.951 0.039 0.311 
Non- Zero return days 235 0.099 0.101 0.000 0.062 0.506 
Firms in Industry 235 3.375 3.114 1.000 2.000 10.000 
Trading Volume 220 0.208 1.043 0.000 0.018 7.356 
Panel C: Kenya 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Synch1 473 0.042 0.085 0.000 0.007 0.665 
Synch2 473 0.050 0.088 0.000 0.015 0.689 
Synch3 473 0.054 0.088 0.000 0.020 0.693 
Firm Size ($million) 455 237.849 482.496 0.380 70.480 5498.730 
Age 473 15.275 6.652 0.000 17.000 24.000 
Leverage 340 0.165 0.158 0.001 0.117 0.746 
Profitability 402 0.056 0.086 -0.677 0.045 0.421 
Non- Zero return days 473 0.531 0.215 0.000 0.595 0.835 
Firms in Industry 473 5.444 2.001 1.000 2.000 17.000 
Trading Volume 443 0.137 0.446 0.000 0.064 7.356 










Table 5.1 continued  
Panel D: Nigeria 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Synch1 793 0.063 0.104 0.000 0.016 0.750 
Synch2 793 0.073 0.107 0.000 0.027 0.756 
Synch3 793 0.077 0.107 0.000 0.032 0.756 
Firm Size ($million) 453 537.496 1253.194 1.070 72.710 8364.220 
Age 702 2.922 2.166 0.000 3.000 11.000 
Leverage 501 0.198 0.179 0.001 0.151 0.972 
Profitability 612 0.050 0.105 -0.830 0.042 0.421 
Non- Zero return days 793 0.349 0.278 0.000 0.314 0.916 
Firms in Industry 793 13.444 4.802 2.000 7.000 46.000 
Trading Volume 637 0.109 0.121 0.000 0.072 1.388 
Panel E: South Africa 
 Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Synch1 3124 0.057 0.104 0.000 0.011 0.610 
Synch2 3124 0.063 0.105 0.000 0.018 0.628 
Synch3 3124 0.069 0.107 0.000 0.024 0.749 
Firm Size ($million) 2883 806.768 1726.011 0.040 114.150 8364.220 
Age 3124 12.413 8.646 0.000 12.000 42.000 
Leverage 2664 0.227 0.215 0.001 0.174 1.172 
Profitability 3017 0.041 0.183 -0.951 0.062 0.421 
Non- Zero return days 3124 0.437 0.232 0.000 0.487 0.905 
Firms in Industry 3124 40.400 12.791 1.000 32.000 112.000 
Trading Volume 2953 0.407 0.918 0.000 0.201 7.356 




Table 5.2: Correlations 
This table presents correlations of the variables used. Panels A, B, C, D, and E represent correlations for Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa 
respectively.  
Panel A: Botswana 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Synch1 1         
2 Synch2 0.862*** 1        
3 Synch3 0.791*** 0.912*** 1       
4 Firm Size 0.448*** 0.459*** 0.446*** 1      
5 Age -0.0823 -0.0948 -0.0819 0.101 1     
6 Leverage 0.279** 0.280** 0.234** 0.119 -0.0120 1    
7 Profitability -0.0642 -0.0488 -0.0227 0.0901 -0.0855 0.00812 1   
8 Non Zero return days 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.279*** 0.392*** 0.210** 0.0998 0.163 1  
9 Firms in Industry 0.305*** 0.284*** 0.237** 0.601*** 0.0724 0.313*** 0.0392 0.241** 1 
10 Trading Volume 0.222** 0.158 0.117 0.0711 0.146 -0.0530 0.0399 0.304*** 0.0235 
Panel B: Ghana 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Synch1 1         
2 Synch2 0.830*** 1        
3 Synch3 0.756*** 0.893*** 1       
4 Firm Size 0.573*** 0.624*** 0.619*** 1      
5 Age -0.00694 0.117 0.0924 0.0253 1     
6 Leverage -0.180** -0.210*** -0.193** -0.306*** 0.0299 1    
7 Profitability 0.0696 0.107 0.0744 0.320*** -0.0289 -0.636*** 1   
8 Non Zero return days 0.443*** 0.490*** 0.461*** 0.564*** 0.186** -0.258*** 0.176** 1  
9 Firms in Industry 0.212*** 0.226*** 0.165** 0.256*** 0.00525 -0.120 -0.139** 0.188*** 1 
10 Trading Volume 0.245*** 0.262*** 0.206*** 0.217** -0.178** -0.493*** 0.321*** 0.314*** 0.227*** 
Continued on next page 
 




















Table 5.2 continued  
Panel C: Kenya 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Synch1 1         
2 Synch2 0.838*** 1        
3 Synch3 0.782*** 0.906*** 1       
4 Firm Size 0.436*** 0.445*** 0.499*** 1      
5 Age -0.104** -0.143*** -0.160*** -0.156*** 1     
6 Leverage -0.106* -0.122** -0.121** -0.185*** -0.0445 1    
7 Profitability 0.104** 0.133*** 0.141*** 0.252*** -0.0498 -0.185*** 1   
8 Non Zero return days 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.253*** 0.413*** 0.0458 0.0192 -0.0368 1  
9 Firms in Industry 0.0464 0.0482 0.0373 0.0192 -0.0932** -0.268*** -0.0519 0.0507 1 
10 Trading Volume 0.114** 0.173*** 0.153*** 0.0978** -0.249*** 0.132** 0.129** 0.260*** -0.0611 
Panel D: Nigeria 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Synch1 1         
2 Synch2 0.881*** 1        
3 Synch3 0.837*** 0.957*** 1       
4 Firm Size 0.560*** 0.577*** 0.608*** 1      
5 Age -0.0154 -0.0404 -0.0550 0.0489 1     
6 Leverage -0.233*** -0.243*** -0.238*** -0.201*** 0.0404 1    
7 Profitability 0.0541 0.0461 0.0413 0.240*** -0.0486 -0.217*** 1   
8 Non Zero return days 0.381*** 0.397*** 0.372*** 0.362*** 0.296*** -0.179*** 0.0721* 1  
9 Firms in Industry 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.0602 0.0193 -0.192*** -0.0635 0.0722** 1 
10 Trading Volume 0.303*** 0.324*** 0.317*** 0.143*** -0.0206 -0.0994** 0.0297 0.428*** 0.0432 
Continued on next page 





Table 5.2 continued  
 
Panel E: South Africa 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Synch1 1         
2 Synch2 0.854*** 1        
3 Synch3 0.814*** 0.945*** 1       
4 Firm Size 0.601*** 0.647*** 0.665*** 1      
5 Age 0.205*** 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.342*** 1     
6 Leverage -0.0950*** -0.0734*** -0.0710*** -0.182*** -0.0929*** 1    
7 Profitability 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.340*** 0.0112 -0.295*** 1   
8 Non Zero return days 0.428*** 0.451*** 0.447*** 0.686*** 0.332*** -0.211*** 0.165*** 1  
9 Firms in Industry -0.0194 -0.0285 -0.0284 0.0393** 0.0198 0.0868*** -0.00721 -0.0760*** 1 
10 Trading Volume 0.435*** 0.446*** 0.444*** 0.480*** 0.102*** -0.0741*** 0.102*** 0.571*** -0.0537*** 





5.4.2 Univariate analysis of synchronicity 
This section presents univariate analysis of synchronicity. 
5.4.2.1 Stock return synchronicity over time 
Although the summary statistics shown in Table 5.1 reveal an averagely low level of stock 
return synchronicity in each country over the sample period, it is perhaps necessary to 
further indicate how synchronicity may have change over the period. Figure 5.1 depicts 
time series plots of mean synchronicity values for each country over the sample period 
which indicate the evolution of synchronicity for each country. For the purposes of these 
plots, the non-log-transformed versions of synchronicity are used. The logged transformed 
version of synchronicity are only used in regression where synchronicity is a dependent 
variable. Across all countries in Figure 5.1, the average synchronicity values per year still 
depict a persistently low level of stock return synchronicity, with the highest being just 
about 12% in the case of Nigeria (Synch3). It is also important to observe a similarly close 
pattern of stock return synchronicity in each country across for all three measures. This 
provides support for Hypothesis 1 about the averagely low level of synchronicity. 
However, there appears to be a rise in synchronicity in the crisis period for most 
countries, giving some support to the conjecture that developing markets might have also 
experienced its impact through spillovers and contagion. Movements in developed 
markets, to which these developing markets are exposed, would have triggered significant 
movements in stock prices giving rise to increasing synchronicity over that period. 
However whether the changes in synchronicity between the crisis period and other periods 
represents a statistically significant differences might be a subject of further empirical 
investigation. Section 5.4.2.3 of this chapter tests mean differences of stock return 
synchronicity in the crisis periods and non-crisis periods. Although there are hardly studies 
of stock return synchronicity in African markets, the patterns in Figure 5.1 provide some 
support for the arguments by Mensah and Alagidede (2017) that dependence of stock 
returns in African markets is time-varying. One point of departure of their study, however, 
is that they find dependence to be weak in most African countries except South Africa. It 
is also important to mention that whilst the patterns of stock synchronicity in Figure 5.1 
may depict some interesting trends, these trends do not appear significant as synchronicity 
is still persistently low on average, over the sample period.  
























































































5.4.2.2 Differences in synchronicity between pairs of countries 
Table 5.3 presents results from tests of differences in means of synchronicity between pairs 
of countries. The objective of this analysis is to compare whether within a set of developing 
countries, there may be differences in synchronicity in the relatively more developed ones 
than others. The null hypothesis for each of these tests is that average synchronicity of 
firms in the country on the left side of the pairing minus average synchronicity of firms in 
the country of the right side of the pairing is zero. Therefore, a negative value would mean 
that average synchronicity in the country on the left side is less than average synchronicity 
in countries on the right side. From the table there is no statistically significant differences 
between average synchronicity of firms in Botswana and average synchronicity of firms in 
each of the other four countries. These may be due to the fact that both markets have similar 
characteristics relative to size and liquidity. However, pairs including Ghana and each of 
the other three countries (excluding Botswana) show negative and statistically significant 
differences, implying that synchronicity is lower in Ghana than in Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa. Thus, for a set of generally developing markets, smaller and even less 
developed markets have a lower level of stock return synchronicity.  
Tests involving Kenya and Nigeria and Kenya and South Africa also show negative 
and statistically significant differences. However, there are no statistical differences 
between Nigeria and South Africa. This may also be due to the fact that these two market 
represent the most developed in the sample. Overall, the results from the table point to quite 
an interesting pattern where synchronicity is higher in the relatively more developed 
markets than in the less developed ones. Therefore, the size of the relatively more 
developed markets creates a comparatively more enhanced information environment 
where, consistent with the views of Dasgupta et al. (2010), market participants become less 
surprised about the occurrence of corporate events leading to lower reactions and a higher 
level of stock return synchronicity.






Table 5.3 Test of mean differences in synchronicity between pairs of countries 
 
This table presents tests of mean differences in synchronicity between pairs of countries. The null hypothesis is that stock return synchronicity in the country on the left 
minus stock return synchronicity in the country on the right is equal to zero. 
  Synch1   Synch2   Synch3 
  Mean diff T-test   Mean diff T-test   Mean diff T-test 
Botswana- Ghana 0.022 (1.51)  0.023 (1.52)  0.023 (1.55) 
Botswana-Kenya 0.008 (0.55)  0.004 (0.30)  0.004 (0.31) 
Botswana-Nigeria -0.013 (-0.93)  -0.018 (-1.27)  -0.019 (-1.30) 
Botswana-South Africa -0.007 (-0.50)  -0.009 (-0.63)  -0.011 (-0.76) 
Ghana-Kenya -0.0144** (-2.28)  -0.0181*** (-2.80)  -0.0185*** (-2.84) 
Ghana-Nigeria -0.0357*** (-5.79)  -0.0409*** (-6.47)  -0.0417*** (-6.56) 
Ghana-South Africa -0.0294*** (-5.57)  -0.0314*** (-5.82)  -0.0336*** (-6.17) 
Kenya- Nigeria -0.0213*** (-3.95)  -0.0228*** (-4.12)  -0.0232*** (-4.17) 
Kenya-South Africa -0.0150*** (-3.45)  -0.0133*** (-2.98)  -0.0151*** (-3.36) 
Nigeria-South Africa 0.006 (1.52)   0.00954** (2.26)   0.00813* (1.91) 
 
 





5.4.2.3 Synchronicity: pre and post financial crises  
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began in the US. However, due to globalisation and the 
increasing interdependence of financial markets, markets in other developed as well as 
emerging markets experienced some spillover effects (Covitz et al. 2013, Bekaert et al. 
2014). An and Zhang (2013) argue that the GFC lead to increases in market volatility and 
stock crash risk which resulted in higher synchronicity in the GFC period relative to the 
non-GFC period. It is therefore hypothesised that there are significant differences in 
synchronicity between the GFC period as well as the pre and post GFC periods. In 
particular, this chapter determines whether stock return synchronicity decreases or 
increases as a result of the market instability generated outside of African markets. Table 
5.4 shows the mean synchronicity values for all three measures of synchronicity in the Pre-
Crisis, during the GFC (2007-2009), and Post-Crisis periods for each country. Due to the 
lack of firm return data for the Botswana sample, synchronicity, for the Pre-Crisis period 
is not displayed. Using Synch1 as a reference point, the mean synchronicity value for the 
Ghana sample is 1%, 1.2% and 3.47% in the Pre-GFC, GFC and Post-GFC periods 
respectively. In the case of Kenya, synchronicity is 0.5%, 3.6% and 5.4% for the three 
periods respectively indicating a notable increase in synchronicity over the period. This 
may be due either to the impact of the crisis or may result from institutional and financial 
development over time. The mean Synch1 figure for the Nigeria sample is 6.7%, 6.5% and 
6.1% respectively whilst the sample that of the South Africa sample is 5.8% 5.9%, and 
5.4%. For these latter two countries, synchronicity does not appear to have been 
substantially altered by the advent of the GFC although synchronicity is lower in the later 
period for both countries. 
The pattern shown in Table 5.4 can also be observed for the other two measures of 
synchronicity and for the Botswana sample, relative to the GFC and Post GFC periods. 
Synchronicity in the crisis period appears to be marginally higher than in the Pre-crisis 
period. Panel B reports a test of mean differences between synchronicity in pairs of periods, 
i.e, Pre-GFC period and GFC periods, GFC and Post-GFC periods, and Pre-GFC and Post-
GFC periods. In all tests, the null hypothesis is that synchronicity in the period on the left-
hand side minus synchronicity in the period on the right-hand side is equal to zero. Hence 
a negative t-statistic implies that synchronicity is lower in the period on the left-hand side 
than in the period on the right-hand side. For example, a t-statistic of -4.07 for Kenya under  




Table 5.4: Synchronicity and financial crisis 
This table compares average stock synchronicity in the Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis periods for each country. Panel A presents the mean synchronicity values of firms and 
Panel B presents results for tests of mean differences.  
Panel A: Average Synchronicity 
  Pre-GFC(2005-2006)   GFC(2007-2009)   Post-GFC(2010-2015) 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3   Synch1 Synch2 Synch3   Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Botswana     0.051 0.054 0.057  0.049 0.054 0.059 
Ghana 0.011 0.017 0.020  0.012 0.014 0.016  0.037 0.043 0.047 
Kenya 0.005 0.014 0.017  0.036 0.045 0.048  0.054 0.062 0.066 
Nigeria 0.067 0.074 0.077  0.068 0.081 0.089  0.061 0.070 0.074 
South Africa 0.058 0.066 0.071  0.059 0.066 0.072  0.054 0.060 0.066 
Panel B: Test of mean differences. 
 Pre-GFC —GFC  GFC and Post—GFC  Pre-GFC and Post—GFC 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3   Synch1 Synch2 Synch3   Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Botswana     -0.050 -0.02 -0.04     
Ghana -0.11 -0.300 -0.400  -2.74*** -3.11*** -3.24***  -2.44*** -2.36*** -2.41*** 
Kenya -4.07*** -3.60*** -3.59***  -1.91* -1.73* -1.82*  -8.49*** -7.23*** -7.36*** 
Nigeria -0.05 -0.48 -0.79  0.690 1.170 1.560  0.460 0.330 0.280 









“Pre-GFC- GFC” implies that synchronicity in the Pre-GFC period was significantly lower 
than synchronicity in the GFC period. Notable differences can be observed for the Kenyan 
sample between the Pre-GFC and GFC periods as well as the Pre-GFC and Post-GFC 
periods. Synchronicity is significantly lower in the Pre-GFC period than in the GFC period. 
Also, synchronicity is significantly lower in the GFC period than in the Post-GFC period 
and significantly lower in the Pre-GFC period than in the Post-GFC period. This holds true 
for all three measures of synchronicity. An almost similar observation can be made in the 
case of Ghana except for the Pre-GFC and GFC pairs which are not statistically significant. 
Significant differences can also be observed in Ghana. Hence, in some of the smaller 
markets, synchronicity increased over the period. One explanation for this might be that 
investors increased their reliance on market movements given the high levels of uncertainty 
and volatility of stock prices.  However, in the case of Nigeria and South Africa, there 
appears to be no significant differences between any of the pairs of periods, although 
synchronicity in the GFC period is higher than in both the Pre-GFC and Post-GFC periods. 
This therefore implies that despite increased volatility during the GFC, market movements 
did not have a significantly greater impact on synchronicity of stock returns in both Nigeria 
and South Africa.  Despite the differences observed in the Ghana and Kenya sample, the 
figures from Panel A of the table show that overall, when synchronicity values are divided 
into different time periods, we still observe low average levels of synchronicity in all five 
countries.  
5.4.3 Multivariate analysis of synchronicity 
The empirical results in this section are organized as follows: Section 5.4.3.1 focuses on 
the determinants of synchronicity using pooled OLS regression on a country by country 
basis. Section 5.4.3.2 also considers the determinants of synchronicity by addressing 
potential concerns of cross-sectional dependence with the pooled OLS regression. Section 
5.4.3.3 presents results of the analysis to determine whether synchronicity is influenced by 
ownership structure in African markets. 
5.4.3.1  Determinants of synchronicity 
Table 5.5 presents OLS regression estimates of the determinants of synchronicity. The 
results are presented separately for each country. For each country, there are three models 




with each having one of the three measures of synchronicity as the dependent variable. 
This is done to further ensure the robustness of the findings. Coefficient estimates for firm 
size are positive and statistically significant across all models in all countries. This implies 
that returns of larger firms tend are relatively more synchronous than smaller firms.  Thus, 
the second hypothesis of this chapter, that returns of larger firms are more synchronous, is 
supported. This is consistent with the arguments of Roll (1988) and the findings of 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004)  and Boubaker et al. (2014). Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) 
for example, argue that the size of firms is a good indicator of the size of its information 
environment including overall investor interest and media exposure. Large firms may serve 
as leading market indicators by signaling macroeconomic trends which have the potential 
to trigger similar aggregate markets movements. Roll (1988) provides another explanation 
for why larger firms may exhibit greater synchronicity. He posits that larger firms usually 
tend to operate in different markets and industries, and can, therefore, be likened to a 
diversified portfolio of smaller firms. Thus, by operating in these different markets and 
industries, larger firms have greater exposure and will be more susceptible to the impact of 
market-wide factors. A key implication of this finding for African markets is that firm size 
is a key factor in helping to explain the nature and movement of stock returns. Although, 
the computation of stock return synchronicity (R2), is not necessarily a test of an asset 
pricing model (Jin and Myers 2006), the co-efficient estimates on firm size from Table 5.5 
may lend some support to the role of size in explaining the cross section of stock returns in 
African markets which have been established in some previous studies of African markets 
(Hearn and Piesse 2010, Hearn 2012, Hearn 2014). 
With regards to firm age, coefficient estimates are less consistent across all countries. 
Age is statistically insignificant for Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria. However, it is 
positive and highly significant (at the 1% level) for South African firms across all three 
different measures of synchronicity. This implies that older firms are more synchronous in 
the South African sample but not elsewhere. The positive and significant coefficient for 
Age in South Africa is consistent with the findings by Dasgupta et al. (2010) who argue 
that the market learns about a firm’s time-invariant characteristics as it gets older. 
Therefore, more market-wide factors will be incorporated into its stock price, leading to 
high synchronicity. Further, Dasgupta et al. (2010) argue that older firms tend to have more 
stable fundamentals and will therefore co-move, leading to greater return synchronicity. 
The difference in the impact of age between South Africa and the other four countries could 
reflect the wide disparities in stock market development. The South African market is the 
largest and one of the oldest markets on the continent. Hence the implications of age for 




any firm level outcomes will be more pronounced as markets have had more time to learn 
about the company. On the whole, and given the results presented in Table 5.5, the third 
hypothesis, which indicates that older firms in African markets are more synchronous, is 
not supported. South Africa, however, remains an exception. 
In terms of the other variables in Table 5.5, Leverage is insignificant in Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, consistent with Gul et al. (2010) and Boubaker et al. (2014) 
who also do not find any statistically significant impact of leverage on synchronicity. In 
South Africa, however, Leverage has a positive and significant impact on synchronicity, 
lending support to the notion that, as leverage transfers ownership from equity to 
debtholders, stock prices of firms will incorporate less or no firm-specific information. 
Profitability is positive and significant across two models in Botswana but insignificant for 
the Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria sample. In South Africa, and contrary to the case of 
Botswana, profitability is negative and statistically significant across all three measures of 
synchronicity. Non-Zero Return Days has no statistically significant impact on 
synchronicity in Botswana and Ghana. These might be due to the fact that these two 
countries are relatively less liquid compared to Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa where 
coefficient estimates of this variable, consistent with Chan et al. (2013), are positive and 
significant. This finding suggests that stocks that trade more often are also more likely to 
be driven by market wide-forces and therefore exhibit higher levels of synchronicity. Using 
a different measure for liquidity, Feng et al. (2016) find that illiquidity has a negative 
impact on synchronicity which is consistent with the findings in this study as far as Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa are concerned. This contrasts with the findings of Boubaker et al. 
(2014) who find that less liquid stocks incorporate less firm-specific information and are 
therefore more synchronous. The number of firms in the industry (Firms in Industry) is 
insignificant in all five countries. This is consistent with Gul et al. (2010) and Hasan et al. 
(2014) who also do not find any statistically significant impact. This also suggests that 
industry-wide factors may not be very relevant for movement in prices of individual stocks.  
Finally, trading volume is not significant for Botswana, Ghana and Kenya, but positive and 
significant for the Nigerian and South African samples. The findings in the case of Nigeria 
and South African support the findings in Xing and Anderson (2011) who also find a 
positive impact of trading volume on synchronicity. This also explains why Non-Zero 
Return equally has a positive impact in the case of Nigeria and Nigeria as more traded 
stocks are likely to be more liquid.  
 




  Table 5.5: Firm determinants of synchronicity 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity. Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent variables. Synch1 is the R-squared from a regression of firm’s 
stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return and the lagged market return. Synch3  is 
the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as the world market return.   Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  Leverage is computed as total debt divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as operating income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a firm has non-zero returns in the previous year. Log (Firms in 
Industry) is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the 
year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
 Botswana  Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.9480*** 0.6095** 0.5624**  0.9177*** 0.6229*** 0.4334*** 
 (3.01) (2.38) (2.51)  (5.31) (4.91) (3.93) 
Age -0.6834 -0.6300 -0.5775  11.8820 0.4465 -1.7142 
 (-1.08) (-1.44) (-1.48)  (1.46) (0.11) (-0.45) 
Leverage 2.3733 0.0861 0.4823  -0.5218 0.3261 0.8756 
 (0.83) (0.04) (0.23)  (-0.34) (0.32) (1.03) 
Profitability 6.6970 11.3002*** 9.0903**  -2.7996 0.8611 1.0128 
 (1.13) (3.30) (2.27)  (-0.81) (0.51) (0.75) 
Non-zero return days 2.8032 5.1175 4.0061  4.4941 2.4048 2.2788 
 (0.38) (0.94) (0.73)  (1.19) (0.80) (0.91) 
Firms in Industry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0885 0.1700 0.1229 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.26) (0.71) (0.67) 
Trading Volume 0.4137 -0.0342 -0.0356  0.0368 0.1814 0.0470 
 (1.50) (-0.18) (-0.21)  (0.10) (1.32) (0.37) 
Constant -9.6997*** -9.0563*** -7.2829***  -31.6845** -8.1241 -3.4793 
 (-4.36) (-5.29) (-4.77)  (-2.18) (-1.02) (-0.49) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 60 60 60  86 86 86 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.311 0.344 0.286   0.419 0.503 0.328 
                                                                    Continued on next page 
 




Table 5.5 continued 
  Kenya   Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.4828*** 0.3668*** 0.3208***  0.7203*** 0.5199*** 0.4617*** 
 (4.60) (5.00) (5.98)  (9.75) (10.80) (11.72) 
Age 0.2422 0.0354 0.0132  0.0340 0.0297 0.1271 
 (1.03) (0.24) (0.11)  (0.06) (0.08) (0.33) 
Leverage 1.3004 0.6964 0.5996  -0.4594 -0.2972 -0.5563 
 (1.02) (0.88) (1.02)  (-0.54) (-0.48) (-1.21) 
Profitability 0.6397 0.7556 0.6961  -0.4992 -0.0421 0.0447 
 (0.25) (0.56) (0.63)  (-0.20) (-0.04) (0.06) 
Non-zero return days 3.0885*** 2.2105*** 1.9311***  3.2711*** 3.0956*** 2.5440*** 
 (3.27) (3.38) (3.77)  (4.69) (7.33) (7.20) 
Firms in Industry 0.0751 -0.0124 0.0219  0.2550 0.3431* 0.3715** 
 (0.50) (-0.12) (0.25)  (1.20) (1.77) (2.30) 
Trading Volume -0.0354 0.0628 0.1237  0.3992*** 0.2728*** 0.2195*** 
 (-0.18) (0.65) (1.53)  (3.14) (3.24) (3.23) 
Constant -10.5442*** -7.0910*** -6.2717***  -8.6522*** -8.0722*** -7.7802*** 
 (-7.55) (-7.16) (-8.15)  (-5.59) (-6.19) (-6.81) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 323 323 323  291 291 291 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.423 0.421 0.466   0.541 0.581 0.653 










Table 5.5 continued    
  South Africa   Excl. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.5984*** 0.4397*** 0.3852***  0.6658*** 0.4494*** 0.3972*** 
 (19.26) (22.06) (24.78)  (12.28) (13.14) (13.84) 
Age 0.1724*** 0.1482*** 0.1283***  -0.1595 -0.2335*** -0.2348*** 
 (3.02) (4.06) (4.26)  (-1.43) (-3.11) (-3.61) 
Leverage 0.3456 0.4447*** 0.3816***  0.4374 0.2131 0.3171 
 (1.47) (3.04) (3.19)  (0.72) (0.51) (1.02) 
Profitability -0.6925** -0.4159** -0.4169***  -0.6993 0.1860 0.1261 
 (-2.34) (-2.28) (-2.89)  (-0.53) (0.22) (0.20) 
Non-zero return days 0.5667 0.8094*** 0.6875***  2.4446*** 2.2187*** 1.8644*** 
 (1.47) (3.38) (3.65)  (4.92) (6.97) (6.78) 
Firms in Industry -0.0196 -0.1885* -0.1132  0.0021 -0.1151 -0.0903 
 (-0.06) (-1.77) (-1.20)  (0.01) (-0.94) (-0.88) 
Trading Volume 0.3391*** 0.2137*** 0.1781***  0.1353 0.0848 0.0439 
 (7.32) (7.49) (7.64)  (1.46) (1.59) (0.98) 
Constant -7.2533*** -5.0487*** -4.8664***  -8.3965*** -5.7900*** -5.2809*** 
 (-3.55) (-7.79) (-8.51)  (-8.58) (-8.05) (-8.73) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2373 2373 2373  760 760 760 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.448 0.520 0.547   0.414 0.435 0.461 




Overall, based on the pooled OLS regression model, the results in this section 
suggest that the main determinant of synchronicity of firms across all countries is firm size, 
as this is consistently positive and significant in each of the countries. This is still the case 
when the South African sample is compared to a combined sample of the other four 
countries. As already mentioned earlier, this points to the importance of firm size in a firm’s 
information environment and to some extent, the relevance of firm size in helping to 
explain stock returns in African markets.  The impact of other variables including Age, 
Leverage, Profitability, Non-Zero return days, Firms in Industry and Trading Volume is 
less consistent across all countries. These differences may indicative of the differences in 
the development of the respective stock markets. 
5.4.3.2 Fama-MacBeth regressions  
Regression results from the Fama-Macbeth two-step procedure are presented in Table 5.6. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 4, this analysis is done to address any potential concerns 
of cross-sectional dependence, and has be employed in some previous studies of 
synchronicity (Boubaker et al. 2014, Feng et al. 2016).  Consistent with the pooled OLS 
regression results, Firm Size continues to have a positive and significant impact on 
synchronicity in all five countries except in models 2 and 3 of the Botswana sample, 
providing further evidence in support of the second hypothesis of this chapter. Thus, the 
impact of firm size on stock return synchronicity in the sampled markets is not affected by 
any cross-sectional dependence. Also, Age is statistically insignificant for Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria but statistically significant for the South African sample, similar 
to the results from the pooled OLS regressions. Leverage is also positive and significant 
for the South African sample but not in the case of the other four countries. Further, Non-
Zero Return Days and Trading Volume are both positive and significant in Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa but not Ghana and Botswana. Overall, the results from Table 5.6 show 
that the determinants of synchronicity in these markets are not driven by cross-sectional 
correlation of errors as the results from the Fama-Macbeth regressions are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained from the pooled OLS regressions.  




  Table 5.6: Fama-MacBeth regressions 
This table presents results of Fama MacBeth regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity. Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent variables. Synch1 is the R-squared from a regression 
of firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return and the lagged market return. 
Synch3  is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as the world market return.   Firm Size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  Leverage is computed as total debt divided by total 
assets at the beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as operating income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a firm has non-zero returns in the previous year. 
Firms in Industry is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year scaled by the number of shares outstanding 
at the year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
 Botswana  Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 1.3491** 0.8910 0.5901  1.0554** 0.6875** 0.5394*** 
 (3.08) (1.83) (1.34)  (4.01) (4.16) (5.41) 
Age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  10.5378 3.3409 3.3446 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (1.03) (1.03) (1.03) 
Leverage 19.1596 4.9539 0.0433  1.9096 2.4669 2.5425 
 (0.86) (0.40) (0.01)  (0.74) (1.51) (1.73) 
Profitability -52.0796 -5.0076 9.9297  18.6422 21.1698 19.8293 
 (-0.82) (-0.16) (0.46)  (1.18) (1.45) (1.54) 
Non-zero return days -70.1089 -24.5419 -15.3283  6.5163 3.7809 4.2486 
 (-0.76) (-0.65) (-0.65)  (1.39) (1.51) (2.05) 
Firms in industry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  1.1813** 0.8909** 0.7088*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (4.23) (3.99) (5.80) 
Trading Volume 1.2886 0.0530 -0.2304  0.2701 0.0456 0.0031 
 (0.78) (0.06) (-0.36)  (0.49) (0.14) (0.01) 
Constant 8.4120 -4.8868 -7.0914  -34.8985 -18.5145* -17.1401* 
 (0.37) (-0.47) (-1.01)  (-1.80) (-2.76) (-2.65) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 60 60 60  86 86 86 
Average. 𝑅2 0.864 0.847 0.833   0.860 0.816 0.771 
 Continued on next page 
 
 




Table 5.6 continued  
 Kenya  Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.3187** 0.3345*** 0.1826  0.7507*** 0.5652*** 0.5022*** 
 (2.77) (5.89) (1.62)  (14.58) (16.84) (11.43) 
Age -0.1162 0.1858 0.1972  2.2999 1.7235 1.4971 
 (-0.34) (0.88) (0.95)  (1.07) (1.13) (1.18) 
Leverage -0.0228 -0.8287 -0.3936  -0.3911 -0.2133 -0.4876** 
 (-0.02) (-1.26) (-0.67)  (-1.16) (-1.38) (-3.58) 
Profitability 0.1117 -0.4138 0.0949  -1.2214 -1.4291 -1.0759 
 (0.06) (-0.38) (0.09)  (-1.02) (-1.27) (-1.18) 
Non-zero return days 2.4895* 1.9778** 1.4940**  3.5162** 3.1863*** 2.6185*** 
 (1.99) (2.25) (2.55)  (4.22) (7.79) (8.37) 
Firms in industry -0.2189 -0.2811* -0.1762*  0.1330 0.1352* 0.1942* 
 (-1.14) (-2.14) (-1.85)  (0.98) (2.21) (2.65) 
Trading Volume 0.2572 0.2037* 0.3220***  0.3476** 0.2318*** 0.1926*** 
 (1.36) (1.92) (3.96)  (3.68) (7.93) (8.45) 
Constant -6.2031*** -5.6859*** -4.4868***  -11.7429** -9.8643*** -9.1664*** 
 (-4.01) (-6.93) (-5.39)  (-3.78) (-4.91) (-4.91) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 323 323 323  291 291 291 
Average. 𝑅2 0.641 0.712 0.713   0.663 0.660 0.724 









Table 5.6 continued  
 South Africa  Excl. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.5989*** 0.4449*** 0.3891***  0.4213*** 0.3721*** 0.2103 
 (16.44) (17.06) (22.95)  (3.41) (6.14) (1.80) 
Age 0.1945*** 0.1562*** 0.1369***  -0.3811 0.0342 0.0451 
 (4.52) (4.32) (5.02)  (-1.38) (0.14) (0.19) 
Leverage 0.2280 0.3753** 0.3252**  0.2380 -0.3003 0.2313 
 (1.04) (2.56) (2.57)  (0.33) (-0.45) (0.43) 
Profitability -0.7471*** -0.5533** -0.4773***  0.3419 0.0710 0.7646 
 (-3.90) (-3.16) (-3.53)  (0.19) (0.08) (1.05) 
Non-zero return days 0.6974 0.9158* 0.6976*  3.2730*** 2.6218*** 2.0514*** 
 (1.11) (2.03) (1.87)  (3.74) (3.88) (5.00) 
Firms in industry -0.1022 -0.2170** -0.1328  -0.0691 -0.2008 -0.0989 
 (-0.40) (-2.41) (-1.74)  (-0.47) (-1.52) (-1.21) 
Trading Volume 0.3241*** 0.1991*** 0.1758***  0.0860 0.0721 0.1325** 
 (5.34) (5.16) (4.61)  (0.68) (1.01) (2.78) 
Constant -7.1154*** -5.1882*** -4.9748***  -7.0015*** -6.3143*** -5.1716*** 
 (-4.17) (-9.59) (-10.30)  (-5.30) (-8.86) (-7.55) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2373 2373 2373  760 760 760 









5.4.3.3 Ownership structure and synchronicity 
This chapter next investigates whether synchronicity is influenced by ownership structure. 
The main ownership variables of interest are the level of ownership concentration (Top 5 
shareholders), the percentage of shares directly held by government/government 
institutions (Government Ownership), the percentage of shares directly held by 
institutional investors (Institutional Ownership) and the percentage of shares directly held 
by Families and Individuals (Families and Individuals). This analysis is limited to only 
shares directly held by the different types of shareholders. Due to constraints with data 
availability, more complex ownership structures such as pyramids and ultimate owners 
cannot be examined.  
Figure 5.2 depicts the evolution of ownership in terms of these four variables of 
interest. Ownership appears to have remained relatively stable over the sample period 
especially in the post 2007 period. Throughout the sample period, the level of institutional 
ownership has remained above government ownership. However, a closer look also 
suggests that the gap between institutional ownership and government ownership appears 
narrower relative to the period prior. Interestingly the influence of family and individual 
ownership has also persistently remain lower than the rest of the three structures over the 
period. 
 Table 5.7 presents a description of the ownership data by way of summary statistics 
for each country. The highest level of ownership concentration is found in Botswana with 
the Top 5 shareholders directly holding an average of 69% of the shares. This is followed 
by Kenya and Ghana with 66% and 62% respectively. Nigeria and South Africa both have 
Top 5 shareholders directly holding less than 60% of company stock. The few number of 
observations is worthy of note. This is due to many instances of missing observations. 
Despite this limitation, the  statistics on ownership concentration are quite consistent 
previous studies of Markets as indicated in Chapter 2 of the thesis (eg. Tsamenyi et al. 
2007, Ongore et al. 2011). These studies find the level of percentage of shares held by top 
3-5 shareholders to be greater than 50% Botswana also has the largest percentage of shares 
directly held by institutional investors (60%) with Kenya having the lowest. Kenya has the 




largest proportion of shares directly held by the Government whilst Botswana has the 
largest percentage of shares directly held by families and individuals.7 
 





                                                          
7 It is important to stress that the summary statistics for Botswana could be influenced by the relatively 
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Table 5.7: Summary statistics of ownership data 
This table presents summary statistics of ownership data for each country. 
Panel A: Botswana 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Top 5 Shareholders 62 0.693 0.190 0.172 0.726 1.000 
Institutional Ownership 62 0.595 0.239 0.107 0.631 0.939 
Government Ownership 0 . . . . . 
Families and Individuals 17 0.146 0.137 0.005 0.120 0.534 
Panel B: Ghana 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Top 5 Shareholders 110 0.617 0.267 0.054 0.661 0.972 
Institutional Ownership 110 0.467 0.304 0.013 0.406 0.965 
Government Ownership 26 0.217 0.162 0.001 0.214 0.427 
Families and Individuals 60 0.076 0.124 0.002 0.026 0.557 
Panel C: Kenya 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Top 5 Shareholders 160 0.659 0.186 0.054 0.690 1.000 
Institutional Ownership 160 0.267 0.258 0.007 0.175 0.948 
Government Ownership 42 0.253 0.168 0.011 0.227 0.600 
Families and Individuals 108 0.065 0.064 0.003 0.035 0.261 
Panel D: Nigeria 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Top 5 Shareholders 214 0.524 0.250 0.093 0.507 1.000 
Institutional Ownership 214 0.297 0.195 0.015 0.256 0.830 
Government Ownership 11 0.112 0.209 0.002 0.021 0.534 
Families and Individuals 64 0.100 0.099 0.000 0.079 0.557 
Panel E: South Africa 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Top 5 Shareholders 1330 0.564 0.243 0.054 0.569 1.000 
Institutional Ownership 1330 0.353 0.233 0.007 0.300 0.965 
Government Ownership 44 0.090 0.048 0.014 0.104 0.184 











Table 5.8  presents regression results for the impact of ownership structure on 
synchronicity. Similar to previous regressions in this chapter, industry and year dummies 
are included. Due to the limited number of observations in each country, results are 
presented for the full sample rather than by country. However, to ensure that the results 
are not driven by the inclusion of South African sample, which is disproportionately 
larger than each of the other four countries, a separate set of results are presented for a 
sample that excludes South Africa. Country dummies are included to address the impact 
of any particular country effects.   
The results in Table 5.8 do not provide any evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that synchronicity is influenced by ownership structure. Therefore, hypotheses 4,5, 6 and 
7 are not supported. For the full sample, none of the coefficients of the ownership 
variables are statistically significant. In the sample that excludes South Africa, only a 
weakly significant relationship is found between synchronicity and Government 
Ownership, and Families and Individuals. The findings from this regressions contrast 
with previous studies on synchronicity and ownership structure. Gul et al. (2010), using 
the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder as a measure of ownership 
concentration, find a positive and significant relationship between synchronicity and 
ownership concentration. They further find this relationship to be more pronounced when 
the largest shareholder is government-related. However,  and consistent with the 
alignment effect posited by Fan and Wong (2002), the relationship they find between 
synchronicity and ownership concentration is concave. Beyond a level of ownership 
concentration, synchronicity starts to decrease. This is because, at a certain high level of 
ownership concentration, there is no further entrenchment irrespective of the increase in 
voting rights. However, the majority shareholder(s) will find it more costly to divert firm 
resources for private gain due to the significant cash flow rights they possess. An and 
Zhang (2013) find that the level of institutional holdings has a significantly negative 
impact on synchronicity suggesting that firms with higher levels of institutional 
ownership are less synchronous. They, however, draw an important distinction between 
dedicated investors, who have a greater incentive to monitor managers by virtue of their 
large holdings and long-term orientation, and transient investors, who monitor managers 
weakly owing to their small holdings and short-termism. Whilst they find synchronicity 
to be lower in the case of the former, they find it to be higher in the case of the latte




Table 5.8: Ownership structure and synchronicity 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates of the impact of ownership structure on synchronicity. The dependent variable is Synch1. To preserve space, the variable definitions 
are excluded from this table. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Synch1 
  Full Sample   Excl. South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top 5 Shareholders 0.3614     0.0009    
 (1.49)     (0.00)    
Institutional Ownership  0.2295     -0.4775   
  (0.91)     (-0.93)   
Government Ownership   4.5054     6.7040*  
   (1.16)     (1.73)  
Families and Individuals    1.0514     3.8261* 
    (1.15)     (1.76) 
Firm Size 0.6609*** 0.6605*** 1.8130*** 0.6429***  0.8368*** 0.8476*** 2.1007*** 0.9851*** 
 (16.32) (16.33) (4.34) (10.48)  (9.36) (9.50) (4.51) (6.38) 
Age 0.2387** 0.2329** 0.0838 0.3341**  0.4127 0.4595 1.2418 0.3846 
 (2.51) (2.43) (0.04) (2.31)  (1.03) (1.14) (0.58) (0.80) 
Leverage 0.1164 0.1015 3.4969 0.4065  0.4588 0.5333 2.0620 2.3753** 
 (0.31) (0.27) (1.51) (0.62)  (0.50) (0.59) (0.76) (2.07) 
Profitability -0.4973 -0.4628 -7.7850 -1.9290**  -1.8079 -1.5684 -15.6239 -5.6716 
 (-0.94) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-2.07)  (-0.65) (-0.56) (-0.63) (-1.45) 
Non-zero return days -0.4082 -0.4426 5.4817 -0.3981  1.5969 1.6093 5.8885 -0.8257 
 (-0.73) (-0.80) (1.38) (-0.56)  (1.47) (1.52) (1.44) (-0.64) 
Firms in industry -0.2831** -0.2892** -0.5540 -0.2905**  -0.4143 -0.4301 -0.2554 -0.1980 
 (-2.51) (-2.57) (-0.56) (-2.42)  (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.37) (-1.47) 
Trading Volume 0.4131*** 0.4023*** -0.1032 0.3997***  0.2078 0.2044 -0.2843 0.3424 
 (5.78) (5.62) (-0.27) (3.77)  (1.22) (1.27) (-0.60) (1.25) 
Constant -5.5702*** -5.4104*** -18.5288*** -5.7531***  -8.2180*** -8.2712*** -16.4245*** 
-8.2378*** 
 
 (-7.02) (-7.04) (-2.87) (-5.91)  (-3.94) (-3.98) (-4.09) (-3.52) 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1122 1122 54 552  235 235 44 120 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.482 0.482 0.430 0.433   0.498 0.500 0.426 0.498 




Regressions which test for the impact of ownership structure on stock return 
synchronicity, where Synch1 and Synch2 are dependent variables, have also been carried 
out, and results of these are presented in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Consistent 
with the results in Table 5.8, co-efficient estimates of the ownership variables are not 
statistically significant and lends more support to the finding that stock return 
synchronicity in African markets appear not to be influenced by ownership structure. The 
results in Table 5.8 are therefore robust to different measures of stock return 
synchronicity.  
5.5 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
This section presents some robustness checks. These include re-estimating the level of 
synchronicity using non-zero firm returns and also employing an alternative estimation 
technique to ascertain the determinants of synchronicity. 
Synchronicity from non-zero firm returns 
A major characteristic of developing markets/emerging markets in general and African 
markets, in particular, is the issue of thin-trading. This is manifested in the many zero 
returns associated with stocks8. Therefore, one may argue that the low level of 
synchronicity is due to the infrequent nature with which prices change in this market. 
Whilst the percentage of non-zero return days has been included as a control in the 
regressions, an attempt is made to more directly address the above concern by re-
computing synchronicity by using only non-zero return firm observations and their 
corresponding market or world returns.  
Table 5.9 presents summary statistics of the synchronicity figures. Although noticeable 
increases in synchronicity can be observed, especially for Botswana and Ghana, overall, 
they still remain relatively stable. Table 5.9 shows that synchronicity is lower than might 
be expected compared to previous literature for the markets in this study. The average 
level of synchronicity for emerging markets was found to be upwards of 40% in Morck 
et al (2000)—43%, 45% and 57% for Malaysia, China, and Poland respectively. In Jin 
and Myers (2006), it is found to be between 27% and 47%. Table 5.10 presents 
synchronicity constructed from non-zero returns by year. Although the figures in this 
                                                          
8 In the next chapter of this thesis, the percentage of non-zero returns is used as a basis to select stocks to 
test the impact of corporate information as the problems of thin trading are more pronounced in event 
study settings as opposed to measures of synchronicity. 




table show higher values of synchronicity, they still point to a generally lower level of 
stock return synchronicity than will be expected for a developing markets. 
 
Table 5.9: Synchronicity excluding zero return firm observations 
This table presents summary statistics of synchronicity figures where zero return firm observations are 
excluded.   
  
N 
Synch1   Synch2   Synch3 
Mean  Median   Mean  Median   Mean  Median 




















South Africa 3119 0.088 0.03   0.108 0.051   0.124 0.065 
 
 
 Table 5.11 presents regression results on the determinants of synchronicity using the 
three specifications of synchronicity as the dependent variable. Firm size continues to be 
the main driver of synchronicity.  In the case of Botswana, this is only significant for 
Synch1. In Ghana, firm size loads positively and significantly on both Synch2 and Synch3. 
For Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, it loads positively on all three measures. Age also 
remains significant in South Africa. One notable differences in Table 5.11 compared to 
the earlier tables is that Age is significant in the Ghana sample. But overall, the results 
presented in these table are qualitatively similar to those presented in earlier tables where 
synchronicity was constructed from returns that included zero returns. Therefore, the 
results on the determinants of stock return synchronicity are not driven by the inclusion 
of zero returns in the sample.





Table 5.10 :  Synchronicity from non-zero returns by year 
This table presents synchronicity computed from only non-zero return firm observations by year.  
  Botswana Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
2005    0.095 0.178 0.417 0.011 0.036 0.050 0.104 0.160 0.175 0.072 0.096 0.112 
2006    0.145 0.256 0.455 0.006 0.032 0.038 0.087 0.094 0.100 0.111 0.136 0.152 
2007    0.080 0.128 0.274 0.007 0.039 0.051 0.066 0.080 0.092 0.096 0.113 0.130 
2008    0.034 0.150 0.298 0.131 0.141 0.149 0.123 0.129 0.145 0.101 0.123 0.138 
2009 0.218 0.305 0.354 0.284 0.407 0.545 0.028 0.063 0.084 0.129 0.171 0.219 0.077 0.097 0.115 
2010 0.129 0.203 0.251 0.197 0.249 0.298 0.085 0.092 0.102 0.117 0.148 0.170 0.095 0.116 0.132 
2011 0.181 0.206 0.280 0.197 0.289 0.341 0.083 0.099 0.108 0.072 0.101 0.133 0.102 0.123 0.137 
2012 0.177 0.296 0.353 0.171 0.254 0.344 0.045 0.054 0.062 0.103 0.141 0.157 0.064 0.077 0.092 
2013 0.129 0.208 0.342 0.138 0.159 0.183 0.119 0.137 0.147 0.104 0.129 0.151 0.083 0.101 0.118 
2014 0.236 0.303 0.409 0.185 0.272 0.330 0.061 0.067 0.076 0.118 0.178 0.211 0.071 0.088 0.105 
2015 0.218 0.380 0.591 0.239 0.262 0.296 0.066 0.078 0.087 0.199 0.224 0.258 0.095 0.115 0.133 




   
 Table 5.11: Synchronicity constructed with non-zero returns of firms 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity where synchronicity is computed using non-zero firm returns. Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent 
variables. Synch1 is the R-squared from a regression of firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the 
contemporaneous market return and the lagged market return. Synch3 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as 
the world market return. Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  
Leverage is computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as operating income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a 
firm has non-zero returns in the previous year. Firms in industry is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively.    
 Botswana  Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.7490** 0.3514 0.2072  0.5817** 0.3407** 0.2197 
 (2.16) (1.42) (0.89)  (2.63) (2.65) (1.65) 
Age -0.5468 0.1912 0.5460  30.0137*** 18.2648*** 19.3985*** 
 (-0.67) (0.45) (1.19)  (3.66) (3.52) (4.11) 
Leverage -2.9530 -0.9049 -0.6872  -0.2810 0.1757 0.3107 
 (-0.86) (-0.45) (-0.33)  (-0.15) (0.13) (0.24) 
Profitability -0.2352 7.1364** 4.4121  7.4594 3.4391 6.5261 
 (-0.05) (2.18) (1.13)  (1.12) (0.81) (1.48) 
Non-zero return days 10.7495 2.4256 2.9766  4.1668 0.6320 0.3543 
 (1.61) (0.43) (0.52)  (0.98) (0.28) (0.16) 
Firms in industry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.8155* 0.5359*** 0.5627*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (1.71) (2.90) (3.15) 
Trading Volume 0.0089 -0.1744 -0.3055  0.0201 -0.0011 -0.0572 
 (0.03) (-1.00) (-1.66)  (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.36) 
Constant -7.2970*** -5.6814*** -4.3670***  -65.3000*** -39.8648*** -41.5287*** 
 (-3.98) (-4.09) (-3.10)  (-4.41) (-4.07) (-4.71) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 57 57 57  73 73 73 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.242 0.249 0.124   0.119 0.079 0.127 
Continued on next page 
 




Table 5.11 continued 
 Kenya  Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.4306*** 0.3256*** 0.3144***  0.6141*** 0.4233*** 0.3617*** 
 (4.11) (4.53) (5.88)  (7.81) (8.92) (7.63) 
Age 0.3427 0.0457 0.0770  0.1676 0.3080 0.3076 
 (1.42) (0.37) (0.69)  (0.35) (0.64) (0.76) 
Leverage 2.3774* 1.3886* 1.0794*  -0.7379 -0.5753 -0.8151 
 (1.95) (1.84) (1.78)  (-0.76) (-1.01) (-1.58) 
Profitability 0.5022 -0.4813 -0.5803  0.3527 0.4079 -0.4170 
 (0.22) (-0.33) (-0.44)  (0.12) (0.23) (-0.27) 
Non-zero return days 0.1211 -0.4443 -0.7644  1.1591* 0.6169 0.2794 
 (0.14) (-0.72) (-1.59)  (1.67) (1.39) (0.68) 
Firms in industry -0.2688 -0.1954 -0.1825*  0.4891 -0.1061 -0.0517 
 (-1.40) (-1.23) (-1.70)  (1.18) (-0.46) (-0.24) 
Trading Volume -0.0088 -0.0124 0.0033  0.3228* 0.1356 0.0914 
 (-0.05) (-0.12) (0.04)  (1.93) (1.35) (0.96) 
Constant -7.9225*** -5.0556*** -4.4269***  -7.9616*** -3.6134** -3.3366** 
 (-5.40) (-4.90) (-5.62)  (-2.96) (-2.26) (-2.26) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 321 321 321  279 279 279 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.376 0.389 0.417   0.352 0.417 0.393 









Table 5.11 continued  
 South Africa  Excl. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.5811*** 0.4143*** 0.3616***  0.5366*** 0.3483*** 0.2961*** 
 (19.61) (20.29) (22.08)  (9.24) (9.10) (8.35) 
Age 0.2112*** 0.2178*** 0.2008***  -0.2200* -0.3136*** -0.2858*** 
 (3.71) (5.73) (6.20)  (-1.88) (-3.87) (-4.14) 
Leverage 0.3599 0.5771*** 0.5129***  0.2817 0.3438 0.1051 
 (1.45) (3.55) (3.75)  (0.41) (0.79) (0.27) 
Profitability -0.7874*** -0.4207** -0.4479***  -0.0276 0.3568 0.2794 
 (-2.66) (-2.04) (-2.61)  (-0.02) (0.30) (0.29) 
Non-zero return days -1.4498*** -1.1957*** -1.3892***  -0.4306 -0.9939*** -1.3904*** 
 (-3.82) (-4.83) (-6.89)  (-0.85) (-3.01) (-4.73) 
Firms in industry -0.2439* -0.1976* -0.1134  -0.0992 -0.1457 -0.1472 
 (-1.79) (-1.79) (-1.14)  (-0.59) (-0.97) (-1.32) 
Trading Volume 0.1866*** 0.0549* 0.0013  -0.0419 -0.0728 -0.1176** 
 (3.73) (1.70) (0.04)  (-0.43) (-1.21) (-2.06) 
Constant -4.4169*** -3.5331*** -3.3950***  -5.5656*** -3.2134*** -2.4434*** 
 (-5.19) (-5.23) (-5.59)  (-5.55) (-3.71) (-3.65) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2366 2366 2366  730 730 730 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.303 0.306 0.290   0.271 0.339 0.343 
 
 




Ordered probit regressions 
With averagely low levels of synchronicity, one may question the purpose of carrying out 
a pooled regression in the first place, given that synchronicity may not be present and that 
a pooled regression uses mean values for synchronicity by firm. Whilst on average R2 
figures may be low, some individual firms exhibit high levels of synchronicity, hence 
using a pooled regression may not necessarily be out of place. However, to address this 
concern, the regressions are re-run using an ordered probit model. In this context, the 
purpose is to test which characteristics are likely to determine synchronicity in firms. An 
ordered probit model is used to estimate the relationship between an independent variable 
and an ordinal dependent variable. Unlike a standard probit model, where the dependent 
variable takes on two outcomes, the dependent variable in an ordered probit model takes 
on more than two outcomes, which can be ordered. Synchronicity observations in each 
country are divided into four quartiles with categorical variables assigned to each quartile. 
The first quartile takes on a value of zero, the second quartile takes on a value of one, the 
third quartile takes on a value of 2 and the fourth quartile takes on a value of 3. Larger 
values of the categories therefore correspond to higher outcomes (levels of 
synchronicity).  
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 5.12. Coefficient estimates 
of firm size continue to be positive and significant. Large firms have a greater probability 
of being more synchronous, consistent with the understanding already expressed. These 
firms are more likely to be more diversified and also act as act as a bellwether for general 
market movements, which in turn leads to higher stock return synchronicity. Coefficients 
for firm age are also consistent with those of previous tables. Age continues to be 
insignificant in all four countries except South Africa. Coefficient estimates for the other 
variables and the conclusions thereof are largely consistent with those from the OLS 
estimates. Non-zero return continues to be significant in the case of Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa, whilst the impact of leverage is statistically significant in the case of South 
Africa. It is however important to stress that the results in Table 5.12 only signal the 
impact of firm characteristics on synchronicity in terms of the direction. These are not 
marginal effects and therefore do not give an indication of the magnitude of change in 
synchronicity given a change in a particular characteristic of the firm. Overall, the results 
in this section support the argument that size is a key determinant of stock return 
synchronicity of African firms.




  Table 5.12: Ordered probit regression estimates 
This table presents results of Ordered probit regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity. Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent variables. Synch1 is the R-squared from a regression 
of firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return and the lagged market return. 
Synch3  is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as the world market return. Firm Size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  Leverage is computed as total debt divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as Income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a firm has non-zero returns in the previous year. Firms 
in industry is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the 
year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
 Botswana  Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.4967*** 0.2607* 0.2569*  0.5279*** 0.5279*** 0.3926*** 
 (3.18) (1.77) (1.75)  (4.85) (4.85) (4.14) 
Age -0.2203 -0.1493 -0.2833  0.1288 0.1288 0.0529 
 (-0.83) (-0.58) (-1.09)  (0.35) (0.35) (0.15) 
Leverage 2.2315 -0.5221 0.2016  0.0565 0.0565 0.4161 
 (1.44) (-0.35) (0.14)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.55) 
Profitability 0.4350 5.0014 2.2024  1.0326 1.0326 -0.0438 
 (0.15) (1.50) (0.74)  (0.84) (0.84) (-0.04) 
Non-zero return days -1.8544 -1.9873 0.9476  0.4120 0.4120 1.3474 
 (-0.54) (-0.59) (0.29)  (0.22) (0.22) (0.73) 
Firms in industry 1.9359 6.8870** 3.7256  -1.8407 -1.8407 -0.4019 
 (0.75) (2.12) (1.42)  (-1.11) (-1.11) (-0.25) 
Trading Volume 0.2710** 0.0141 -0.0647  0.1588 0.1588 0.1501 
 (1.97) (0.11) (-0.50)  (1.19) (1.19) (1.14) 
Constant        
Cut 1 11.5278 41.3161** 22.8744  -6.5409 -6.5409 -1.9271 
 (0.74) (2.12) (1.46)  (-1.17) (-1.17) (-0.36) 
Cut 2 12.6058 42.1244** 23.5197  -5.1770 -5.1770 -0.7113 
 (0.81) (2.16) (1.50)  (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.13) 
Cut 3 13.3372 42.8500** 24.2536  -4.0285 -4.0285 0.2452 
 (0.86) (2.20) (1.55)  (-0.73) (-0.73) (0.05) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 60 60 60  86 86 86 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.157 0.098 0.066   0.280 0.280 0.191 
Continued on next page 
 




Table 5.12 continued 
  Kenya   Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.2408*** 0.2381*** 0.2398***  0.4011*** 0.4191*** 0.4246*** 
 (4.57) (4.48) (4.51)  (8.44) (8.76) (8.85) 
Age 0.1237 0.0620 0.0096  0.7823*** 0.7384*** 0.7875*** 
 (1.08) (0.54) (0.08)  (4.28) (4.01) (4.22) 
Leverage 0.3670 0.6346 0.3038  -0.7076 -0.3635 -0.5356 
 (0.71) (1.21) (0.57)  (-1.47) (-0.76) (-1.10) 
Profitability -0.2474 1.0216 0.6597  0.0037 0.6765 0.7066 
 (-0.24) (0.96) (0.62)  (0.00) (0.73) (0.76) 
Non-zero return days 1.1838*** 1.3118*** 1.6244***  1.9991*** 2.1981*** 2.2251*** 
 (2.87) (3.13) (3.82)  (5.41) (5.78) (5.81) 
Firms in industry -0.2799 -0.5475* -0.2411  0.0046 -0.2831 -0.6285 
 (-0.85) (-1.67) (-0.74)  (0.01) (-0.31) (-0.68) 
Trading Volume 0.0041 0.0254 0.0584  0.2148*** 0.2670*** 0.3265*** 
 (0.06) (0.38) (0.88)  (3.00) (3.69) (4.31) 
Constant        
Cut 1 0.8760 -0.0424 0.4005  2.0984 0.9698 -0.2525 
 (0.88) (-0.04) (0.40)  (0.67) (0.31) (-0.08) 
Cut 2 1.6274 0.7235 1.1599  3.0352 2.0837 0.9014 
 (1.63) (0.72) (1.16)  (0.97) (0.67) (0.29) 
Cut 3 2.4448** 1.5355 1.9940**  4.2116 3.2688 2.0535 
 (2.43) (1.53) (1.99)  (1.35) (1.05) (0.65) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 323 323 323  291 291 291 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.103 0.123 0.126   0.286 0.312 0.325 
Continued on next page 
 
 




Table 5.12 continued 
  South Africa   Exc. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.3331*** 0.3198*** 0.3189***  0.3120*** 0.3301*** 0.3094*** 
 (19.72) (19.07) (19.01)  (11.41) (11.86) (11.31) 
Age 0.0956*** 0.1068*** 0.0747**  -0.1502*** -0.1916*** -0.2013*** 
 (3.00) (3.35) (2.36)  (-2.66) (-3.38) (-3.56) 
Leverage 0.3997*** 0.4043*** 0.3800***  -0.0329 0.1365 -0.1263 
 (3.21) (3.25) (3.07)  (-0.12) (0.51) (-0.47) 
Profitability -0.1435 -0.0012 -0.2210  -0.3503 0.1042 0.0853 
 (-0.92) (-0.01) (-1.42)  (-0.72) (0.21) (0.17) 
Non-zero return days 0.6230*** 0.7561*** 0.8542***  1.2479*** 1.3355*** 1.3241*** 
 (3.35) (4.06) (4.59)  (5.83) (6.23) (6.18) 
Firms in industry -0.1770 -0.4292 -0.3546  0.0346 -0.2504 -0.1333 
 (-0.44) (-1.07) (-0.83)  (0.12) (-0.90) (-0.48) 
Trading Volume 0.1991*** 0.1924*** 0.1943***  0.0685* 0.0826** 0.0647* 
 (8.87) (8.60) (8.67)  (1.87) (2.24) (1.77) 
Constant        
Cut 1 0.0954 -0.4386 -0.1090  0.7290 -0.0570 0.0280 
 (0.09) (-0.41) (-0.09)  (0.85) (-0.07) (0.03) 
Cut 2 0.9849 0.4705 0.8320  1.5609* 0.8247 0.8834 
 (0.90) (0.44) (0.71)  (1.83) (0.98) (1.05) 
Cut 3 2.0499* 1.5294 1.8941  2.5114*** 1.8164** 1.8459** 
 (1.87) (1.42) (1.63)  (2.93) (2.15) (2.19) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2373 2373 2373  760 760 760 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.230 0.231 0.231   0.170 0.188 0.170 
 





The appendix to the chapter presents results of some further analysis. Specifically, 
Appendix 5.3 presents regression results where financial companies are excluded. The 
results in this appendix are qualitatively similar to results for the full sample. Hence the 
inclusion of financial firms does not affect the conclusions contained in this chapter. 
Appendix 5.4 presents OLS regression results where standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. These results also remain qualitatively similar to the main results. 
  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the level of stock return synchronicity in African markets using a 
sample of five countries. The analysis in the chapter is motivated by the arguments that 
stock prices in developing markets, which are characterised by poor protection of property 
rights, are deemed to be more synchronous (Morck et al 2000). One reason for this view 
is that arbitrageurs, who help to facilitate the incorporation of information into stock 
prices find poorly developed markets unattractive. Further, Jin and Myers (2006) argue 
that the impact of poor investor protection on stock return synchronicity is exacerbated 
when there is opaqueness (lack of transparency) as the lack of information inhibits 
investors from being able to facilitate the incorporation of information to stock prices. 
Thus, a high level of stock return synchronicity will imply inefficient markets. Taken this 
together, one may expect higher stock return synchronicity in African markets. 
However, a recent school of thought, forcefully put forward by Dasgupta et al. 
(2010), argues that more developed markets, characterised by a better information 
environment, can be associated with higher stock return synchronicity. Alternatively, less 
developed markets, which typically have weaker information environments, can be 
associated with lower synchronicity. This is due to the fact that the generally low 
information available to market participants in less developed markets may induce a 
greater surprise from future company announcements leading to lower synchronicity. The 
increase in stock return synchronicity in a stronger information environment can be due 
to the continuous disclosure of both time-variant information such as earnings and time-
invariant information such as managerial ability. 
 




The findings in this chapter show that on average, stock prices in African markets 
do not fit the conventional narrative of high synchronicity. This is consistent with the 
alternative school of thought that stock return synchronicity can be high in more 
developed markets and low in less developed markets (Dasgupta et al. 2010). Overall, the 
findings in this chapter contribute to the understanding of synchronicity and how it can 
vary between different information environments. The results presented here underscore 
the need to understand the dynamics of the relationship between stock prices and 
synchronicity in developing and emerging markets, and how changes in a firm’s 
information environment affect the mechanics of price discovery. The evidence provided 
in this chapter further shows that, unlike what pertains in developed countries, the 
information and economic environment in African markets may be having a different 
impact on the price discovery process. Thus, although these countries are characterised 
by low GDP and relatively weaker transparency, the averagely low level of synchronicity 
among firms may suggest that corporate events may carry some stock price implications. 
In a weak information environment, market participants may not be able to learn a lot 
about the fundamentals of the firms due to the lack or inadequate disclosure of 
information. For example, it may be difficult to determine if a particular company will be 
the likely target of a takeover bid. This is because, the level of transparency and disclosure 
may not be sufficient to enable investors or analysts gather enough information to come 
to this conclusion. But should such an announcement be eventually disclosed, it might 
trigger more substantial reactions, leading to lower levels of stock return synchronicity. 
The next chapter examines whether conditional on the low levels of synchronicity 
observed in this chapter, stock prices react to earnings announcements. 
 






  Appendix 5.1: Ownership structure and synchronicity (using Synch2 as a dependent variable) 
 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates of the impact of ownership structure on synchronicity. The dependent variable is Synch2. To preserve space, the variable definitions are 
excluded from this table. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. .   
Dependent Variable: Synch2 
  Full Sample   Excl. South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top 5 Shareholders 0.2098     -0.1341    
 (1.24)     (-0.30)    
Institutional Ownership  0.2089     -0.5794   
  (1.23)     (-1.36)   
Government Ownership   4.6178     5.9321  
   (1.31)     (1.68)  
Families and Individuals    -0.0634     2.0566 
    (-0.11)     (1.51) 
Firm Size 0.5036*** 0.5025*** 1.3651*** 0.4839***  0.6581*** 0.6695*** 1.4708*** 0.7158*** 
 (17.76) (17.72) (5.32) (11.13)  (10.27) (10.33) (5.53) (6.54) 
Age 0.1612*** 0.1560** 0.8696 0.1734*  0.1239 0.1811 1.7076 -0.0057 
 (2.60) (2.51) (0.65) (1.92)  (0.45) (0.66) (1.10) (-0.02) 
Leverage 0.2506 0.2397 1.9679 0.7244**  0.6079 0.6875 1.0148 2.0976** 
 (1.00) (0.95) (1.35) (2.01)  (0.82) (0.94) (0.49) (2.41) 
Profitability -0.0765 -0.0544 -7.0032 -0.3857  1.2163 1.4397 -5.7146 -0.8410 
 (-0.21) (-0.15) (-0.71) (-0.63)  (0.56) (0.66) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
Non-zero return days -0.0093 -0.0244 3.9755 0.0330  1.7682* 1.7620** 4.1090 -0.1556 
 (-0.03) (-0.07) (1.11) (0.07)  (1.95) (1.99) (1.16) (-0.16) 
Firms in industry -0.1955* -0.1985* -0.4959 -0.1865*  -0.0226 -0.0336 0.1079 -0.1141 
 (-1.88) (-1.91) (-0.58) (-1.73)  (-0.13) (-0.19) (0.20) (-0.80) 
Trading Volume 0.2542*** 0.2493*** 0.0227 0.2444***  0.1682 0.1698 -0.0839 0.2025 
 (5.40) (5.36) (0.09) (3.83)  (1.48) (1.57) (-0.26) (1.42) 
Constant -4.8023*** -4.7325*** -15.9171*** -4.9197***  -6.2678*** -6.1567*** -21.2649*** -6.3146*** 
 (-7.17) (-7.14) (-2.79) (-6.46)  (-4.69) (-4.73) (-3.06) (-3.63) 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1122 1122 54 552  235 235 44 120 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.543 0.543 0.466 0.516   0.545 0.550 0.426 0.569 




   
  Appendix 5.2 Ownership structure and Synchronicity (using Synch3 as a dependent variable) 
 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates of the impact of ownership structure on synchronicity. The dependent variable is Synch3. To preserve space, the variable definitions are excluded from 
this table. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Synch3 
  Full Sample   Excl. South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top 5 Shareholders 0.1522     -0.2218    
 (1.07)     (-0.54)    
Institutional Ownership  0.1411     -0.4793   
  (0.95)     (-1.27)   
Government Ownership   4.0566     5.2403  
   (1.26)     (1.66)  
Families and Individuals    0.3629     1.9981 
    (0.74)     (1.16) 
Firm Size 0.4574*** 0.4567*** 1.2594*** 0.4420***  0.6030*** 0.6110*** 1.3328*** 0.6920*** 
 (18.16) (18.08) (5.33) (11.31)  (10.53) (10.52) (5.95) (7.33) 
Age 0.1115** 0.1080** 0.7024 0.1284  0.0612 0.1087 1.3742 -0.0627 
 (2.06) (2.00) (0.60) (1.59)  (0.25) (0.45) (1.05) (-0.20) 
Leverage 0.2838 0.2762 1.4026 0.5901**  0.8217 0.8787 0.5405 1.4570* 
 (1.41) (1.37) (1.05) (1.98)  (1.49) (1.56) (0.29) (1.69) 
Profitability -0.3218 -0.3060 -5.1953 -0.3426  -0.4181 -0.2886 -1.8182 -2.0361 
 (-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.58) (-0.62)  (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.71) 
Non-zero return days 0.2610 0.2493 3.5467 0.4220  1.2338* 1.2111* 3.5209 -0.0407 
 (0.87) (0.83) (1.10) (1.06)  (1.81) (1.83) (1.13) (-0.05) 
Firms in industry -0.1770* -0.1792* -0.4478 -0.1759*  -0.1566 -0.1590 0.1642 -0.1487 
 (-1.79) (-1.81) (-0.59) (-1.68)  (-0.88) (-0.92) (0.32) (-1.09) 
Trading Volume 0.1955*** 0.1917*** 0.0428 0.1887***  0.0978 0.1038 -0.0597 0.1234 
 (5.24) (5.20) (0.18) (3.52)  (1.12) (1.24) (-0.20) (0.96) 
Constant -4.5256*** -4.4717*** -14.2188** -4.6757***  -5.2973*** -5.2728*** -18.8109*** -5.8161*** 
 (-7.11) (-7.09) (-2.69) (-6.39)  (-4.39) (-4.49) (-3.08) (-3.62) 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1122 1122 54 552  235 235 44 120 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.566 0.566 0.411 0.544   0.534 0.538 0.364 0.549 
 









This table presents results of OLS regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity, excluding Financial companies.  Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent variables. Synch1 is the R-
squared from a regression of firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return 
and the lagged market return. Synch3  is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as the world market return.  
Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  Leverage is 
computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as Income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a firm has non-zero 
returns in the previous year. Firms in industry is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding at the year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.    
  Botswana   Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 2.1478* 0.9655 0.8851  0.4646* 0.4027*** 0.1861 
 (2.00) (1.73) (1.68)  (1.86) (2.85) (1.28) 
Age -1.3850 -0.8276 -0.6890  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-1.75) (-1.16) (-1.46)  (.) (.) (.) 
Leverage -7.3276 -7.8594 -5.7725  -2.8987* -0.6079 -0.0553 
 (-0.76) (-1.27) (-1.37)  (-2.04) (-0.71) (-0.08) 
Profitability 1.8584 5.5006 4.4841  -3.6846 -0.0554 0.1985 
 (0.21) (1.05) (0.96)  (-0.98) (-0.03) (0.14) 
Non-zero return days -13.0439 -5.3511 -2.7365  9.8699 3.3270 3.6817 
 (-0.72) (-0.41) (-0.32)  (1.02) (0.60) (1.05) 
Firms in industry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  -0.2639 0.5436 0.1320 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (-0.23) (0.95) (0.58) 
Trading Volume 0.9552* -0.0845 -0.2629  -0.7515 0.0419 -0.1272 
 (1.94) (-0.34) (-1.18)  (-1.46) (0.23) (-0.75) 
Constant -9.3020* -10.5045*** -9.9311***  -11.2918*** -8.0132*** -6.4193*** 
 (-1.81) (-3.68) (-3.95)  (-2.81) (-3.14) (-4.55) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effect No  No No  No  No No 
Obs 27 27 27  47 47 47 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.073 0.147 0.155   0.420 0.460 0.092 
Continued on next page 









Appendix 5.3 continued  
  Kenya   Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.3000** 0.2384*** 0.2191***  0.6674*** 0.4113*** 0.3283*** 
 (2.46) (3.12) (3.85)  (5.67) (5.03) (5.93) 
Age 0.2185 0.2049 0.2151  0.7545 0.4474 0.5071 
 (0.68) (0.89) (1.14)  (0.86) (0.73) (0.77) 
Leverage 1.6218 1.0461 0.8928  0.0930 0.6019 0.1188 
 (1.12) (1.23) (1.42)  (0.08) (0.80) (0.22) 
Profitability 1.7237 1.4527 1.2278  -1.3341 0.9445 0.9899 
 (0.60) (1.00) (1.00)  (-0.59) (0.56) (0.95) 
Non-zero return days 3.3532*** 2.2446*** 2.0987***  2.7147** 2.9685*** 2.3735*** 
 (3.08) (3.40) (3.86)  (2.45) (4.60) (5.11) 
Firms in industry -0.3554* -0.3313** -0.2674**  0.4517* 0.4322* 0.4596** 
 (-1.82) (-2.53) (-2.48)  (1.73) (1.96) (2.58) 
Trading Volume -0.1199 0.0123 0.0716  0.3545** 0.2081** 0.1470* 
 (-0.49) (0.13) (0.86)  (2.45) (2.01) (1.91) 
Constant -9.2538*** -6.5252*** -6.0715***  -10.3409*** -8.9460*** -8.4143*** 
 (-5.44) (-5.20) (-6.49)  (-4.56) (-5.17) (-5.47) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effect No  No No  No  No No 
Obs 229 229 229  175 175 175 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.347 0.367 0.418   0.353 0.390 0.483 
Continued on next page 











Appendix 5.3 continued  
  South Africa   Excl. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.6083*** 0.4474*** 0.3903***  0.5609*** 0.3368*** 0.2827*** 
 (17.13) (19.73) (22.65)  (8.00) (7.96) (8.83) 
Age 0.1132* 0.0997** 0.0800***  -0.2530 -0.2711*** -0.2967*** 
 (1.78) (2.41) (2.38)  (-1.60) (-2.85) (-3.65) 
Leverage 0.8759*** 0.9178*** 0.820***  0.3625 0.3319 0.4941 
 (2.89) (5.02) (5.75)  (0.50) (0.70) (1.60) 
Profitability -0.4940 -0.0968 -0.1164  -0.9151 0.4922 0.5849 
 (-1.40) (-0.45) (-0.71)  (-0.65) (0.50) (0.86) 
Non-zero return days 0.1053 0.4577* 0.374*  2.6400*** 2.3227*** 1.9939*** 
 (0.25) (1.74) (1.84)  (3.82) (6.14) (6.16) 
Firms in industry -0.0118 -0.2131* -0.1164  -0.0617 -0.1680 -0.1562 
 (-0.03) (-1.67) (-1.03)  (-0.36) (-1.34) (-1.49) 
Trading Volume 0.3982*** 0.2483*** 0.2214***  0.0301 0.0283 -0.0299 
 (7.39) (7.75) (7.96)  (0.25) (0.46) (-0.61) 
Constant -6.9353*** -4.7805*** -4.6422***  -7.7809*** -5.2271*** -4.6749*** 
 (-3.24) (-6.80) (-7.47)  (-7.17) (-6.87) (-7.36) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effect No  No No  No  No No 
Obs 1853 1853 1853  478 478 478 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.433 0.515 0.557   0.298 0.327 0.360 




   Appendix 5.4: OLS regression with clustered standard errors at the firm level 
 
This table presents results of OLS regression estimates on the determinants of synchronicity with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Synch1, Synch2, and Synch3 are the dependent variables. 
Synch1 is the R-squared from a regression of firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return. Synch2 is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous 
market return and the lagged market return. Synch3  is the R-Squared from the regression of a firm’s stock returns on the contemporaneous market return, lagged market return as well as the world 
market return. Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the log of the number of years since a firm’s base date in Datastream.  
Leverage is computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Profitability is measured as Income scaled by Total Assets. Non-Zero return days is the number of days a firm 
has non-zero returns in the previous year. Firms in Industry is the log of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. Trading Volume is the total trading volume of a firm in each year 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the year-end. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively.     
 Botswana  Ghana 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.9480*** 0.6095* 0.5624*  0.9177*** 0.6229*** 0.4334*** 
 (3.46) (2.13) (1.97)  (4.40) (4.70) (3.13) 
Age -0.6834 -0.6300 -0.5775  11.8820 0.4465 -1.7142 
 (-0.95) (-1.42) (-1.47)  (1.19) (0.09) (-0.33) 
Leverage 2.3733 0.0861 0.4823  -0.5218 0.3261 0.8756 
 (0.95) (0.04) (0.25)  (-0.32) (0.35) (0.81) 
Profitability 6.6970 11.3002*** 9.0903**  -2.7996 0.8611 1.0128 
 (1.08) (3.27) (2.88)  (-1.41) (0.81) (0.89) 
Non-zero return days 2.8032 5.1175 4.0061  4.4941 2.4048 2.2788 
 (0.31) (0.87) (0.64)  (1.10) (0.81) (0.84) 
Firms in industry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0885 0.1700 0.1229 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.30) (1.07) (0.65) 
Trading Volume 0.4137 -0.0342 -0.0356  0.0368 0.1814 0.0470 
 (1.19) (-0.16) (-0.21)  (0.09) (1.45) (0.41) 
Constant -9.6997*** -9.0563*** -7.2829***  -31.6845* -8.1241 -3.4793 
 (-4.42) (-7.15) (-6.16)  (-1.78) (-0.93) (-0.37) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 60 60 60  86 86 86 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.311 0.344 0.286   0.419 0.503 0.328 
Continued on next page 
 









 Appendix 5.4 continued 
 Kenya  Nigeria 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.4828*** 0.3668*** 0.3208***  0.7203*** 0.5199*** 0.4617*** 
 (4.16) (4.61) (5.27)  (10.72) (8.71) (8.85) 
Log(Age) 0.2422 0.0354 0.0132  0.0340 0.0297 0.1271 
 (0.79) (0.16) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.29) 
Leverage 1.3004 0.6964 0.5996  -0.4594 -0.2972 -0.5563 
 (0.84) (1.10) (1.20)  (-0.57) (-0.47) (-1.08) 
Profitability 0.6397 0.7556 0.6961  -0.4992 -0.0421 0.0447 
 (0.19) (0.60) (0.63)  (-0.21) (-0.04) (0.05) 
Non-zero return days 3.0885*** 2.2105*** 1.9311***  3.2711*** 3.0956*** 2.5440*** 
 (3.82) (3.41) (3.44)  (4.71) (6.83) (6.44) 
Firms in industry 0.0751 -0.0124 0.0219  0.2550 0.3431 0.3715* 
 (0.74) (-0.17) (0.34)  (1.26) (1.52) (1.94) 
Trading Volume -0.0354 0.0628 0.1237  0.3992*** 0.2728*** 0.2195*** 
 (-0.19) (0.52) (1.23)  (3.36) (3.11) (2.89) 
Constant -10.5442*** -7.0910*** -6.2717***  -8.6522*** -8.0722*** -7.7802*** 
 (-8.14) (-6.89) (-7.25)  (-5.33) (-5.25) (-5.72) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Yea effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 323 323 323  291 291 291 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.423 0.421 0.466   0.541 0.581 0.653 
Continued on next page 





Appendix 5.4 continued 
 South Africa  Excl. South Africa 
  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3  Synch1 Synch2 Synch3 
Firm Size 0.5984*** 0.4397*** 0.3852***  0.6658*** 0.4494*** 0.3972*** 
 (15.03) (14.87) (15.25)  (12.26) (10.75) (10.16) 
Log(Age) 0.1724** 0.1482*** 0.1283***  -0.1595 -0.2335** -0.2348*** 
 (2.33) (2.89) (2.87)  (-1.37) (-2.50) (-2.76) 
Leverage 0.3456 0.4447** 0.3816**  0.4374 0.2131 0.3171 
 (1.18) (2.17) (2.26)  (0.66) (0.43) (0.76) 
Profitability -0.6925** -0.4159* -0.4169**  -0.6993 0.1860 0.1261 
 (-2.13) (-1.88) (-2.28)  (-0.48) (0.23) (0.17) 
Non-zero return days 0.5667 0.8094*** 0.6875***  2.4446*** 2.2187*** 1.8644*** 
 (1.27) (2.70) (2.79)  (4.29) (5.17) (4.84) 
Firms in industry -0.0196 -0.1885*** -0.1132***  0.0021 -0.1151* -0.0903 
 (-0.41) (-5.61) (-3.91)  (0.03) (-1.75) (-1.60) 
Trading Volume 0.3391*** 0.2137*** 0.1781***  0.1353 0.0848 0.0439 
 (5.81) (5.69) (5.69)  (1.39) (1.29) (0.77) 
Constant -7.2533*** -5.0487*** -4.8664***  -8.3965*** -5.7900*** -5.2809*** 
 (-18.91) (-19.78) (-22.58)  (-12.90) (-11.43) (-11.53) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Yea effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2373 2373 2373  760 760 760 















6 Earnings Informativeness: 
Fundamentals or Trading Frequency? 
 
 







It has been established in the previous chapter that contrary to expectations based on 
previous studies (Morck et al. 2000, Jin and Myers 2006), stock returns in African markets 
(which are largely developing markets) is low on average. What then does this imply for 
stock pricing in these markets? Do African markets respond to corporate information as 
the low level of synchronicity might suggest? If so, and given this low level of 
synchronicity on average, are market reactions to corporate information driven by trading 
frequency and/or fundamentals of the firm? Arguably the most important channel of 
communication of company performance between managers and shareholders and, by 
implication, investor protection is the annual earnings announcement. This chapter 
addresses the above issues using a sample of annual earnings announcements.  
This chapter is also motivated by the low attention given to semi-strong efficiency 
in studies of market efficiency in African markets, compared to weak form efficiency (eg. 
Appiah-Kusi and Menyah 2003, Jefferis and Smith 2005, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey 
2008). As African markets develop, it is important to extend the analysis into the 
informativeness of new publicly available information. To date, there have been relatively 
few studies of semi-strong form efficiency of African stock markets. This lack of 
evidence has largely been due to data limitations and general illiquidity of most African 
stock markets (Assefa and Mollick 2014). Another important factor has been the poor 
quality of data provided by corporate news providers in Africa. Griffin et al. (2011) show 
that earnings and other corporate news announcements are more informative in countries 
with greater media sophistication and technology. The few studies that have examined 
the stock price reaction to corporate announcements by African companies such as 
earnings find little evidence to support the view that news regarding African firms carries 
information content (Osei 2002, Afego 2013). Consistent with the data constraints, 
samples used in these studies have been small. However, in recent years, many African 
stock markets have taken steps to improve the provision of value relevant corporate 
information. For example, many stock markets in Africa now have electronic trading 
systems that enable investors and other market participants to obtain information on a 
real-time basis. The websites of African stock exchanges also contain sections for 
company announcements, many of which qualify as price sensitive under the current 
regulation. Thus, this chapter also examines the extent to which recent development of 




African markets has affected information efficiency and the desirability of African 
markets as an investment prospect.   
To investigate the informativeness of earnings announcements, this chapter uses a 
large set of corporate annual earnings announcements from companies in three out of the 
five countries used in the previous chapter - Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.9 It then 
examines whether market reactions are associated with firm fundamentals (earnings 
characteristics) or trading frequency. In order to capture informativeness of earnings, 
normalised volatility (based on market-adjusted abnormal returns) is computed. This 
compares volatility during the earnings event window to volatility for a period outside 
the earnings announcement window (Griffin et al. 2011). Abnormal trading volume for 
the same event window as normalized volatility is also computed.  
The results show that earnings announcements are informative in all three countries 
but the impact of characteristics of earnings varies by country. Informativeness of 
earnings is strongly influenced by the level of trading frequency. The magnitude of 
earnings affects trading volume but not price in the Kenyan sample whilst both price and 
trading volume is affected by the size of earnings in Nigeria. Price and trading volume 
are associated with changes in earnings and changes from negative to positive earnings 
respectively in the South African sample. There is also some evidence of the impact of 
trading frequency. Notably, less frequently traded stocks are associated with greater 
earnings informativeness. More highly traded stocks are less associated with earnings 
informativeness which may indicate, higher levels of synchronicity, consistent with the 
findings in the previous chapter. 
Overall, this chapter provides some new evidence on how African markets respond 
to new value-relevant information. Evidence is found to suggest that highly traded stocks 
are less responsive to new earnings information which provides circumstantial support 
for the argument that company earnings are less important than market movements in 
pricing African stocks. This chapter also contributes to the broader literature on market 
efficiency and investor protection in developing countries. Financial development may 
follow from strong investor protection and market efficiency is of paramount importance 
as a mechanism for investor protection in developing markets. Markets, developing or 
otherwise, will only attract investment funds if investors believe that market values reflect 
the value of companies and if the market is sufficiently liquid to ensure shareholders can 
                                                          
9 An explanation for using three out the five countries has already been provided on Chapter 4 




sell their stocks cheaply and quickly. The responsiveness of markets to earnings 
information provides evidence of an efficient market. This is in a sense that investors and 
market participants act to update prices of stocks to reflect new information. The results 
suggest that whilst earnings are informative across the sample, work is needed to improve 
investor protection in the African markets.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 develops the hypothesis 
to be tested. Section 6.3 presents the empirical design. Section 6.4 presents the empirical 
results which include summary statistics and correlations as well as univariate and 
multivariate analysis of earnings informativeness. Robustness checks are presented in 
Section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Hypothesis development 
Are earnings informative in African markets? 
Although there is a large literature on market responses to earnings announcements, 
evidence on earnings informativeness in an international context is in its infancy 
(Landsman et al. 2012). Due to structural changes such as financial development and 
changes to accounting rules and enforcement, research on the role of earnings in emerging 
markets remains topical. Effective structures in developed countries facilitate the price 
discovery process, enhancing market efficiency in these markets through frequent trading. 
However, according to Griffin et al. (2010), when the information environment is 
saturated, investors may not be able to process all information efficiently leading to 
under-reaction to earnings and related announcements. On the other hand, there may be 
little or no reaction at all to earnings announcements in developing countries which have 
considerably weaker information environments. Again, Griffin et al. (2010) recognise 
that this might be, at least partly, attributed to higher transaction costs. Such structural 
factors also bother on synchronicity and illiquidity as identified by Bhattacharya et al. 
(2000) who argue that stock prices in less developed countries may not react to corporate 
reasons because: 1) the stock market in question is generally informationally inefficient; 
(2) firms in the market do not make value-relevant announcements; (3) the news 
announced may have been completely anticipated; or (4) insider trading prohibitions may 
be non-existent or not enforced. Morck et al (2000) again argue that in countries with 
poorer protection of investor and property rights, makes firm level information less useful 
to traders which reduces the incorporation of such firm information into stock prices. 
However, and as noted in Chapter 2, given that most African stock markets have made 




improvements their stock market operations including the introduction of electronic 
trading platforms and given the low level of stock return synchronicity observed in 
Chapter 5, this chapter hypothesises that earnings announcements in African markets 
would have some information content. 
H8: Earnings announcements in African markets are informative. 
Is earnings informativeness influenced by trading frequency? 
The liquidity of stocks plays an important role in the general determination of asset prices 
and stock returns (Bekaert et al. 2007). The importance of liquidity in influencing stock 
returns dates back to the work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who argue that, 
expected returns of stocks are an increasing concave function of liquidity. Amihud (2002) 
also finds that expected returns increase with illiquidity. The implications of liquidity for 
stock returns may therefore be extended to the informativeness of corporate information 
which measures how stock returns are affected by such corporate information (eg. 
earnings announcements). As already mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, one of the 
major characteristics of African markets is the low level of trading, manifested in the high 
incidence of zero returns. Given that stock return synchronicity has been found to be low, 
it is necessary to examine whether the nature and frequency of trading plays a role in the 
reaction of stock returns to corporate information, which in this case is the earnings report. 
For the purpose of this chapter, liquidity is captured by trading frequency. Trading 
frequency is measured based on the percentage of non-zero returns in the previous year 
of trading. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, Hearn and Piesse (2013) provide evidence 
that the percentage of non-zero return days more accurately captures liquidity in a sample 
of African countries which include all the countries used in this study. 
H9: Earnings informativeness in African markets is influenced by trading frequency 
Do fundamentals (earnings characteristics) affect earnings informativeness? 
The next four set of hypotheses test how earnings informativeness could be influenced by 
the fundamentals of the firm, which in this context, refers to the characteristics of the 
firm’s earnings. These include the magnitude of earnings, changes in the earnings relative 
to the previous year and changes from negative to positive earnings and vice versa. The 
early work of Beaver (1968) shows earnings as an important component of the valuation 
of a firm’s common stock. This is especially true as the value of common stock is 
determined by future cash flows which primarily come from earnings. But as he observes, 




central to this relationship between earnings and stock returns is the fact that earnings 
should have information content. Thus, in any framework for determining the 
informativeness of earnings, the relative magnitude of earnings could influence the 
market reactions associated with the release of earnings information. Further, and based 
on the idea of loss aversion, it is normal to expect higher reactions to earnings when there 
are losses rather than gains as individuals have a greater aversion for the former than the 
latter (Pinello 2008). However studies such as Bartov, Givolvy & Hayn (2002) and 
Kasnik & McNichols (2002) find asymmetrically stronger reactions to positive earnings 
surprises than negative. This chapter focuses on the changes that involve a switch from 
negative earnings to positive earnings and positive earnings to negative earnings to 
capture asymmetric reactions to earnings surprises with greater market reactions to 
positive news.10 For African markets that are generally characterised by weak information 
flow, the nature and characteristics of earnings reported would be important in 
determining how investors and other market participants react to earnings 
announcements. 
10a: Market reactions to earnings announcements are positively associated with the 
magnitude of announced earnings. 
10b: Market reactions to earnings announcements are positively associated with positive 
changes in earnings relative to the previous year. 
10c: Market reactions to earnings announcements are positively related to changes in 
earnings from negative to positive. 
10d: Market reactions to earnings announcements are negatively associated with 
changes in earnings from positive to negative. 
 
6.3 Empirical design 
Abnormal returns to earnings announcements are computed using the market adjusted 
model as already indicated in Chapter 4. However, as the main aim is to examine the 
information content or lack thereof of earnings announcements, the absolute value of the 
market-adjusted abnormal returns is used as a measure of volatility around the earnings 
announcement. Consistent with Griffin et al. (2011), normalised volatility 
(NormalisedVol) is used to measure whether volatility within the event window is greater 
than volatility during normal periods (a period outside the event window). This therefore 
provides a more intuitively appealing way to detect information content. If volatility is 
found to be greater in the event window than during normal periods, earnings are deemed 
                                                          
10 The lack of forecast data limits the ability to predict earnings surprises. Hence the chapter uses changes 
in the sign of earnings to indicate unexpected information. 




to have information content. The period outside of the event window includes a period 
prior to the beginning of the event window and a period after the end of the event window. 
Given that trading and news transmission mechanisms are still not sophisticated in most 
African markets, a slightly bigger event window (-10, +10) is applied as compared to 
those used in more developed markets. However, normalised volatility is also presented 
for other event windows. The pre- and post-event windows are each made up of 60 days.  
Normalised volatility is therefore computed as:       
            
       𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙 = (
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙
) − 1                                                      6.1
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In multivariate analyses, the impact of earnings characteristics on abnormal returns is 
determined by estimating the following model for firms in each country.  
CARit = Earnings Characteristicsit + Firm Sizeit +  Ageit + Leverageit                                 6.4 
+  Trading Frequencyit +  Synchronicityit + Reporting Lagit
+ Industry + Year + εit 
 
Where for a sample firm i: CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns to earnings at year t. 
Earnings Characteristics include; Earnings, Earnings Growth, Positive to Negative and 
Negative to Positive. Earnings is computed as Earnings in year t scaled by total assets. 
Earnings Growth is the change in Earnings to total assets. Negative to Positive is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a negative earnings 
figure to a positive earnings figure, and 0 otherwise. Positive to Negative is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a positive earnings figure to a 
negative earnings figure, and 0 otherwise.  Firm Size is the size of the firm at year t 
measured as the natural log of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age 
is the log of the number of years since the based date of the firm in Datastream. Leverage 
is firm leverage computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 




Trading Frequency is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
≥75% (HTF) category and 0 if in the 50%-74% (MTF) category. Synchronicity is the 2R  
obtained from a regression of the daily returns of individual stock returns in each year 
against the returns on the market for the corresponding period.  Reporting Lag is the 
number of days between the fiscal year end of the firm and the earnings announcement 
date. 
As indicated earlier, revisions of investors’ expectations resulting from the arrival 
of new corporate information would be expected to lead to increased trading volume. 
Hence, in addition to normalised volatility, the informativeness of earnings as measured 
by abnormal trading volume (ATV) around the earnings announcement is also examined 
(Pevzner et al. 2015, DeFond et al. 2007, Landsman et al. 2012). Abnormal trading 





)                                                                                                     6. 5 
          
Trading volume is scaled by number of shares outstanding. 
Again, in multivariate analysis, the impact of earnings characteristics on abnormal 
trading volume is determined by estimating the following equation:        
  
        
ATVit = Earnings Characteristicsit + Firm Sizeit +  Ageit + Leverageit                  6.6 
+  Trading Frequencyit +  Synchronicityit + Reporting Lagit
+ Industry + Year + εit 
         
where ATV is the abnormal trading volume which is estimated as the average trading 
volume of the stock during the event window scaled by the average trading volume over 
a  2 month (60 days) period prior to the event window. This is considered to be a sufficient 
period to reflect normal trading activity prior to the event window. All other variables are 









6.4 Empirical results 
 
This section of the chapter presents and discusses the results. 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 6.1 shows the summary statistics for variables in the sample by country. The mean 
NormalisedVol is 0.12, 0.10 and 0.02 for Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa respectively. 
These figures are lower than the mean figure reported in Griffin et al (2011) for emerging 
countries (0.15). However, this is understandable as their study included countries that 
are relatively more developed than the countries in our sample. The only African country 
included in their study was South Africa. The mean (median) cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) is -0.008 (-0.024) for Kenya, -0.02(-0.03) for Nigeria and -0.008(-0.009) for South 
Africa. The mean (median) abnormal trading volume (ATV) is 1.373(1.144), 
1.240(0.970) and 1.258(1.069) for Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa respectively. Firms 
in Kenya and Nigeria appear on average to have the same level of earnings with South 
Africa having a slightly higher level. Earnings changes from positive in the previous year 
to negative in the current year are 6.8% for Kenya, 5.5% for Nigeria and 6.6% for South 
Africa whilst earnings change from negative to positive are 4.1%, 11.6%, and 5.6% 
respectively. Firms in all three countries are relatively smaller in size (less than half the 
size) compared to those in Pevzner et al. (2015) who include both developed and 
emerging market firms (including US and UK firms). Mean leverage is less than 20% in 
all countries indicating that sample firms use relatively low levels of debt in the capital 
structure. The mean synchronicity values are 5.4%, 12%, and 10.5% respectively for 
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Additionally, on average, firms take 90 days 117 days 
and 66 days after their fiscal year end to report their earnings in Kenya, Nigeria, and South 
Africa respectively. It is interesting but encouraging to observe that the mean figure for 
Reporting Lag is below the maximum time given for firms in each of these three countries 
to report their earnings. But a closer look at the maximum figure shows that some firms 
in each of these countries take substantially longer to report their earnings. However, 
these firms are only small in number and their inclusion does not affect the results of the 
empirical analysis.




  Table 6.1: Summary statistics 
  
This table presents summary statistics of variables used. It reports the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum value, median value and maximum values. In order to minimise the effects of outliers, 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. For variables that are log transformed, the non-log 
transformed version is reported in this table. 
Panel A: Kenya 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Normalised Vol 241 0.120 0.339 -0.581 0.078 0.939 
CAR 241 -0.008 0.119 -0.383 -0.024 0.363 
ATV 235 1.373 0.989 0.166 1.144 5.381 
Earnings 236 0.057 0.063 -0.294 0.046 0.235 
Earnings Growth 221 -0.005 0.056 -0.290 0.000 0.321 
Positive to Negative 222 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Negative to Positive 222 0.041 0.198 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm Size ($million) 241 292.108 463.553 1.550 118.350 3318.080 
Age 241 15.456 6.274 2.000 17.000 24.000 
Leverage 210 0.170 0.153 0.001 0.130 0.628 
Trading Frequency 241 0.079 0.270 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Synchronicity 241 0.054 0.088 0.000 0.015 0.470 
Reporting Lag 232 89.759 38.157 37.000 80.500 246.000 
Panel B: Nigeria 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Normalised Vol 218 0.095 0.316 -0.581 0.070 0.939 
CAR 218 -0.022 0.128 -0.383 -0.033 0.363 
ATV 210 1.240 0.936 0.166 0.970 5.381 
Earnings 215 0.059 0.071 -0.130 0.040 0.314 
Earnings Growth 198 0.013 0.091 -0.210 0.000 0.838 
Positive to Negative 199 0.055 0.229 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Negative to Positive 199 0.116 0.321 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm Size ($million) 161 838.750 1415.487 4.790 267.620 8364.220 
Age 185 3.541 1.925 0.000 3.000 11.000 
Leverage 176 0.154 0.136 0.001 0.112 0.691 
Trading Frequency 218 0.165 0.372 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Synchronicity 218 0.120 0.138 0.000 0.068 0.750 
Reporting Lag 211 116.711 56.413 28.000 101.000 246.000 
Panel C: South Africa 
  Count Mean SD Min Median Max 
Normalised Vol 1303 0.015 0.283 -0.581 -0.013 0.939 
CAR 1303 -0.008 0.122 -0.383 -0.009 0.363 
ATV 1247 1.258 0.824 0.166 1.069 5.381 
Earnings 1296 0.076 0.250 -5.380 0.074 4.731 
Earnings Growth 1280 -0.002 0.147 -1.013 -0.001 0.917 
Positive to Negative 1281 0.066 0.248 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Negative to Positive 1281 0.056 0.230 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm Size ($million) 1303 1426.835 2216.046 3.190 420.760 8364.220 
Age 1303 14.467 8.650 1.000 14.000 42.000 
Leverage 1206 0.191 0.175 0.001 0.152 1.172 
Trading Frequency 1303 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Synchronicity 1303 0.105 0.134 0.000 0.044 0.610 
Reporting Lag 1289 66.247 20.761 28.000 64.000 236.000 




Table 6.2: Correlations 
 
  
This table presents correlations between variables used. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively      
Panel A: Kenya 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Normalised Vol             
2 CAR 0.180***            
3 ATV 0.192*** 0.230***           
4 Earnings 0.0323 0.138** 0.0336          
5 Earnings Growth -0.016 0.107 0.137** 0.485***         
6 Positive to Negative 0.0322 -0.248*** 0.0485 -0.452*** -0.443***        
7 Negative to Positive -0.140** -0.00743 0.108 -0.0482 0.408*** -0.0553       
8 Firm Size -0.109* -0.0599 -0.104 0.167** 0.0332 -0.134** -0.1      
9 Age -0.0176 0.00721 0.0364 -0.0207 0.117* -0.0441 0.0721 -0.222***     
10 Leverage 0.0449 -0.203*** 0.0794 -0.226*** -0.0982 0.297*** 0.0851 -0.185*** -0.0124    
11 Trading Frequency -0.00773 -0.133** 0.000468 -0.0564 -0.0556 -0.0142 0.106 -0.0362 -0.0548 0.0185   
12 Synchronicity -0.0902 0.0403 -0.0805 0.0524 -0.0000493 -0.0982 -0.103 0.618*** -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.00166  
13 Reporting Lag -0.0977 -0.0857 0.0574 -0.218*** -0.0378 0.0664 0.186*** -0.355*** 0.0294 0.0593 -0.0522 -0.295*** 




















Table 6.2 continued 
 
Panel B: Nigeria 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Normalised Vol             
2 CAR 0.0314            
3 ATV 0.0027 0.114*           
4 Earnings -0.0528 0.151** 0.055          
5 Earnings Growth 0.145** -0.0507 -0.170** 0.153**         
6 Positive to Negative -0.09 -0.00189 0.0953 -0.331*** -0.244***        
7 Negative to Positive 0.0736 -0.112 -0.0682 -0.128* 0.530*** -0.0874       
8 Firm Size 0.0316 0.02 0.101 0.184** -0.0741 -0.113 -0.158*      
9 Age 0.124* 0.0353 -0.00971 -0.05 0.0293 0.00696 -0.106 0.167**     
10 Leverage 0.0315 -0.0358 -0.0769 -0.267*** 0.151* 0.103 0.106 -0.229*** 0.0393    
11 Trading Frequency -0.0905 0.026 -0.0763 -0.140** 0.206*** 0.129* 0.177** -0.191** 0.00204 0.154**   
12 Synchronicity 0.139** -0.0173 0.0604 -0.0665 -0.0745 -0.104 -0.122* 0.756*** 0.182** -0.246*** -0.0982  
13 Reporting Lag 0.00275 -0.0129 -0.0461 -0.220*** -0.200*** 0.303*** -0.0647 -0.357*** -0.0371 0.0676 0.187*** -0.293*** 
Panel C: South Africa 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Normalised Vol             
2 CAR 0.0912***            
3 ATV 0.0286 0.000376           
4 Earnings 0.0234 0.0412 0.0292          
5 Earnings Growth -0.0129 0.0257 0.0168 0.484***         
6 Positive to Negative 0.0113 0.0331 -0.00348 -0.197*** -0.296***        
7 Negative to Positive 0.00214 0.0511* 0.0591** -0.0000743 0.366*** -0.0646** 1 
     
8 Firm Size -0.0168 0.0112 -0.0850*** 0.0637** 0.00293 -0.0772*** -0.0835***      
9 Age 0.0345 0.0346 -0.0314 0.0155 0.0105 0.0362 0.00758 0.294***     
10 Leverage 0.0285 0.0181 -0.0511* -0.114*** -0.0667** 0.104*** 0.00175 -0.0401 0.00965    
11 Trading Frequency -0.00492 -0.0472* -0.0208 -0.0379 -0.0318 0.0339 -0.00528 0.270*** 0.106*** -0.0499*   
12 Synchronicity 0.00815 0.017 -0.0958*** 0.0640** 0.0167 -0.114*** -0.0697** 0.812*** 0.287*** -0.0446 0.328***  
13 Reporting Lag 0.0000331 -0.0419 0.0201 -0.0554** -0.0025 0.0643** 0.00292 -0.214*** -0.179*** -0.0245 -0.0705** -0.234*** 




Table 6.2 presents bivariate correlations between variables. Modest correlation is 
displayed between Firm Size and a number of variables, the highest of these being with 
the Reporting Lag which is also correlated with a number of other variables. Reporting 
lag is related to the complexity of accounting as the company gets larger. Small but 
significant correlations are identified for Leverage with earnings and structural variables 
but notably not with Firm Size.  
6.4.2 Informativeness of earnings announcements 
 
Table 6.3 shows normalised volatility (NormalisedVol) calculated for the main event 
window and a set of other event windows. Panel A presents NormalisedVol for all 
earnings announcements by country. Panels B and C show NormalisedVol for positive 
and negative CARs respectively. Positive CARs signify good news and negative CARs 
indicate bad news. In panel A, for the main event window, normalized volatility is 0.12 
for the full sample of Kenyan earnings announcements, implying that volatility during 
the event window is 12% greater than volatility during normal periods. Normalised 
volatility is 9.5% and 2% for Nigeria and South Africa respectively for their full samples. 
The implication is that earnings announcements carry information content as volatility 
during the event window is significantly greater than volatility during normal periods. 
Using a smaller event window, (-1, +1), normalised volatility remains positive and 
significant for both Kenya and Nigeria but is not significant for South African companies. 
Similar observations are made on the event day itself. These findings provide support for 
Hypothesis 8 which seeks to suggest that earnings in African markets are informative.   
 Normalised volatility across all event windows except the pre-event window in (-
10, -3) in the case of Kenya and Nigeria and (-2 +2 and -1, +0) for South Africa, are 
positive. In essence, a positive normalised volatility figure implies that volatility in the 
event window is greater than volatility in the period outside of the event window. In the 
light of the low level of stock return synchronicity established in the previous chapter, 
and some of the gradual improvements in African markets over the period, these results 
are not surprising. What appears a bit surprising is the lack of evidence of leakage 
especially for Kenya and Nigeria. As can be seen from the table, Normalised volatility 
for the full sample for (-10, -3) in both countries, is negative suggesting lack of 
informativeness, whilst that for the South African sample, for the same event window, is 
positive. A potential explanation may be that, since both Kenya and South Africa are 
relatively underdeveloped as compared to South Africa, there may be less interest by 




market participants in being keen to know more about the earnings, and possibly other 
corporate information, ahead of when they are released. 
 Normalised volatility for both HTF and MTF categories for the full sample of 
earnings announcement in Panel A, also shows some evidence of information content. 
Again, except for the pre-event window, both HTF and MTF categories across all event 
widows show positive values for Kenya and Nigeria. South Africa, on the other hand, has 
more negative values for normalised volatility for the HTF sample but less only one 
negative value for the (-1, +0) event window in the MTF category. One observation that 
can be clearly made for the HTF and MTF sub-samples is that, in terms of statistical 
significance, earnings announcements in the MTF category are informative than earnings 
in the MTF category. Thus, earnings informativeness is influenced by trading frequency, 
providing support for Hypothesis 9. Announcements in the MTF category display higher 
and more significant NormalisedVol than announcements in the HTF category in all 
panels of Table 6.3. The results from the MTF sample indicate significant informativeness 
of earnings for less frequently traded stocks in Kenya and Nigeria whilst informativeness 
seems confined to good news in South Africa. The latter result is consistent with a 
behavioral explanation. Significance in the HTF sample is associated with the post-
announcement window (+3, +10) in all three countries and with Kenyan firms in other 
windows.  
One explanation for this phenomenon may be that stocks that trade less frequently 
are more greatly impacted by news that is material to stock prices in these countries. The 
evidence presented in Table 6.3 suggests that although stocks in these African markets 
are generally illiquid, for stocks that meet a certain threshold of trading frequency, the 
more highly frequently traded stocks from that category by their nature of being 
frequently traded, may react less to the corporate information whilst the relatively less 
frequently traded stocks, who still meet the minimum threshold react more profoundly to 
earnings announcements. Also, stocks in the more highly traded (HTF) category may be 
more synchronously traded and are therefore more susceptible to market movements. In 
deed this is consistent with the findings in the previous chapter, where the percentage of 
non-zero return days has a significant and positive impact on stock return synchronicity 
in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 




Table 6.3: Normalised volatility for different earnings event window  
 
This table presents earnings event reaction results in the form of normalized volatility. Normalised volatility measures the volatility of stock returns with the event window in relation to volatility 
outside the event window, and is computed as ((event volatility/normal volatility)-1). Event volatility is computed as the mean absolute market-adjusted abnormal return within the event window. For 














. Normal volatility is computed as mean absolute market-adjusted abnormal return for the 60 days 
























11 . Panel A presents results for all earnings, Panel B for positive earnings and Panel C for negative earnings. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% respectively. Significance only reported for EventVol>NormalVol. 
 
PANEL A: ALL EARNINGS                               
   Full  HTF  MTF 
Event Window   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa 
(-10,+10)  0.122***  0.095***  0.022**  0.111**  0.03  0.01  0.123***  0.108***  0.023** 
(-10,-3)  -0.016  -0.013  0.029*  -0.117  -0.058  0.005  -0.007  -0.004  0.032* 
(-2,+2)  0.375***  0.139***  -0.001  0.433**  0.08  -0.017  0.370***  0.151***  0.001 
(-1,+1)  0.507***  0.187***  0.016  0.667**  0.107  -0.039  0.494***  0.203***  0.022 
(-1,0)  0.336***  0.164***  -0.011  0.281  0.136  -0.038  0.341***  0.169***  -0.007 
0  0.496***  0.324***  0.024  0.777*  0.069  0.034  0.472***  0.374***  0.023 
(0,+1)  0.665***  0.279***  0.046**  1.111**  0.06  -0.004  0.626***  0.323***  0.052** 
(0,+3)  0.438***  0.202***  0.015  0.599**  0.024  0.007  0.424***  0.237***  0.016 
(+3,+10)   0.111***   0.185***   0.055***   0.163**   0.161**   0.073**   0.107***   0.189***   0.053*** 
Continued on next page 
                
      
 
          
                
                
                
 
 
               




                
                
                
Table 6.3 continued 
PANEL B: POSITIVE CARs                
   Full  HTF  MTF 
Event Window   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria South Africa 
(-10,10)  0.216***  0.114***  0.052***  0.199*  -0.034  0.008  0.216***  0.145***  0.056*** 
(-10, -3)  0.013***  -0.044  0.078***  -0.314  -0.271  0.003  0.038  0.005  0.086*** 
(-2,2)  0.389***  0.124**  0.048**  0.293  0.027  0.023  0.394***  0.144**  0.051** 
(-1,1)  0.537***  0.085  0.076***  0.132  0.063  0.039  0.573***  0.09  0.079*** 
(-1,0)  0.390***  0.12  0.029  -0.057  0.145  -0.073  0.437***  0.114  0.041 
0  0.505***  0.217**  0.111**  0.301  0.186  0.014  0.529***  0.225*  0.122*** 
(0,1)  0.652***  0.171**  0.103***  0.622  0.062  0.088  0.655***  0.192**  0.104*** 
(0-3)  0.455***  0.151**  0.050**  0.396  -0.009  0.032  0.460***  0.178**  0.052** 
(3,10)   0.158***   0.128***   0.064***   0.238   0.052   0.078   0.152***   0.145***   0.063*** 
PANEL C: NEGATIVE CARs                
   Full  HTF  MTF 
Event Window   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa   Kenya   Nigeria South Africa 
(-10,10)  0.059**  0.082***  -0.004  0.088  0.076  0.012  0.055*  0.083*** 
 -0.006 
(-10, -3)  -0.041  0.007  -0.016  0.026  0.095  0.007  -0.047  -0.01 
 -0.019 
(-2,2)  0.362***  0.152***  -0.045  0.497**  0.128  -0.047  0.346***  0.157*** 
 -0.045 
(-1,1)  0.482***  0.295***  -0.041  1.149**  0.17  -0.091  0.426***  0.316*** 
 -0.034 
(-1,0)  0.288***  0.212***  -0.049  0.746*  0.121  0.001  0.256***  0.226** 
 -0.055 
0  0.490***  0.438***  -0.053  1.307  -0.094  0.052  0.436***  0.527*** 
 -0.064 
(0,1)  0.674***  0.384***  -0.009  1.656**  0.058  0.088  0.605***  0.447*** 
 0.000 
(0-3)  0.424***  0.249***  -0.014  0.747**  0.048  -0.01  0.396***  0.294*** 
 -0.015 
(3,10)   0.076**   0.236***   0.048***   0.107   0.283***   0.068   0.073**   0.228***   0.046*** 





Asymmetric reactions to good and bad earnings information are examined in panels 
B and C of Table 6.3. Positive CARs are considered to indicate good news and negative 
CARs indicate bad news. For the full event window, results are largely consistent, if a 
little lower in magnitude for negative news, with those in Panel A for Kenya and Nigeria. 
Notably, for the South African sample, good news appears to result in higher returns 
throughout our event window but normalized volatility is only positive and significant in 
the post-event window (+3, +10) for bad news. In the period prior to the event (-10,-3), 
only positive and significant normalized volatility is observed in Panel B and not in Panel 
C. This might suggest that firms are more likely to leak information when earnings news 
is good. 
It is also important to mention that informativeness of earnings announcements, 
captured by normalised volatility as presented in Table 6.3, may also be explained with 
respect to some of the institutional and development characteristics of these markets in 
general, and their stock markets in particular. Firstly, and as can be observed from Table 
2.1 in Chapter 2, firms are required to report their earnings in 4 months, 90 days and 6 
months after their financial year in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. 
However, the mean reporting lag shown in Table 6.1 of this chapter reveals that on 
average firms take a less number of days to report their earnings in these countries. This 
may contribute to making earnings announcements more useful and timely. Secondly, 
there is also now the presence of automated trading systems in markets used for this study 
as shown in Table 2.2 of Chapter 2. All else equal, this enhances the flow and access of 
information and helps in the price discovery process with respect to such regulatory news 
items as earnings announcements. 
Figure 6.1 shows the average abnormal trading volume over the event window. As 
earlier indicated, abnormal trading volume is the trading volume over the event window 
divided by trading volume in a period of 60 days prior to the event window. In all 
instances, trading volume for each day is scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
Overall, there appears to some abnormal trading activity in the event window. In the case 
of Kenya and Nigeria, this appears more profound for the HTF category whilst for South 
Africa, this appears so for the MTF category. 
 





Figure 6.1 Average abnormal trading volume during full event window. 
 Average Abnormal Trading Volume during full event window.                                                   
         





































-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6.1D: Nigeria MTF





  Figure 6.1 continued 
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6.1F: South Africa MTF





6.4.3 Analyses of earnings informativeness and fundamentals 
Regression analyses of abnormal returns (CARs) 
This section of the chapter presents the analyses of how the market reactions to earnings 
are affected by the fundamentals of the firm, i.e earnings characteristics. The dependent 
variables that are used are CARs and ATV.  Results of the regression analysis of CARs are 
presented in   Table 6.4, and those of ATV are presented in Table 6.5. The earnings 
characteristics of interest are: the magnitude of earnings (Earnings), the change in the 
magnitude of earnings (Earnings Growth) and changes in earnings negative to positive 
and vice versa (Negative to Positive/Positive to Negative).  Additionally, for all countries, 
industry and year effects are included in line with previous studies. Coefficient estimates 
of Earnings have a positive and significant impact on CARs only for Nigerian firms. Co-
efficient estimates for Kenya and South Africa, although positive, are statistically 
insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis that market reaction to earnings are influenced by the 
size of earnings (H10a), is supported only for the Nigeria sample, but rejected for both 
the Kenyan and South African sample. The positive and significant coefficient of 
Earnings in the Nigerian sample is consistent with the argument the earnings are 
important in determining the value of the firms. Further, of all the three countries, Nigeria 
has the shortest time frame for firms to report their earnings (90 days). Although this is 
not reflected in the summary statistics, it may suggest that earnings are considered 
relatively more important by regulators and market participants which may explain why 
it is significant in influencing market reactions to earnings. 
Columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 6.4 show the regression results for the impact of 
Earnings Growth on CAR. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, earnings in the previous 
year proxies for expected earnings due to the lack of analyst forecasts. Therefore, a higher 
value for Earnings Growth indicates better than expected earnings from the previous year, 
which is reasonable since developing markets are expected to be more synchronous and 
prices less fundamentals. Co-efficient estimates of Earnings Growth are statistically 
insignificant across all three countries, providing no support for hypothesis H10b, that 
Earnings Growth positively and significantly affects market reactions to earnings. A 
potential explanation for this is that market participants in these markets have no 
expectations relative to earnings and therefore, would not react to changes in earnings 
sufficiently enough to lead to a change in stock price. This could be attributed to the level 
of information flow and the absence of analysts.




  Table 6.4: Regression analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table presents results of regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the earnings event window (-10, +10) on a country by country basis. Earnings is the earnings of the firm 
scaled by total assets; Earnings Growth changes in earnings scaled by total assets; Positive to Negative is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a positive earnings figure 
to a negative earnings figure, and 0 otherwise; and Negative to Positive is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a negative earnings figure to a positive earnings figure, 
and 0 otherwise. Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the year. Age is the number of years since the base date of the firm in Datastream. Leverage 
is computed as total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Trading Frequency is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the HTF category and 0 if in the MTF 
category. Synchronicity is the R-squared from a market model regression. Reporting Lag is the number of days between the fiscal year end of the firm and the earnings announcement date. T-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Dependent Variable: CAR 
  Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Earnings 0.1219    0.5988**    0.0120   
 (0.70)    (2.52)    (0.28)   
Earnings Growth  0.1592    0.2623    0.0609  
  (0.63)    (1.43)    (1.64)  
Positive to Negative   -0.0651**    0.0139    0.0011 
   (-2.49)    (0.25)    (0.06) 
Negative to Positive   0.0421    0.0071    0.0348* 
   (1.18)    (0.13)    (1.90) 
Firm Size -0.0166 -0.0151 -0.0171  -0.0048 -0.0010 0.0009  -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0022 
 (-1.58) (-1.43) (-1.63)  (-0.40) (-0.08) (0.08)  (-0.93) (-0.88) (-0.55) 
Age 0.0062 0.0055 0.0058  0.0187 0.0100 0.0064  0.0023 0.0017 0.0013 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.30)  (0.53) (0.28) (0.18)  (0.44) (0.32) (0.26) 
Leverage -0.1686** -0.1824** -0.1438**  0.2094* 0.1379 0.1462  0.0115 0.0133 0.0100 
 (-2.21) (-2.70) (-2.10)  (1.93) (1.47) (1.64)  (0.64) (0.74) (0.54) 
Trading Frequency -0.0880*** -0.0871*** -0.0954***  -0.0226 -0.0237 -0.0193  -0.0218 -0.0211 -0.0225 
 (-3.41) (-3.39) (-3.87)  (-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.49)  (-1.59) (-1.56) (-1.64) 
Synchronicity 0.1133 0.1107 0.1149  0.0035 -0.0079 -0.0200  0.0572 0.0572 0.0538 
 (1.43) (1.38) (1.44)  (0.04) (-0.08) (-0.21)  (1.37) (1.39) (1.30) 
Reporting Lag -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (-1.31) (-1.43) (-1.48)  (-0.18) (-0.10) (-0.32)  (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.48) 
Constant 0.1206 0.1302 0.1416  0.0317 0.0695 0.0705  0.0361 0.0335 0.0275 
 (0.98) (0.99) (1.08)  (0.37) (0.84) (0.93)  (1.05) (0.98) (0.78) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 188 188 188  122 122 122  1141 1141 1141 
R2 0.234 0.235 0.258   0.176 0.158 0.146   0.036 0.041 0.040 




The insignificance of the Earnings Growth variable across all three countries may 
also be consistent with Wei and Zhang (2018) who argue that investors underact to 
earnings surprises in low trust regions. After all, trust by investors and other market 
participants is a function of rigorous accounting, investor protection, legal enforcement 
and corruption, most of which still leave much to be desired in these African markets. 
The remaining columns of Table 6.4, (columns 3, 6 and 9), show regression results 
for the impact of changes in earnings from positive to negative (Positive to Negative) and 
negative to positive (Negative to Positive), on CAR. This effect is also meant to be 
considered a more behavioural than rational variable. There is a negative and significant 
co-efficient for the Negative to Positive variable in the Kenyan sample, implying less 
reactions to earnings when earnings change from positive to negative than when they 
change from negative to positive. Therefore the hypothesis that changes in earnings from 
positive to negative negatively affect the market reactions to earnings (H10C) is 
supported only in the Kenyan sample. This also suggests potential asymmetric price 
effects in the case of Kenya. Co-efficients estimates for Negative to Positive are only 
weakly significant for the South African sample, providing no strong support for the last 
hypothesis (H10d), that changes in earnings from negative to positive influence the 
market reactions to earnings positively. Overall, the limited evidence found in the positive 
co-efficient of Positive to Negative shows that the market reacts more strongly to bad 
news that good news and is also consistent with the view that behavioural biases could 
affect how accounting information may be incorporated into stock prices (Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy 2012). They are also consistent with the idea of loss aversion, where 
there are higher reactions to earnings when there are losses rather than gains as individuals 
have a greater aversion for the former than the latter (Pinello 2008). 
With respect to other variables, Firm Size appears to have no significant impact 
on the reactions to earnings around the event date. The impact of Leverage is mixed. 
Whilst there is a negative relationship between leverage and CARs in Kenya, there is 
weakly significant and positive coefficient for leverage in Nigeria in column 4 of the 
table. The weakly positive coefficient observed in Nigeria is in line with the findings of 
Landsman et al. (2012) and Pevzner et al. (2015) who also find a positive relationship 
between leverage and the market reactions to earnings. The significant impact of leverage 
on CARs in Nigeria can be explained by the notion that debt monitoring improves 
governance. Debt monitoring substitutes for improved governance in a country when 
national institutions are weak, and corruption is prevalent. Consistent with the arguments 
made on Table 6.3 that stocks in the HTF category may be more synchronously traded, 




there is a negative coefficient for the Trading Frequency dummy which is significant in 
both the Kenyan and Nigerian Sample. Thus, liquidity has some impact on market 
reactions to earnings in terms of abnormal returns. With the exception of a weakly 
positive coefficient of Synchronicity in South Africa (columns 8 and 9), it can be observed 
that market reactions to earnings are not influenced by synchronicity. 
Regression analysis of Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV) 
Regression results of ATV are presented in Table 6.5. Similar to Table 6.4, year and 
industry effects are controlled for. The absolute value of Earnings and Earnings Growth 
are used to test how the magnitude of corporate earnings and changes in earnings, 
irrespective of the sign, impacts on ATV. There is a positive and significant coefficient for 
the magnitude of earnings (Earnings) in both Kenya and Nigeria. This implies that, whilst 
the absolute value of earnings may be sufficient to induce trading in Kenya, it may not be 
enough to cause a change in the share price as observe in Table 6.4, In the case of Nigeria, 
there is a significant impact of the value of earnings on ATV, consistent with the results 
in Table 6.4, implying that the value of earnings induces a change in both price and 
volume. The high level of the perception of corruption in Kenya may be a potential 
explanation for why Earnings and Earnings Growth in Kenya are only enough to trigger 
changes in trading volume but not sufficient to cause a change in the stock price. In South 
Africa, there is no significant impact on the magnitude of earnings and changes in 
earnings on ATV. Instead and consistent with the behavioural hypothesis, there is a only 
a weakly significant impact of changes in earnings from negative to positive on CAR as 
shown in Table 6.4. In addition, firm size loads negatively on ATV in South Africa and is 
consistent with the findings of Landsman et al. (2012) and Pevzner et al. (2015) who both 
include South Africa in their cross-country study.  
 
Overall, coefficient estimates of Earnings and Earnings Growth in both Tables 
6.4 and 6.5 are consistent with the views of Beaver (1968) that the usefulness of earnings 
data in triggering market reactions to earnings may be observed in either a test of price, 
volume or both, but should not be non-existent in both. Therefore, in terms of the four 
hypothesis on the impact of fundamentals (earnings characteristics) on earnings 
informativeness, the hypotheses can be accepted for the impact of the magnitude of 
earnings (only in Nigeria), changes in earnings (both Kenya and Nigeria) and changes in 
earnings from positive to negative (only Kenya). These differences as earlier explained 
may be function of the level of institutional development. 
 





 Table 6.5: Regression analysis of Abnormal Trading Volume  
This table presents results of regression analysis of Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV) around the earnings event window (-10, +10) on a country by country basis. Earnings is the earnings of the firm 
scaled by total assets; Earnings Growth   is change in earnings scaled by total assets; Positive to Negative is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a positive earnings 
figure to a negative earnings figure, and 0 otherwise; and Negative to Positive is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a negative earnings figure to a positive earnings 
figure, and 0 otherwise. For brevity definitions of the control variables are excluded. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
Dependent Variable: ATV  
 Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
| Earnings| 2.8913**    6.4260***    -0.3981*   
 (2.16)    (2.93)    (-1.93)   
| Earnings Growth) |  3.7939    4.5491***    0.1013  
  (1.24)    (2.95)    (0.56)  
Positive to Negative   -0.0365    0.2590    -0.0173 
   (-0.12)    (0.46)    (-0.20) 
Negative to Positive   0.4063    0.1142    0.2391 
   (0.84)    (0.65)    (1.42) 
Firm Size -0.0803 -0.0434 -0.0590  -0.0350 -0.0227 0.0131  -0.0544** -0.0493* -0.0438* 
 (-1.15) (-0.59) (-0.88)  (-0.55) (-0.25) (0.16)  (-2.04) (-1.92) (-1.79) 
Age 0.1210 0.1269 0.1111  -3.7971*** -3.8471*** -3.8855***  -0.0126 -0.0093 -0.0141 
 (1.00) (1.10) (0.93)  (-17.53) (-16.70) (-16.03)  (-0.31) (-0.23) (-0.35) 
Leverage 0.8094 0.2752 0.5554  0.1897 -0.6494 -0.3893  -0.2266 -0.2284 -0.2225 
 (1.04) (0.33) (0.62)  (0.33) (-0.83) (-0.54)  (-1.56) (-1.58) (-1.52) 
Trading Frequency -0.0632 -0.1345 -0.1425  -0.0381 -0.1313 -0.0320  -0.0329 -0.0419 -0.0402 
 (-0.32) (-0.76) (-0.72)  (-0.13) (-0.36) (-0.09)  (-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.48) 
Synchronicity -0.0145 -0.1174 -0.0425  0.4945 0.5594 0.2924  -0.0070 -0.0264 -0.0403 
 (-0.02) (-0.17) (-0.06)  (0.83) (0.93) (0.49)  (-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.17) 
Reporting Lag 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0007  -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0014  -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0011 
 (0.07) (-0.53) (-0.42)  (-1.13) (-1.25) (-0.87)  (-0.97) (-0.99) (-0.80) 
Constant 0.9724 1.0468 1.2442*  6.1433*** 6.6282*** 6.3806***  1.9435*** 1.8569*** 1.8183*** 
 (1.42) (1.56) (1.97)  (13.64) (9.75) (10.32)  (6.74) (6.73) (6.65) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 188 188 188  122 122 122  1141 1141 1141 
𝑅2 0.153 0.156 0.141   0.344 0.340 0.300   0.034 0.032 0.036 





6.5 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
 
To test the robustness of our results, an alternative dependent variable is used which 
captures price, Differenced Abnormal Returns (DARs) and provide results for comparison 
to those in Tables 5 and 6. DARs are computed as the average abnormal return during the 
event window minus the average abnormal return in a ±60 period prior the event window. 
This is similar in spirit to the differenced volatility variable used in Griffin et al. (2011) 
except that it does not use absolute values of abnormal returns. Results of these are 
presented in Table 6.6. Three differences are notable. Firstly, the significance of Positive 
to Negative dummy for Kenyan companies is no longer present. Secondly, Change in 
Earnings becomes insignificant for HTF companies in South Africa whilst it becomes 
significant for Nigerian HTF companies. The latter finding is also present in abnormal 
trading volume models in Table 6.4. The conclusions regarding the impact of earnings 
information, synchronicity and trading frequency on both prices and volume remain 
unaltered. 
Again, it has been argued that ownership structure could affect the extent to which 
stocks trade (Gompers et al. 2003). Different types of ownership structure have therefore 
been found to have an impact on stock price informativeness including ownership 
concentration (Fan and Wong 2002); government ownership (Ben-Nasr and Cosset 2014) 
block holdings (Brockman and Yan 2009) and institutional investors (Boehmer and 
Kelley 2009). One may, therefore, argue that the impact of the trading frequency 
(liquidity) measures on earnings informativeness could be explained by differences in the 
ownership structure of firms in the sample. This conjecture is tested by using yearly 
ownership data to examine whether there are significant differences in ownership 
structure between HTF and MTF stocks. However, as can be seen from Table 6.7, there 
are no significant differences in ownership between HTF and MTF stocks. Hence the 
finding that the more illiquid MTF stocks are driving earnings informativeness is not 
explained by ownership structure. It should, however, be noted that our data on ownership 
is rather scant11 and it is recommended that future work could explore ownership structure 
more extensively given available data. 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately, there are a lot of missing observations in the ownership data which account for the 
rather small number of observations (N) we have in Table 6.7 




Table 6.6: Regression analysis of Differenced Abnormal Returns (DARs) 





















































.Earnings is the earnings of the firm scaled by total assets; Earning Growth  is change in earnings scaled by total assets ; Positive to 
Negative  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a positive earnings figure to a negative earnings figure, and 0 otherwise; and Negative to Positive is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings was from a negative earnings figure to a positive earnings figure, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.   
Dependent Variable: DARS  
 Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Earnings 0.0034    0.0282**    0.0016   
 (0.39)    (2.58)    (0.87)   
Earnings Growth  0.0097    0.0187**    0.0024*  
  (1.00)    (2.12)    (1.83)  
Positive to Negative   -0.0021    -0.0004    -0.0003 
   (-1.40)    (-0.15)    (-0.39) 
Negative to Positive   0.0023    0.0012    0.0010 
   (1.48)    (0.52)    (1.29) 
Firm Size -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004  -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-0.89) (-0.80) (-1.00)  (-0.10) (0.18) (0.42)  (0.46) (0.69) (0.78) 
Age 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0018  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.31) (0.20) (0.25)  (-0.74) (-0.97) (-1.12)  (0.20) (0.03) (0.04) 
Leverage -0.0056 -0.0057* -0.0049  0.0119** 0.0083* 0.0092**  0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 
 (-1.47) (-1.73) (-1.37)  (2.45) (1.93) (2.15)  (0.85) (0.76) (0.65) 
Trading Frequency -0.0037*** -0.0036*** -0.0040***  -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0004  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (-2.80) (-2.73) (-3.22)  (-0.31) (-0.43) (-0.23)  (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.23) 
Synchronicity 0.0048 0.0047 0.0049  -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0018  -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 (1.23) (1.20) (1.25)  (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.40)  (-0.43) (-0.48) (-0.53) 
Reporting Lag -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-1.14) (-1.25) (-1.33)  (-0.73) (-0.58) (-0.72)  (-0.41) (-0.45) (-0.33) 
Constant 0.0028 0.0036 0.0040  0.0049 0.0067* 0.0062*  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.54) (0.63) (0.73)  (1.31) (1.91) (1.83)  (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 188 188 188  122 122 122  1141 1141 1141 
𝑅2 0.216 0.223 0.234   0.148 0.145 0.118   0.022 0.025 0.023 






Table 6.7: Differences in ownership structure between HTF and MTF stocks. 
This table presents summary statistics of five different types of ownership structures and test of mean differences 
between HTF and MTF stocks.  N denotes the number of observations in each case. 
       HTF     MTF   Diff 
     N Mean Std   N Mean Std   
(p-
value) 
Largest Shareholder   77 0.328 0.22  579 0.309 0.19  (0.402) 
Top 5 Shareholders   77 0.577 0.25  579 0.547 0.251  (0.352) 
Government Ownership   8 0.133 0.088  31 0.24 0.193  (0.134) 
Institutional Ownership   77 0.321 0.221  579 0.329 0.234  (0.796) 
Families and Individuals    36 0.042 0.086   264 0.075 0.099   (0.053) 
 
The appendix to the chapter provides some additional tables in respect of both 
Abnormal Returns and Normalised Volatility. Appendix 6.1 shows Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for the same set of event windows as computed for 
normalised volatility. Appendix 6.2 shows Daily Average Abnormal Returns to earnings 
announcements over the main event window, (-10, +10).  Appendix 6.3 presents Daily 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns to earnings announcements over the main event 
window. Appendix 6.3 shows more significance of abnormal returns as the reaction to 
earnings may take a bit of time to get impounded in to the stock prices. Appendix 6.4 
show the pattern of cumulative abnormal returns event window respectively. Finally 
Appendix 6.5 presents differences in Normalised volatility between samples grouped 
according to quartiles of firm’s size. This was done to further investigate whether 




Whilst the literature on the informativeness of earnings in an international context 
continues to develop, there remains relatively little evidence on African markets, which 
differ considerably in terms of institutional and regulatory factors when compared with 
more developed markets (Hearn and Piesse 2013, Asongu 2014).12 The chapter adds to 
this literature by examining market responses to earnings announcements for a set of 
common law (i.e., market-based) African countries and investigate whether considering 
                                                          
12 Institutional and regulatory factors might include but are not limited to timing of earnings 
announcements, channels by which earnings are reported (newsprint, websites, social media, etc) and 
insider trading enforcement. 
 




that these markets are developing, reactions to earnings announcements are influenced by 
firm fundamentals or trading frequency. 
Earnings announcements were collected and categorised according to the 
percentage of non-zero returns in the prior year of trading of the stock concerned. In order 
to ensure sufficient liquidity to capture earnings information, firms below a 50% 
threshold were dropped. The sample used was further categorised into two groups 
according to their trading frequency. Stocks which traded on 75% or more trading days 
over the previous years were categorised as high trading frequency and sample stocks that 
traded less frequently than 75% (but more than 50%) of days in the previous year were 
categorized as medium trading frequency. Normalised volatility, abnormal trading 
volume, and market-adjusted CARs were estimated for a ten-day window before and after 
the event. A cross-sectional analysis was then conducted to determine how earnings 
characteristics affect the market reactions to earnings announcements. 
The findings reveal that, in terms of the preferred measure of normalised volatility, 
earnings are informative in all three countries. There is little evidence of leakage in the 
full sample, but significant information content is identified in other event windows. The 
results are strongly driven by the less regularly traded sample (MTF). Of the highly traded 
samples, only Kenyan stocks display significant informativeness. Nonetheless, for all 
three countries, informativeness is present for the more highly traded stocks in the post-
event window. 
In order to check for an asymmetric reaction to good and bad news, the 
informativeness of positive and negative CARs was examined separately. The results for 
less frequently traded stocks mirror those of the full sample, i.e. positive normalised 
volatility across the sample but some leakage in South Africa. For negative news, the 
HTF sample indicates no leakage but significant positive normalised volatility around the 
event (-2 to +3) for Kenyan stocks and in the post-event window (+3 to +10) for Nigeria. 
Whilst the results indicate idiosyncrasies in the pattern of earnings informativeness; 
trading frequency has an important role in determining when earnings information is 
impounded into stock prices. 
The effect of specific characteristics of earnings on market reactions using cross-
sectional regression analysis is also carried out. The primary dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal return, which unlike normalised volatility, captures both the 




magnitude and direction of earnings variables. There is only limited evidence of an effect 
of earnings characteristics on market reactions. Earnings are only found to be significant 
for Nigeria (but strongly so). Changes in earnings are only weakly significant in South 
Africa and not in other countries in the sample. To test the effect of what one may consider 
behavioral variables, as opposed to fundamental earnings data, this chapter included 
variables that capture changes in earnings from positive to negative and vice versa in the 
analysis. Changes from positive to negative are strongly significant and negative for 
Kenyan companies but not for companies in other countries. With abnormal trading 
volume as an alternative dependent variable, it can be observed that earnings are 
informative for both Kenya and Nigeria. The Change of Earnings variable is significant 
for Nigerian companies. Notably, a dummy variable indicating changes in earnings from 
negative to positive was found to be significant for South African companies. Tests using 
differenced volatility confirm results from the earlier analysis. 
Whilst the role of trading frequency is clear in the results, there is no direct 
association between synchronicity and earnings informativeness. If African stocks are 
more synchronous with market movements and less associated with earnings news, then 
we would expect stock price effects (positive or negative) to earnings announcements to 
be lower for stocks which are more synchronous and higher for those which are less 
associated with market movements. The cross-sectional analysis provides no evidence of 
such an effect. However, one of the most notable results, that earnings announcements by 
medium traded stocks are more informative than highly traded stocks, indicating that 
pricing of more liquid stocks is less driven by earnings announcements. Contrary to the 
findings in this chapter, Miao and Yeo (2009) document that more liquid stocks will lead 
to a larger market reaction to earnings announcement in the US stock market. They argue 
that illiquidity will result in a larger trading cost, making investors reluctant to respond 
to earnings. Such a view is also supported by Chordia et al. (2009). They document that 
post-earnings announcement drift is more prevalent for highly illiquid stocks since 
investors delay the response to earnings due to the high trading costs. Whilst the findings 
that illiquidity will result in larger market responses in African markets is 
counterintuitive, it may result from synchronicity of the more highly traded stocks. This, 
in turn, may arise from index-tracking type investment strategies. Alternatively, earnings 
information may be communicated via less formal mechanisms, such as via the media 
coverage or informal briefings to major shareholders, rather than the formal earnings 
announcement. However, the results of tests of behavioural variables suggest that other 
less sophisticated influences on pricing persist in African markets. 




Overall, the findings in this chapter support the notion that African markets may 
not fit the stereotypical view of synchronous pricing (Morck et al. 2000). Earnings 
announcements in this sample carry important stock price implications although the 
association between the underlying earnings characteristics and stock price adjustments 
is less consistent. Contrary to popular belief, the findings demonstrate that earnings news 
is impounded into stock prices around the announcement date and that pricing, especially 
for less frequently traded stocks, relies on earnings news in African markets.  
The next chapter of this thesis presents the third and final empirical analysis which 
examines how earnings informativeness is influenced by institutional development. 
 
 







Appendix 6.1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for different event windows 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns for various event windows around earnings announcements. Panel A presents results for all earnings announcements. Panel B presents results for 
announcements with positive earnings. Panel C presents results for announcements with negative earnings. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
PANEL A: ALL EARNINGS 
  Full Sample  HTF  MTF 
Event Window ALL  HTF  MTF  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
  CAR    CAR    CAR    CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR  
(-10,+10) -0.858%***  -2.482%**  -0.664%**  -6.19%  -1.496%  -2.218%  -0.287%  -2.417%**  -0.463% 
(-10,-3) -0.214%  -1.585%***  -0.050%  -1.382%  -2.718%*  -1.307%**  -0.367%  -1.082%**  0.171% 
(-2,+2) -0.052%  -0.693%  0.024%  -2.707%  0.687%  -0.778%  -0.006%  -0.401%  0.096% 
(-1,+1) -0.034%  -0.008%  -0.037%  -1.732%  0.838%  0.009%  -0.310%  -0.307%  0.057% 
(-1,+0) -0.032%  0.002%  -0.037%  -0.870%  1.221%  -0.203%  -0.344%  0.021%  0.013% 
0 -0.037%  -0.016%  -0.039%  -0.716%  0.806%  -0.139%  -0.649%***  -0.188%  0.099% 
(0,+1) -0.038%  -0.027%  -0.039%  -1.578%  0.423%  0.073%  -0.614%  -0.516%  0.144% 
(0,+3) -0.226%  -1.096%**  -0.122%  -2.627%  0.430%  -1.290%**  -0.438%  -0.268%  -0.040% 
(+3,+10) -0.592%***   -0.204%   -0.638%***   -2.106%   0.535%   -0.133%   0.086%   -0.934%   -0.730%*** 
PANEL B: POSITIVE EARNINGS 
  Full Sample   HTF   MTF 
Event Window ALL  HTF  MTF  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
  CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR 
(-10,+10) -0.784%***  -3.269%***  -0.502%  -5.599%*  -1.806%  -3.313%**  0.252%  -2.079%**  -0.396% 
(-10, -3) -0.208%  -1.661%***  -0.043%  -1.411%  -2.610%  -1.426%**  -0.281%  -0.834%  0.129% 
(-2,+2) -0.016%  -0.867%  0.081%  -1.928%  0.828%  -1.186%  0.366%  -0.207%  0.072% 
(-1,+1) -0.023%  -0.140%  -0.009%  -1.217%  1.304%  -0.383%  -0.009%  -0.184%  0.018% 
(-1,0) 0.011%  0.094%  0.002%  -0.455%  1.627%  -0.263%  -0.088%  0.048%  0.012% 
0 -0.019%  0.053%  -0.027%  -0.331%  1.078%*  -0.182%  -0.387%*  -0.146%  0.061% 
(0,+1) -0.053%  -0.180%  -0.039%  -1.094%  0.754%  -0.302%  -0.307%  -0.378%  0.067% 
(0+3) -0.238%  -1.125%*  -0.138%  -2.072%  0.459%  -1.431%**  -0.152%  -0.308%  -0.107% 
(+3,+10) -0.560%***   -0.741%   -0.540%***   -2.260%*   -0.024%   -0.701%   0.167%   -1.037%   -0.597%*** 
PANEL C: NEGATIVE EARNINGS 
  Full Sample    HTF   MTF 
Event Window ALL  HTF  MTF  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
  CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR   CAR 
(-10,+10) -2.261%  2.018%  -3.076%*  -16.913%  0.99%  3.020%  -10.044%***  -8.242%*  -1.618% 
(-10, -3) -0.592%  -1.149%  -0.485%  -0.857%  -3.58%  -0.738%  -0.366%  -5.276%*  -0.018% 
(-2,+2) -0.481%  0.303%  -0.630%  -16.715%  -0.44%  1.172%  -7.246%***  -2.256%  0.423% 
(-1,+1) -0.211%  0.743%  -0.393%  -10.984%  -2.89%  1.884%  -6.181%***  -1.332%  0.480% 
(-1,0) -0.529%  -0.519%  -0.531%  -8.339%  -2.03%  0.084%  -4.568%**  -0.196%  -0.022% 
0 -0.308%  -0.413%  -0.288%  -7.649%  -1.37%*  0.067%  -4.972%***  -0.681%  0.381% 
(0,+1) 0.009%  0.849%  -0.151%  -10.295%  -2.22%  1.868%  -6.585%***  -1.818%  0.883% 
(0+3) -0.305%  -0.928%  -0.187%  -12.618%  0.20%  -0.616%  -7.366%***  0.635%  0.696% 
(+3,+10) -1.188%   2.863%   -1.960%**   0.659%   5.01%   2.586%   -2.432%   -0.710%   -2.023%** 





Appendix 6.2: Daily Average Abnormal Returns to Earnings Announcements 
This table presents daily average abnormal returns around earnings announcements. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market-adjusted model. HTF indicates high trading frequency stocks i.e. stocks 
which experienced a price change in at least 75% of trading days in the previous year. MTF indicates medium trading frequency stocks, i.e. stocks which experienced a price change on between 50% and 
74.99% of trading days in the previous year. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
PANEL A: DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS  
  ALL   HTF  MTF 
Trading days 
Full Sample  HTF ALL  MTF ALL  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa  Kenya  Nigeria  South Africa 
AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR  AAR 
-10 -0.063%  -0.139%  -0.054%  0.060%  -0.600%  -0.042%  -0.022%  0.010%  -0.070% 
-9 -0.010%  0.014%  -0.013%  -0.047%  -1.522%**  0.438%  0.019%  -0.222%  0.013% 
-8 0.033%  -0.100%  0.049%  0.338%  -0.169%  -0.144%  0.035%  0.006%  0.058% 
-7 0.086%  -0.412%  0.146%  -0.722%  0.800%  -0.696%  -0.103%  0.051%  0.208% 
-6 -0.095%  -0.187%  -0.084%  -0.431%  -0.317%  -0.117%  -0.359%**  -0.131%  -0.025% 
-5 -0.057%  -0.804%***  0.033%  0.376%  -0.401%  -1.081%**  0.008%  -0.220%  0.077% 
-4 -0.094%  0.214%  -0.131%  -0.331%  -0.024%  0.357%  -0.010%  -0.512%**  -0.094% 
-3 -0.013%  -0.171%  0.005%  -0.626%  -0.486%  -0.021%  0.065%  -0.065%  0.005% 
-2 0.047%  -0.328%  0.091%  -0.412%  -0.135%  -0.368%  0.127%  -0.116%  0.117% 
-1 0.004%  0.019%  0.003%  -0.154%  0.415%  -0.064%  0.304%  0.209%  -0.087% 
0 -0.037%  -0.016%  -0.039%  -0.716%  0.806%  -0.139%  -0.649%***  -0.188%  0.099% 
1 -0.001%  -0.011%  0.000%  -0.862%  -0.383%  0.212%  0.035%  -0.328%  0.045% 
2 -0.065%  -0.356%  -0.031%  -0.563%  -0.016%  -0.419%  0.177%  0.022%  -0.078% 
3 -0.123%  -0.713%**  -0.053%  -0.487%  0.023%  -0.944%**  -0.001%  0.226%  -0.106% 
4 -0.093%  -0.072%  -0.095%  -1.624%**  0.367%  0.031%  -0.031%  -0.264%  -0.081% 
5 -0.073%  0.527%  -0.144%  0.414%  0.431%  0.568%  0.259%  -0.333%  -0.191%* 
6 -0.094%  -0.210%  -0.080%  0.313%  -0.727%  -0.145%  -0.166%  -0.185%  -0.048% 
7 0.087%  0.561%  0.031%  0.227%  0.383%  0.656%  0.064%  0.075%  0.017% 
8 -0.097%  -0.137%  -0.092%  0.020%  -0.075%  -0.176%  0.172%  0.014%  -0.159%* 
9 -0.191%**  -0.311%  -0.177%**  -0.489%  0.239%  -0.435%  -0.117%  -0.422%  -0.150% 




   




  Appendix 6.3: Daily Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns to Earnings Announcements 
This table presents daily cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market-adjusted model HTF indicates high trading frequency stocks 
i.e. stocks which experienced a price change in at least 75% of trading days in the previous year. MTF indicates medium trading frequency stocks, i.e. stocks which experienced a price change on 
between 50% and 74.99% of trading days in the previous year. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 ALL  HTF  MTF 
Trading days 
Full Sample  HTF ALL  MTF ALL  Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa  Kenya   Nigeria   South Africa 
CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR 
-10 -0.063%  -0.139%  -0.054%  0.060%  -0.600%  -0.042%  -0.022%  0.010%  -0.070% 
-9 -0.073%  -0.125%  -0.067%  0.014%  -2.122%***  0.396%  -0.003%  -0.212%  -0.057% 
-8 -0.041%  -0.225%  -0.019%  0.352%  -2.291%**  0.251%  0.032%  -0.206%  0.001% 
-7 0.046%  -0.638%  0.127%  -0.370%  -1.491%  -0.445%  -0.071%  -0.155%  0.209% 
-6 -0.050%  -0.824%*  0.043%  -0.801%  -1.808%  -0.562%  -0.430%  -0.286%  0.184% 
-5 -0.106%  -1.628%***  0.076%  -0.424%  -2.209%*  -1.643%***  -0.422%  -0.505%  0.260% 
-4 -0.200%  -1.414%***  -0.055%  -0.756%  -2.232%  -1.286%**  -0.432%  -1.017%**  0.166% 
-3 -0.214%  -1.585%***  -0.050%  -1.382%  -2.718%*  -1.307%**  -0.367%  -1.082%**  0.171% 
-2 -0.167%  -1.913%***  0.042%  -1.794%*  -2.853%*  -1.675%**  -0.240%  -1.198%**  0.288% 
-1 -0.162%  -1.894%***  0.044%  -1.948%*  -2.438%  -1.739%**  0.064%  -0.989%*  0.201% 
0 -0.199%  -1.910%***  0.005%  -2.664%*  -1.632%  -1.878%  -0.585%  -1.176%**  0.301% 
1 -0.200%  -1.921%***  0.005%  -3.526%  -2.015%  -1.666%  -0.550%  -1.505%**  0.345% 
2 -0.266%  -2.277%***  -0.025%  -4.088%  -2.031%  -2.085%**  -0.373%  -1.483%**  0.267% 
3 -0.389%  -2.990%***  -0.078%  -4.575%  -2.008%  -3.029%***  -0.374%  -1.257%*  0.162% 
4 -0.481%*  -3.062%***  -0.173%  -6.199%**  -1.641%  -2.998%***  -0.406%  -1.521%**  0.081% 
5 -0.554%*  -2.535%***  -0.317%  -5.785%**  -1.210%  -2.430%**  -0.146%  -1.854%**  -0.111% 
6 -0.648%**  -2.745%**  -0.398%  -5.472%*  -1.937%  -2.575%**  -0.313%  -2.039%***  -0.158% 
7 -0.561%*  -2.185%**  -0.367%  -5.245%**  -1.554%  -1.918%  -0.249%  -1.964%**  -0.141% 
8 -0.658%**  -2.322%***  -0.459%  -5.226%**  -1.629%  -2.094%  -0.077%  -1.950%**  -0.300% 
9 -0.849%***  -2.633%***  -0.636%*  -5.714%**  -1.390%  -2.529%**  -0.194%  -2.372%***  -0.449% 
10 -0.858%***  -2.482%***  -0.664%**  -6.194%**  -1.496%  -2.218%  -0.287%  -2.417%**  -0.463% 
 
 





Appendix 6.4: Cumulative abnormal returns during the event window 
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  Appendix 6.5: Size differences in normalized volatility 
 This table presents event reaction results for portfolios of the firm created according to quartiles of firm size. Earnings 
reaction is measured by normalized volatility which is computed as Panel A presents results for Kenya, Panel B for 
Nigeria and Panel C for South Africa. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
Kenya                     
  Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4  T-stat [Quartile 4- Quartile 1 
(-10,+10)  0.080*  0.166***  0.167***  0.075*  [0.925] 
(-10,-3)  -0.004  0.003  0.012  -0.075  [0.358] 
(-2,+2)  0.231***  0.549***  0.390***  0.330***  [0.423] 
(-1,+1)  0.252***  0.825***  0.521***  0.436***  [0.248] 
(-1,0)  0.188  0.499***  0.374**  0.287**  [0.587] 
0  0.268*  0.566***  0.607***  0.547**  [0.341] 
(0,+1)  0.321***  1.000***  0.705***  0.638***  [0.138] 
(0,+3)  0.238***  0.690***  0.452***  0.374***  [0.312] 
(+3,+10)   0.081   0.092*   0.196***   0.078   [0.966] 
Nigeria                     
  Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4  T-stat[Quartile 4- Quartile 1 
(-10,+10)  0.124**  0.091  0.110**  0.165***  [0.548] 
(-10,-3)  0.005  0.015  -0.009  0.035  [0.763] 
(-2,+2)  0.137  0.134  0.237**  0.254***  [0.358] 
(-1,+1)  0.268**  0.151  0.249*  0.393***  [0.464] 
(-1,0)  0.266**  0.175  0.271*  0.242*  [0.900] 
0  0.408***  0.258  0.687***  0.593**  [0.508] 
(0,+1)  0.336**  0.185  0.451**  0.643***  [0.152] 
(0,+3)  0.239**  0.193  0.329***  0.399***  [0.323] 
(+3,+10)   0.253***   0.156**   0.180**   0.227***   [0.822] 
South Africa                     
  Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4  T-stat[Quartile 4- Quartile 1 
(-10,+10)  0.020  0.042  0.014  0.010  [0.658] 
(-10,-3)  0.028  0.060  0.019  0.010  [0.569] 
(-2,+2)  -0.042  0.029  0.009  0.000  [0.233] 
(-1,+1)  -0.028  0.051  0.017  0.024  [0.252] 
(-1,0)  -0.048  0.023  -0.013  -0.004  [0.407] 
0  -0.044  0.048  0.028  0.063  [0.176] 
(0,+1)  -0.016  0.076*  0.052  0.071*  [0.132] 
(0,+3)  -0.036  0.057  0.016  0.023*  [0.158] 
























As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is a large body of literature that investigates the 
informativeness of earnings in an international context. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine further the impact of two institutional factors that are of particular relevance to 
developing countries. The first is the expected improvement in accounting standards as a 
result of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. A survey of the literature on IFRS adoption by 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016) finds that its impact on the quality of accounting numbers have 
been mixed.13  Consequently the impact of IFRS adoption on the market reaction to 
earnings announcements across countries is still open for debate. One key study that has 
provided direct evidence on the impact of IFRS adoption on the market reaction to 
earnings is Landsman et al. (2012).  Using a sample of 16 countries, they find that market 
reactions to earnings increase after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in these countries. 
However, they add that this effect depends on how strongly rules are enforced in adopting 
countries. Houqe et al. (2012), in a study of 46 countries, come to a similar conclusion 
when they find that earnings quality increases after mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
countries that have a strong investor protection regime. This therefore suggest that studies 
of the impact of IFRS adoption on earnings and earnings responses may require a focus 
on individual countries.  
The second institutional factor, which is yet to gain prominence in the literature on 
earnings informativeness, relates to the impact of the perception of corruption.14 In their 
theoretical paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the secrecy around corruption 
makes it distortionary and costly, which ultimately impedes development in the long run. 
Since then there have been some economic studies on corruption at the country level (Mo 
2001). However, specific firm channels by which corruption could affect economic 
outcomes remain open for debate and empirical scrutiny. In this chapter, it is hypothesised 
that corruption as a political and socio-economic phenomenon, erodes public trust.  The 
continuous erosion of trust, as a result of perception of the presence of corruption, will 
eventually lead to a situation where information transmitted by economic agents becomes 
                                                          
13 See hypothesis development section of this chapter for details of some of these studies. 
14 This chapter focuses on the perceptions of corruption and not actual corruption as actual corruption is 
hard to measure.  However, studies such as Houqe and Monem (2016) argue that actual corruption and 
perception of corruption are somehow interrelated because actual corruption fuels the perception of 
corruption. The perception of corruption is however more important for the purposes of this analyses also 
because, perception of corruption can exist even in the absence of actual corruption (Melgar et al. 2010)   
 




less and less valuable to anyone including investors. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the earnings report is a major means of information transmission from managers 
to investors. Hence, this chapter tests the impact of perceptions on the value of 
information associated with earnings announcements. 
The connection between corruption and the belief investors have in markets is by 
no means trivial. As La Porta et al. (2000) state, investor protection mechanisms, are 
instituted to provide a legal and regulatory framework that protects investors. The 
prevalence of corruption implies that laws that are meant to safeguard the interest of 
investors and other market participants are either not enacted or, if enacted not enforced. 
It is for this reason that many studies posit that countries with high levels of corruption 
tend to be associated with poor investor protection (Giofré 2014, Beuselinck et al. 2017). 
Indeed, studies such as Behn et al. (2013) include corruption as a component variable in 
their construction of investor protection indices. 
Taken the above together, this chapter examines the effect of institutional factors 
on earnings informativeness by looking at the separate and joint influences of IFRS 
adoption and the perceptions of corruption. Normalised volatility increased in the post 
IFRS adoption period for the Nigerian sample. Normalised volatility in South Africa, 
however, does not appear different between the pre and post mandatory IFRS adoption 
periods. The findings in South Africa could be explained by the very early harmonisation 
of IFRS with domestic standards in South Africa. Multivariate analysis in this chapter, 
however does not provide any evidence of the impact of IFRS on both CARs and ATV. 
This leads to the overall conclusion that the impact of IFRS adoption had little or no 
impact on the informativeness of earnings in the sample countries and companies, lending 
support to the view that the impact of IFRS can only be realised when there is strong 
enforcement of rules. With regards to the perception of corruption, the findings show that 
corruption has a negative and significant impact on the market reaction to earnings in 
terms of trading volume but not price. Investors in countries with higher perceived levels 
of corruption trade less when earnings are announced. Given that trading volume reflects 
the real actions of investors around the earnings announcement date, this finding is 
intuitively appealing in a sense that, if investors are sceptical about accounting 
information due to increasing levels of the perception of corruption in countries, less 
trading activity will be generated around the release of earnings information. However, 
the negative impact of corruption on earnings informativeness disappears in the post IFRS 
mandatory adoption period. This provides some evidence to suggest that improvements 




in financial governance such as the improvement of Accounting Standards can moderate 
the adverse impact of corruption on capital markets. 
Overall, this chapter makes some important contributions to the literature. First, it 
contributes to the growing literature on how structural and institutional factors affect 
earnings informativeness. Specifically with regards to the impact of IFRS adoption, the 
analysis adds to the work of Landsman et al. (2012) by showing that although IFRS led 
to increase in market reactions to earnings in a combined sample of countries, an 
examination of individual countries, given differences in investor protection mechanisms, 
can provide evidence to the contrary. The analysis in this chapter shows that specific 
country factors and processes leading to adoption might help explain cross-country 
variations on the capital market effects of IFRS adoption. Also, the capital markets 
implications of corruption have been overlooked. However, for developing markets such 
as those used in this study, the perceptions of corruption may be an important 
consideration for investors. The inclusion of corruption in this strand of literature, 
therefore, makes a significant contribution, particularly as countries in the sample, tend 
to be characterised by weaker legal and economic institutions. Finally, the chapter extends 
the literature on corruption by showing that it has implications for firm-level outcomes. 
From a policy perspective, it is relevant for policymakers to know that financial markets 
can only the gain confidence of investors if the general legal, political and economic 
frameworks are strengthened.   
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 develops the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 7.3 provides details of the empirical design. The empirical analyses are 
presented in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides some additional analyses and robustness 
checks. Section 7.6 concludes.  
7.2 Hypotheses development 
This section formulates the hypotheses to be tested. 
The impact of IFRS adoption on earnings informativeness 
The adoption of IFRS requires publicly listed companies to adopt a set of single high-
quality standards with the view to facilitating the cross-border comparability, reducing 
information asymmetry, as well as increasing reporting transparency (Ball 2006). Thus, 
the theoretical arguments in favour of the capital market benefits of IFRS adoption 
including earnings informativeness are based mainly on the premise of improved 




transparency and comparability (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). They argue that the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS lead firms to improve quality of financial reporting as IFRS 
reduces the amount of discretion relative to many local Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). IFRS adoption will therefore lead to an increase in reporting quality 
(Barth et al. 2008). The comparability argument, put forward by Armstrong et al. (2010), 
is based on the premise that IFRS adoption makes it easier and cheaper for investors to 
compare firms across markets. This implies that, even without an increase in reporting 
quality, financial information becomes more useful to investors and can help to reduce 
information asymmetry as investors will be able to differentiate between lower and higher 
quality financial information (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). To this end, we can expect 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS to lead to greater earnings informativeness and market 
reaction to earnings. However, despite the intuitively appealing premise for the adoption 
of IFRS, and the evidence of its capital market benefits, there are opposing views. A key 
argument in this strand of literature is based on the idea that the adoption of a single set 
of accounting standards does not necessarily address differences in the institutional 
features of countries (Ball et al. 2000, Ball 2006). This raises genuine questions about 
whether developing countries, characterised by weak rule of law, poor investor protection 
and widespread corruption, can reap the capital market benefits of the adoption of IFRS. 
Moreover, firms may also have different reporting incentives which can limit the 
importance of accounting standards in determining reporting quality and earnings 
informativeness (Ball et al. 2000, Ball et al. 2003, Burgstahler et al. 2006). Thus, there 
still remains an empirical question as to whether the adoption of IFRS could improve 
earnings informativeness in different in different jurisdictions. As already indicated in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, one of the main challenges of the African markets is the weak 
enforcement of laws, regulations and corporate governance. Based on this premise, one 
is not likely to observe significant improvement in the market reactions to earnings 
following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. This leads to the first hypothesis which is 
stated in alternative form as follows: 
H11: Adoption of IFRS does not increase earnings informativeness in African markets 
The impact of perception of corruption 
As mentioned earlier, research on how country-level corruption influences the utilisation 
of accounting information by investors has been scarce. Javorcik and Wei (2009) argue 
that high level of corruption could worsen the problem of information asymmetry or the 
perception of its existence. Many studies have shown that corruption decreases 
investment which ultimately leads to a decrease in financial development and economic 




growth (Mauro 1995, Wei 2000, Knill 2013, Jain et al. 2017, Bodnaruk et al. 2017). But 
if investors provide funds despite the prevalence of corruption, it remains to be seen 
whether accounting disclosure is informative or is treated with scepticism. On the one 
hand, and based on the view that corruption could have implications for financial markets, 
one may expect a corruption proxy to be associated with reduced informativeness i.e a 
negative coefficient if investors respond less to observations more exposed to corruption. 
In Chapter 2, one of the institutional challenges about markets in the sample, and African 
markets in general, is corruption and its perception. Countries in African markets continue 
to rank poorly in comparison to other African countries in various corruption perception 
surveys. One major concern about the impact of corruption in Africa has always been 
about its impact on economic growth (d'Agostino et al. 2016). Given the high prevalence 
of corruption on the African continent, this chapter hypothesises that the impact of 
corruption can also manifest via firm level outcomes in terms of how investors perceive 
and react to accounting information of firms operating in these markets. This leads to the 
next hypothesis that; 
H12: The perception of corruption is negatively associated with earnings 
informativeness. 
 
7.3 Empirical design 
The measures of earnings informativeness used in this chapter are the same as those used 
in Chapter 6. Normalised volatility which compares, volatility in the event window to 
volatility outside of the event window, is used in univariate analyses. In multivariate 
analyses, the measures of informativeness are Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and 
Abnormal Trading Volume (ATV).  
With regards to testing for the impact of IFRS adoption, the analysis focuses on 
Nigeria and South Africa. Both countries instituted a mandatory switch from domestic 
standards to IFRS in 2012 according to their IFRS profiles published on 
https://www.ifrs.org.  The adoption of IFRS in Kenya precedes the start of the sample 
period. For the purposes of analysis in this chapter, the Pre-IFRS adoption period is 2005-
2012 whilst the post-IFRS adoption period is 2013-2015. It is however important to 
mention that in the case of South Africa, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements have required listed firms to use IFRS since January 2005. In some 
instances where companies are unable to comply due to such factors as dual listing, they 
have to make a disclosure to that effect. Further, Regulations enacted under the 




Companies Act of 2008 continued to permit the use of South African GAAP as it was 
mostly similar to IFRS due to harmonisation.  As a result of this, the use of South African 
GAAP was fully withdrawn in 2012 making IFRS the only applicable accounting 
standard. Hence the results on South Africa need to be interpreted within this context as 
prior to 2012, there was already a significant overlap between local South African GAAP 
and IFRS. However, given this does not affect conclusions drawn from the Nigerian 
Sample and the overall arguments in the chapter.  
In univariate analyses, normalised volatility is computed for each country in both 
periods. In multivariate analyses, and to further test whether the market reaction to 
earnings is greater after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the following model is estimated 
for each of the two countries in the spirit of Landsman et al. (2012). 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡




+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                 7.1 
Where for each firm i, market reaction is either CAR or ATV at time t. CAR is the -10,+10 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns to earnings at year. ATV is the abnormal 
trading volume which is estimated as the average trading volume of the stock during the 
event window scaled by the average trading volume over a  2 month (60 days) period 
prior to the event window. IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for 
any of the years 2013, 2014 or 2015 and zero otherwise. All other variables (Earnings, 
Earnings Growth and those listed as controls), are as defined previously. An interaction 
term for Earnings and IFRS and Earnings Growth and IFRS has been included to ascertain 
differences in the impact of the size and growth of earnings between the pre- and post-
IFRS adoption periods. 
The impact of corruption on earnings informativeness is examined by estimating the 
following regression model. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 +
                                         ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               7.2 
 




Where market reaction refers to both CAR and ATV. CAR is the -10, +10 market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns to earnings at year. ATV is the abnormal trading volume 
which is estimated as the average trading volume of the stock during the event window 
scaled by the average trading volume over a  2 month (60 days) period prior to the event 
window. Corruption is the inverse of the transparency international corruption index score 
in year t for each country. Higher scores denote higher levels of perceived corruption. 
Auditing and Reporting Standards is a country’s score on the quality of its Auditing and 
reporting standards according to the Global competitiveness index. Again, the set of 
controls are as defined in Chapter 4. 
In order to investigate whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS has a moderating 
effect on the impact of corruption on market reactions, equation 7.2 is re-estimated to 
include an interaction term for IFRS with corruption. 
7.4 Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analyses of the chapter. 
7.4.1 Normalised volatility pre and post-IFRS adoption 
Normalised volatility in both the Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS adoption period are presented 
in Table 7.1. Panel A presents normalised volatility for all earnings announcements whilst 
normalised volatility for good and bad news are presented in Panels B and C respectively. 
These are presented for a range of event windows similar to Table 6.3 in Chapter 6. For 
the main event window (-10, +10) in Panel A, the average normalised volatility in the 
Pre-IFRS period for firms in Nigeria is 0.052 or 5.2%. In the Post-IFRS window it is 
much higher at 0.157. Across all event windows in Panel A of the table, normalised 
volatility in the Post-IFRS period is greater than normalised volatility in the Pre-IFRS 
period. Interestingly, the only negative average normalised volatility for Nigeria in Panel 
A is observed in the event window preceding the event date (-10, -3). This is the case for 
both the Pre and Post IFRS adoption periods. However, consistent with the positive 
normalised volatility figures in the other event windows, those of the pre-event window 








Table 7.1: Normalised volatility: Pre and Post IFRS adoption  
 This table presents earnings event reaction results in the form of normalized volatility in the Pre- and Post IFRS adoption 
period for Nigeria and South Africa. Normalised volatility measures the volatility of stock returns with the event window 
in relation to volatility outside the event window, and is computed as ((event volatility/normal volatility)-1). Event 
volatility is computed as the mean absolute market-adjusted abnormal return within the event window. For an -10,+10 
event window, event volatility is computed as. Normal volatility is computed as the mean absolute market-adjusted 
abnormal return for the 60 days before the start of the event window and 60 days after the end of the event window. For 
a -10, 10 event window, normal volatility is computed as. Panel A presents results for all earnings, Panel B for positive 
earnings and Panel C for negative earnings. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
Panel A: Full Sample 
Event Window  
Pre-IFRS  Post-IFRS 
 Nigeria  South Africa  Nigeria  South Africa 
(-10,+10)  0.052*  0.028**  0.157***  -0.001 
(-10,-3)  -0.009  0.028  -0.019  0.034 
(-2,+2)  0.023  0.007  0.308***  -0.030 
(-1,+1)  0.028  0.027  0.418***  -0.025 
(-1,0)  0.018  0.007  0.375***  -0.071** 
0  0.089  0.037  0.664***  -0.021 
(0,+1)  0.067  0.052  0.587***  0.023 
(0,+3)  0.049  0.014  0.424***  0.019 
(+3,+10)  0.141***  0.068***  0.248***  0.009 
Panel B: Good News 
Event Window  
Pre-IFRS  Post-IFRS 
 Nigeria  South Africa  Nigeria  South Africa 
(-10,+10)  0.058*  0.025***  0.165***  -0.008 
(-10,-3)  -0.006  0.022*  -0.003  0.014 
(-2,+2)  0.026  0.014  0.341***  -0.015 
(-1,+1)  0.029  0.028  0.451***  -0.018 
0  0.109  0.046  0.690***  -0.002 
(-1,0)  0.022  0.010  0.403***  -0.057 
(0,+1)  0.075  0.055**  0.621***  0.029 
(0,+3)  0.056  0.017  0.455***  0.029 
(+3,+10)  0.147***  0.066***  0.234***  0.002 
Panel C: Bad News 
Event Window  
Pre-IFRS  Post-IFRS 
 Nigeria  South Africa  Nigeria  South Africa 
(-10,+10)  0.000  0.056  0.007  0.044 
(-10,-3)  -0.078  0.081  -0.282  0.161 
(-2,+2)  0.020  -0.053  -0.242**  -0.126 
(-1,+1)  0.017  0.019  -0.128  -0.070 
(-1,0)  -0.019  -0.026  -0.095  -0.156* 
0  -0.064  -0.046  0.225  -0.137 
(0,+1)  0.007  0.031  0.019  -0.017 
(0,+3)  0.029  -0.016  -0.101  -0.045 
(+3,+10)   0.107   0.091   0.480   0.055 
  





In South Africa, average normalised volatility for the main event window (-10, +10) in 
the Pre-IFRS period is 0.028 but -0.001 in the Post-IFRS period. Thus, not only is 
normalised volatility greater in the Pre- mandatory IFRS period than in the Post-
mandatory IFRS period, but the table also shows that earnings in the post-mandatory 
period for the main event window are not informative, given the negative sign of the 
normalised volatility figure. Consistent with the results for the main event window, 
normalised volatility in the other windows are also greater in the Pre-IFRS period than in 
Post-IFRS period. For both good and bad news, a similar pattern to the full sample is 
observed.  
Overall, the findings in Table 7.1 show that the debate about whether the adoption 
of IFRS improves the information environment of firms, and by extension, the 
functioning of capital markets, may be genuine and not far from over. However, given 
that most previous studies of the capital market benefits of IFRS adoption use cross-
country samples (eg. Daske et al. 2008, Landsman et al. 2012), the differences in the 
impact of IFRS on a firm’s information environment can be due to country-specific 
factors. The next section discusses results from the multivariate analysis where the impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on CAR and ATV is analysed. 
7.4.2 Impact of IFRS adoption on CARs and ATV 
Results from the estimations of the impact of IFRS adoption on CAR and ATV are 
presented in Table 7.2 and 7.3 for Nigeria and South Africa respectively. As already 
mentioned, IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for years after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in each country (2013-2015) and zero otherwise. 
Interestingly, the regression results in Table 7.2 do not show any statistically significant 
impact of IFRS on both CAR and ATV, although the coefficients are generally positive. 
This insignificant effect is still observed when the IFRS dummy is interacted with 
earnings characteristics notably Earnings and Earnings Growth.  
The results presented in Table 7.3 for South Africa also do not appear different to 
those for the Nigerian sample. The impact of IFRS is generally insignificant except for a 
weakly significant impact in models 6 and 7. Again, interacting the IFRS dummy with 
earnings characteristics do not also lead to any significant impact on either CAR or ATV. 




This provides support for Hypothesis 11, that the market reaction to earnings did not 
improve significantly following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
The results from the regressions presented in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 are consistent with 
the view that financial reporting outcomes of IFRS adoption is greater in countries with 
stronger enforcement of laws (Daske et al. 2008, Landsman et al. 2012, Houqe et al. 
2012). These studies combine samples from different countries and find that although the 
adoption of IFRS has statistically significant positive effects, these effects may vary 
depending on the strength of legal enforcement of regulations. For example, Landsman 
et al (2012) arrive at this conclusion by interacting their IFRS dummy with another 
dummy which indicates whether countries in their sample have above median level of 
enforcement in the rule of law index constructed by Mastruzzi et al. (2007). Therefore, 
the approach in this Chapter, to focus on countries individually, provides evidence in 
support of this view as the two countries in question are associated with weaker 
enforcement of laws compared to more developed countries like the US, UK and 
countries in the European Union. 
Indeed, Holthausen (2009) argues that the goal of having a credible and uniform 
set of accounting standards, which standards like the IFRS seek to achieve, may not be 
realised if underlying institutional and economic factors within countries do not improve. 
Using a sample of 26 countries around the world, Daske et al. (2008) find that the capital 
market benefits of the adoption of IFRS are more pronounced in countries where there 
have been simultaneous efforts to improve governance and enforcement of regulations 
and where firms have a greater incentive to be transparent. Such arguments are consistent 
with studies which have concluded that perhaps the improvement in accounting standards 
alone is not a sufficient condition to improve financial reporting outcomes and its 
consequent impact.  
As identified in Chapter 2 of this thesis, although most African countries have 
developed corporate governance codes and pieces of legislation, the problem of 
enforcement yet remains the biggest challenge. Some of the factors already identified 
include inadequate resourcing of state institutions mandated to enforce this regulations as 
well as a general lack of will by the political establishments. The findings presented in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 therefore provide some further evidence to suggest that the regulatory 
environment, especially with respect to enforcement in African markets, would have to 
be improved if the capital market benefits of IFRS adoption are to be fully realised. 




 Table 7.2: IFRS adoption and earnings reactions in Nigeria 
 This table presents regression results on the impact of IFRS adoption on market reactions to earnings in Nigeria. IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for a year 
relating to the post-IFRS adoption period (2013-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.      
  CAR   ATV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IFRS 0.0109 0.0149 0.0330 0.0435  -0.0010 0.0749 0.2321 0.2927 
 (0.25) (0.34) (0.78) (1.05)  (-0.00) (0.09) (0.27) (0.35) 
Earnings 0.5539**   0.9912***      
 (2.26)   (2.75)      
Earnings Growth  0.1660  -0.1062      
  (0.93)  (-0.70)      
|Earnings|      6.5974***   7.6655 
      (2.90)   (1.61) 
|Earnings Growth|       4.2077**  2.4414 
       (2.62)  (1.08) 
Positive to Negative   0.0237     0.5600  
   (0.42)     (0.94)  
Negative to Positive   0.0018     -0.1946  
   (0.04)     (-0.71)  
IFRS x Earnings    -0.9973**      
    (-2.61)      
IFRS x Earnings Growth    0.4160      
    (0.53)      
IFRS x |Earnings|         -5.7448 
         (-0.99) 
IFRS x |Earnings Growth|         -1.4631 
         (-0.35) 
                                                                                         Continued on next page 
 




Table 7.2 continued  
 CAR  ATV 
Firm Size -0.0041 -0.0002 0.0015 -0.0055  -0.0828 -0.0682 -0.0289 -0.1026 
 (-0.34) (-0.02) (0.12) (-0.45)  (-0.96) (-0.62) (-0.29) (-1.02) 
Leverage 0.1852* 0.1219 0.1273 0.1508  0.0270 -0.8132 -0.6156 -0.4557 
 (1.68) (1.29) (1.43) (1.28)  (0.04) (-0.96) (-0.77) (-0.58) 
Age 0.0146 0.0161 -0.0069 0.0205  0.0499 0.0826 -0.2199 0.0872 
 (0.27) (0.30) (-0.14) (0.41)  (0.05) (0.08) (-0.21) (0.09) 
Trading Frequency -0.0183 -0.0180 -0.0159 -0.0175  -0.1167 -0.2004 -0.1040 -0.1901 
 (-0.43) (-0.42) (-0.41) (-0.38)  (-0.36) (-0.53) (-0.30) (-0.51) 
Synchronicity -0.0023 -0.0163 -0.0262 0.0205  0.5970 0.6373 0.2693 0.8472 
 (-0.02) (-0.17) (-0.27) (0.20)  (0.90) (0.93) (0.41) (1.18) 
Reporting Lag 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001  -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0020 
 (0.21) (0.21) (-0.05) (0.44)  (-1.04) (-1.19) (-1.25) (-1.16) 
Constant -0.0014 0.0148 0.0324 -0.0260  1.0940 1.3750 1.5365 1.0742 
 (-0.01) (0.14) (0.36) (-0.26)  (1.01) (1.12) (1.19) (0.96) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 122 122 122 122  122 122 122 122 










Table 7.3: IFRS adoption and earnings reactions in South Africa 
This table presents regression results on the impact of IFRS adoption on market reactions to earnings in South Africa. IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for a year relating to the 
post-IFRS adoption period (2013-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.      
  CAR   ATV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IFRS -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0039 0.0001  0.0937 0.1031* 0.0976* 0.1047 
 (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.46) (0.00)  (1.61) (1.76) (1.70) (1.15) 
Earnings 0.0027   -0.0389      
 (0.06)   (-0.70)      
Earnings Growth  0.0547  0.0666      
  (1.47)  (1.32)      
|Earnings|      -0.4881**   -0.5940** 
      (-2.39)   (-2.17) 
|Earnings Growth|       0.0460  0.2356 
       (0.25)  (1.05) 
Positive to Negative   0.0044     -0.0052  
   (0.23)     (-0.06)  
Negative to Positive   0.0366**     0.2115  
   (2.02)     (1.28)  
IFRS x Earnings    -0.0606      
    (-0.55)      
IFRS x Earnings Growth    0.0716      
    (0.77)      
IFRS x |Earnings|         -0.3206 
         (-0.45) 
IFRS x |Earnings Growth|         0.3985 
         (0.50) 
 Continued on next page 
  




 Table 7.3 continued  
 CAR  ATV 
Firm Size -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0018  -0.0468* -0.0422* -0.0355 -0.0398 
 (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.44) (-0.46)  (-1.81) (-1.72) (-1.51) (-1.63) 
Leverage 0.0096 0.0124 0.0091 0.0071  -0.2301 -0.2329 -0.2288 -0.2313 
 (0.53) (0.68) (0.48) (0.38)  (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.50) (-1.54) 
Age 0.0025 0.0019 0.0014 0.0010  -0.0219 -0.0180 -0.0230 -0.0253 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.27) (0.18)  (-0.53) (-0.44) (-0.56) (-0.61) 
Trading Frequency -0.0222* -0.0206* -0.0221* -0.0209*  0.0379 0.0347 0.0383 0.0277 
 (-1.89) (-1.79) (-1.88) (-1.79)  (0.53) (0.48) (0.54) (0.38) 
Synchronicity 0.0541 0.0512 0.0494 0.0487  -0.1706 -0.1992 -0.2258 -0.1781 
 (1.42) (1.36) (1.29) (1.27)  (-0.78) (-0.92) (-1.04) (-0.81) 
Reporting Lag -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0012 
 (-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.42) (-0.56)  (-0.89) (-0.90) (-0.74) (-0.86) 
Constant 0.0285 0.0255 0.0176 0.0258  1.9046*** 1.8149*** 1.7635*** 1.8668*** 
 (0.87) (0.78) (0.53) (0.79)  (6.98) (7.01) (6.78) (6.99) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1141 1141 1141 1141  1141 1141 1141 1141 









7.4.3 Corruption and earnings informativeness 
This section presents results from analysis of the effect of perception of corruption on the 
market reactions to earnings. Summary statistics Corruption and Auditing and Reporting 
Standards are presented in Table 7.4.15 Kenya has the highest mean value of Corruption 
of 0.432 with South Africa having the lowest of 0.221. With respect to the Auditing and 
Reporting Standards, South Africa has the highest of 6.38 with Nigeria having the lowest 
of 3.91. The average value for Kenya over the period is 4.60. 
Table 7.4: Summary statistics of corruption and auditing and reporting standards 
 
 
Regression results from the impact of the perception of corruption on the market 
reaction to earnings are presented in Table 7.5. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent 
variable is CAR, which represents a price reaction to earnings news. In columns (3) and 
(4) the dependent variable is ATV. The main measure of corruption is the inverse value 
of the Transparency International Corruption Score. For robustness purposes, another 
proxy for corruption is used in columns (2) and (4), the International Country Risk Guide 
Corruption Index. This corruption index is produced by the PRS Group, one of the 
world’s leading providers of country risk information. Their corruption index is a 
component of a comprehensive analysis of financial, economic and political risk in 
countries around the world. Corruption is found to have no statistically significant impact 
on CARs, implying that the price reaction to earnings announcements by firms in a 
                                                          
15 Summary statistics are presented for only these variables because those of other variables are the same 
as that which has been presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Appendix 7.1 of this chapter, however, 
presents a correlation matrix for all the variable used. 
This table presents summary statistics of institutional variables: Corruption is the inverse of transparency 
international index score on the perceptions of corruption. Auditing and Reporting is a country’s average score in 
the Global Competitiveness  
  Mean  Median 
Corruption    
Kenya 0.432  0.455 
Nigeria 0.398  0.400 
South Africa 0.221   0.222 
Auditing and Reporting Standards    
Kenya 4.601  4.665 
Nigeria 3.912  3.944 
South Africa 6.380   6.300 




country is not influenced by the level of corruption. However, in columns (3), where the 
dependent variable is ATV, corruption has a negative and significant impact, suggesting 
that investors react less to earnings announcements in countries where corruption is 
higher. Given that trading volume is a reflection of the direct actions of investors around 
the release of corporate information (Kim and Verrecchia 1991), the results in Table 7.5 
provide support for Hypothesis 12 that the market reactions to earnings announcements 
can be influenced by the perceptions of corruption. This finding on ATV is not only 
statistically significant but economically meaningful. In column (3) for example, the 
coefficient of -3.15 suggests that all other things equal, a one standard deviation increase 
in the perception of corruption decreases abnormal trading volume by 0.28 corresponding 
to about 22% of the sample median.16 
Reduced trading volume and lack of price informativeness associated with 
corruption in Table 7.5 support the general notion that country legal and political factors 
have an impact on capital markets via investor participation and information risk 
(Eleswarapu and Venkataraman 2006). In their study, they find that trading cost is usually 
higher in countries with weaker judicial efficiency. A major reason for this assessment 
lies in the fact that rules (and the enforcement thereof) governing corporate disclosures 
have implications for information transmission and how such information is acted upon. 
Moreover, from an investor protection perspective and as argued by La Porta et al. (1998), 
legal rules which are meant to protect investors from expropriation and the confidence 
that they will be enforced can influence the willingness of investors to participate in 
financial markets. The prevalence of corruption implies that such laws, if in existence, 
might not be enforced, and can therefore adversely affect the value investors attach to 
corporate information including earnings. But earnings will be more informative if the 
perception of corruption is lower. 
General corruption at the country level could also serve as a fertile ground for firm-
level corruption to thrive (Alm et al. 2016). Thus, firms in more corrupt countries are 
more likely to have a greater corruption culture. Liu (2016) finds that firms with greater 
corruption culture are more likely to engage in earnings management and other 
accounting misconduct. A natural consequence of this is for investors to be skeptical 
about, and act less on accounting information whenever they are announced (Marquardt 
                                                          
16 The standard deviation of the Corruption variable for all three countries is 0.089. Therefore multiplying 
this by the coefficient of -3.15 gives -0.28. This corresponds to 22% of  the median value of ATV for all 
three countries, which is 1.272 




and Wiedman 2004). Interestingly, Liu (2016) constructs a firm level proxy for corruption 
based on the Transparency International Index scores of countries from where leaders of 
these firms immigrated. This provides further evidence that country corruption has 
implications for firm-level corruption which can ultimately affect investors’ attitudes 
towards corporate information such as earnings. A related  study conducted by Fan et al. 
(2014) in China, shows that firms linked to some 45 top bureaucrats involved in 
corruption scandals were associated with lower earnings informativeness. 
Overall the results in Table 7.5 provide some evidence that corruption can 
influence how investors react to corporate information. The perceived credibility of 
accounting information is a major determinant of the market’s reaction to its release 
(Pevzner et al. 2015). Investors are therefore most likely to assign a higher probability to 
manipulation of financial results or managers behaving opportunistically in countries with 
higher levels of corruption and accordingly react less to corporate earnings 
announcements. Moreover, Donadelli et al. (2014) posit that corruption has the potential 
to worsen the problem of agency conflicts leading to poor corporate governance. For 
instance, they argue that managers in corrupt environments are likely to exploit resources 
of the firm to pay officials for personal gain.  Poor corporate governance has, however, 
been found to affect the informativeness of earnings negatively and this relationship 
appears to be pronounced in countries with less transparent information environment (Lau 
et al. 2016). The results in this chapter indicate that corruption does play a role in the 
governance and investor protection framework, particularly for African countries, where 
this has been shown to be prevalent as indicated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 





Table 7.5: Corruption and market reaction to earnings announcements 
This table presents regression results on the impact of perceptions of corruption on market reactions to earnings. Corruption is the inverse of transparency international index score on the perceptions of 
corruption. Audting and Reporting standards is a country’s average score in the Global. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.        
  CAR   ATV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption -0.0246  0.1924   -3.1525**  -1.6449  
 (-0.12)  (0.97)   (-2.16)  (-1.55)  
Corruption(ICRG)  0.0053  0.0026   -0.2120*  -0.2112** 
  (0.31)  (0.19)   (-1.68)  (-2.00) 
Auditing and Reporting Standards 0.0531 0.0468 -0.0325 -0.0029  0.4757 0.2939 0.2072 0.1737 
 (1.46) (1.42) (-1.53) (-0.16)  (1.52) (1.07) (1.63) (1.37) 
Earnings -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0507 -0.0051      
 (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.54) (-0.08)      
Earnings Growth 0.0305 0.0304 0.0288 0.0239      
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.44) (0.44)      
|Earnings|      -0.3644 -0.3694 -0.3903 -0.3535 
      (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.32) (-1.19) 
|Earnings Growth|      0.4115 0.4116 0.3626 0.3568 
      (1.49) (1.49) (1.33) (1.31) 
Positive to Negative -0.0093 -0.0094 0.0134 -0.0088  -0.0133 -0.0164 0.0109 0.0059 
 (-0.54) (-0.54) (0.57) (-0.51)  (-0.13) (-0.15) (0.10) (0.06) 
Negative to Positive 0.0144 0.0140 0.0031 0.0155  0.2047 0.1975 0.1712 0.1635 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.11) (0.76)  (1.37) (1.32) (1.14) (1.09) 








     
 Table 7.5 continued 
 CAR  ATV 
Firm Size -0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0051 -0.0021  -0.0376* -0.0409* -0.0337 -0.0347 
 (-0.90) (-0.94) (-0.74) (-0.63)  (-1.67) (-1.82) (-1.48) (-1.53) 
Leverage 0.0095 0.0096 0.0269 0.0072  -0.1517 -0.1560 -0.1596 -0.1544 
 (0.48) (0.49) (1.31) (0.36)  (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.03) 
Age 0.0033 0.0034 0.0154** 0.0030  -0.0328 -0.0305 -0.0340 -0.0318 
 (0.57) (0.58) (2.28) (0.51)  (-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.83) 
Trading Frequency -0.0296** -0.0297** -0.0228 -0.0250**  -0.0726 -0.0646 -0.0278 -0.0160 
 (-2.47) (-2.48) (-1.60) (-2.18)  (-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.39) (-0.22) 
Synchronicity 0.0575* 0.0592* 0.0287 0.0445  0.0403 0.0698 -0.0755 -0.0865 
 (1.77) (1.83) (0.72) (1.44)  (0.19) (0.32) (-0.36) (-0.41) 
Reporting Lag -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 
 (-0.55) (-0.55) (0.09) (-0.25)  (-1.45) (-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.47) 
Constant -0.3012 -0.2693 0.2113 0.0736  -0.3859 0.2374 1.1580 1.1052 
 (-1.37) (-1.25) (1.52) (0.63)  (-0.21) (0.14) (1.31) (1.27) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes No  No  Yes Yes No  No 
Obs 1283 1283 1283 1283  1283 1283 1283 1283 
R2 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.018   0.042 0.041 0.031 0.032 
  





7.4.4 The interaction of IFRS and perception of corruption 
To determine whether the mandatory introduction of IFRS has any moderating effect on 
the impact of corruption, the IFRS variable is interacted with the corruption variable. 
Marra et al. (2011) argue that the adoption of IFRS helps to enhance corporate 
governance. They make this conclusion by analysing the effect of two governance 
structures— board independence and audit committee on the earnings management. If the 
adoption of IFRS can be indicative of good governance, then in a setting where corruption 
is highly prevalent, the implementation of IFRS could moderate the adverse impact of 
corruption. Thus, there should be no statistical significance of the interaction term 
between IFRS and corruption. Table 7.6 presents estimates of the regression results 
including the interaction term between IFRS and the two measures of corruption. The 
stand-alone variables for corruption becomes insignificant for ATV. Also the interaction 
term for IFRS and Corruption, is insignificant, providing support for the assertion that the 
negative impact of corruption on the market reaction to earnings announcements can be 
reduced when the accounting and regulatory framework is enhanced. The results from 
this table also provides evidence in support of the earlier arguments that IFRS will not 
have capital markets benefits when there is weak enforcement of laws and regulations. 





  Table 7.6: Corruption, IFRS adoption and market reactions to earnings 
 
This table presents regression results on the moderating effect IFRS has on the impact of perceptions of corruption 
on market reactions to earnings. Corruption is the inverse of transparency international index score on the 
perceptions of corruption. Audting and Reporting standards is a country’s average score in the Global 
Competitiveness IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value for a year relating to the post-IFRS adoption 
period (2013-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively 
  CAR   ATV  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Corruption 0.2802   -0.6536  
 (1.27)   (-0.46)  
Corruption (ICRG)  -0.2953**   -0.4362 
  (-2.14)   (-0.42) 
IFRS -0.0692 -0.0398  0.0735 0.0709 
 (-1.62) (-0.94)  (0.22) (0.22) 
Corruption x IFRS 0.2201   0.1146  
 (1.36)   (0.09)  
Corruption(ICRG) x IFRS  0.1202   0.0782 
  (1.31)   (0.11) 
Auditing and Reporting Standards 0.0333** -0.0150  -0.0084 -0.0131 
 (2.15) (-0.90)  (-0.07) (-0.12) 
Earnings 0.0034 -0.0065    
 (0.05) (-0.10)    
Earnings Growth 0.0300 0.0341    
 (0.56) (0.63)    
|Earnings|    -0.5264* -0.5098* 
    (-1.76) (-1.68) 
|Earnings Growth|    0.4212 0.4220 
    (1.52) (1.52) 
Positive to Negative 0.0061 0.0074  -0.0116 -0.0141 
 (0.32) (0.38)  (-0.11) (-0.13) 
Negative to Positive 0.0156 0.0155  0.1006 0.0945 
 (0.72) (0.72)  (0.64) (0.60) 
Firm Size -0.0010 0.0004  -0.0317 -0.0319 
 (-0.25) (0.10)  (-1.32) (-1.33) 
Leverage 0.0258 0.0255  -0.2208 -0.2170 
 (1.18) (1.17)  (-1.41) (-1.39) 
Age 0.0010 0.0009  -0.0520 -0.0517 
 (0.15) (0.15)  (-1.21) (-1.20) 
Trading Frequency -0.0140 -0.0172  -0.0148 -0.0114 
 (-1.09) (-1.37)  (-0.18) (-0.15) 
Synchronicity 0.0291 0.0172  -0.0734 -0.0814 
 (0.84) (0.48)  (-0.34) (-0.37) 
Reporting Lag 0.0001 0.0001  -0.0017 -0.0017 
 (0.26) (0.28)  (-1.50) (-1.51) 
Constant -0.3766** 0.0986  1.6692 1.7113 
 (-2.05) (0.49)  (1.60) (1.62) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Obs 1098 1098  1098 1098 
𝑅2 0.017 0.019   0.028 0.028 





7.5 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
A series of robustness tests are undertaken and the results are presented in Tables 7.7 to 
7.9. These relate to the impact of IFRS adoption on the market reaction to earnings 
announcements. Table 7.7 presents regression results where the dependent variable is 
Differenced Abnormal Returns (DARs). As defined in Chapter 6, DARs are the average 
abnormal returns during the event window minus the average abnormal returns in a period 
outside the event window. The results from this table confirm those in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 
as the IFRS dummy still remains statistically insignificant. Table 7.8 and 7.9 use an 
alternative dummy variable to capture the mandatory adoption of IFRS in both Nigeria 
and South Africa. Since the mandatory adoption occurred in 2012, it is likely that some 
earnings reported 2013 will have been prepared using the previous local standards. In 
order to address this concern, the IFRS dummy is reconstructed where it takes the value 
of one for 2014-2015 and 0 otherwise. The results presented in the respective tables for 
each country continue to show that the impact of IFRS has no significant impact on the 








 Table 7.7 IFRS and Differenced Abnormal Returns 
This table presents regression results on the impact of IFRS adoption on market reactions to earnings. The dependent variable is Differenced Abnormal Returns (DAR). IFRS is an indicator variable 
which takes the value of 1 for a year relating to the post-IFRS adoption period (2013-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.         
  Nigeria   South Africa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IFRS 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010 0.0015  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.50) (0.87)  (-0.92) (-0.99) (-1.00) (-0.14) 
Earnings 0.0266**   0.0418***  0.0014   0.0004 
 (2.46)   (2.74)  (0.82)   (0.17) 
Earnings Growth  0.0147*  0.0065   0.0023*  0.0021 
  (1.68)  (0.98)   (1.79)  (1.20) 
Positive to Negative   0.0000     -0.0002  
   (0.01)     (-0.26)  
Negative to Positive   0.0009     0.0010  
   (0.39)     (1.33)  
IFRS x Earnings    -0.0461***     -0.0048 
    (-2.72)     (-0.97) 
IFRS x Earnings Growth    -0.0034     0.0032 
    (-0.13)     (0.74) 
Firm Size -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-0.06) (0.21) (0.43) (-0.23)  (0.51) (0.75) (0.83) (0.81) 
Leverage 0.0107** 0.0074* 0.0081* 0.0082*  0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 
 (2.24) (1.72) (1.94) (1.77)  (0.86) (0.78) (0.67) (0.75) 

















Table 7.7 continued  
 Nigeria  South Africa 
Age -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0006  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.14) (0.16) (-0.28) (0.27)  (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (-0.00) 
Trading Frequency -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0007  -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (-0.22) (-0.31) (-0.16) (-0.37)  (-1.41) (-1.31) (-1.39) (-1.34) 
Synchronicity -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0020 0.0001  -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (-0.26) (-0.34) (-0.44) (0.02)  (-0.51) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
Reporting Lag -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.54) (-0.12)  (-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.34) (-0.40) 
Constant 0.0027 0.0032 0.0034 0.0013  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.58) (0.72) (0.83) (0.30)  (-0.04) (-0.08) (-0.18) (-0.12) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 122 122 122 122  1141 1141 1141 1141 
R2 0.132 0.122 0.104 0.189   0.015 0.017 0.016 0.018 




 Table 7.8:      Alternative dummy for IFRS- Nigeria 
This table presents regression results on the impact of IFRS adoption on market reactions to earnings in Nigeria. IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for a year relating to the post-
IFRS adoption period (2014-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.         
 CAR    ATV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IFRS -0.0570 -0.0592 -0.0527 -0.0306  -0.0836 -0.0747 -0.0372 -0.0781 
 (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.26) (-0.62)  (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.14) 
Earnings 0.5888**   0.7162**      
 (2.45)   (2.45)      
Earnings Growth  0.2247  0.0249      
  (1.28)  (0.11)      
|Earnings|      6.6096***   4.7892** 
      (2.90)   (2.04) 
|Earnings Growth|       4.1857**  2.8653 
       (2.50)  (1.54) 
Positive to Negative   0.0110     0.5024  
   (0.19)     (0.85)  
Negative to Positive   0.0054     -0.1697  
   (0.10)     (-0.73)  
IFRS x Earnings    -0.6746*      
    (-1.84)      
IFRS x Earnings Growth    0.1341      
    (0.21)      
IFRS x |Earnings|         1.1798 
         (0.28) 
IFRS x |Earnings Growth|         -3.9638 
         (-0.71) 
 Continued on next page 
 




Table 7.8 continued  
 CAR  ATV 
Firm Size -0.0058 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0050  -0.0839 -0.0737 -0.0437 -0.0940 
 (-0.48) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.41)  (-0.84) (-0.64) (-0.38) (-0.90) 
Leverage 0.1870* 0.1177 0.1247 0.1592  0.0274 -0.8218 -0.6338 -0.2769 
 (1.77) (1.32) (1.45) (1.41)  (0.05) (-1.02) (-0.82) (-0.37) 
Age 0.0801* 0.0895* 0.0779* 0.0818*  0.1288 0.2298 0.0575 0.2050 
 (1.87) (1.85) (1.70) (1.69)  (0.21) (0.36) (0.09) (0.32) 
Trading Frequency -0.0207 -0.0216 -0.0177 -0.0199  -0.1195 -0.2039 -0.1081 -0.1704 
 (-0.50) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.45)  (-0.37) (-0.55) (-0.31) (-0.47) 
Synchronicity 0.0099 -0.0018 -0.0030 0.0146  0.6040 0.6860 0.4071 0.7188 
 (0.11) (-0.02) (-0.03) (0.15)  (0.73) (0.84) (0.49) (0.87) 
Reporting Lag 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000  -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0023 
 (0.06) (0.09) (-0.07) (0.17)  (-1.27) (-1.40) (-1.37) (-1.47) 
Constant -0.4163*** -0.4837*** -0.4817*** -0.3956***  1.3025 2.3534** 2.3487** 1.6369 
 (-4.75) (-5.65) (-6.11) (-4.84)  (1.30) (2.08) (2.03) (1.60) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 122 122 122 122  122 122 122 122 










  Table 7.9: Alternative dummy for IFRS- South Africa 
This table presents regression results on the impact of IFRS adoption on market reactions to earnings in South Africa. IFRS is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for a year relating to the 
post-IFRS adoption period (2014-2015) and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in chapter 6 T-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.         
 CAR  ATV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IFRS -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0059 0.0093  0.0873 0.0944 0.0957 0.1206 
 (-0.57) (-0.52) (-0.57) (0.58)  (1.26) (1.35) (1.37) (1.38) 
Earnings 0.0023   -0.0334      
 (0.05)   (-0.63)      
Earnings Growth  0.0543  0.0672      
  (1.46)  (1.42)      
|Earnings|      -0.5044**   -0.5896** 
      (-2.45)   (-2.18) 
|Earnings Growth|       0.0384  0.2240 
       (0.21)  (1.03) 
Positive to Negative   0.0046     -0.0038  
   (0.24)     (-0.04)  
Negative to Positive   0.0362**     0.2208  
   (2.01)     (1.32)  
IFRS x Earnings    -0.2245      
    (-1.22)      
IFRS x Earnings Growth    0.1705      
    (1.02)      
IFRS x |Earnings|         -1.0174 
         (-1.39) 
IFRS x |Earnings Growth|         1.3461 
         (1.02) 
 Continued on next page 
  




Table 7.9 continued  
 CAR  ATV 
Firm Size -0.0032 -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0017  -0.0440* -0.0391 -0.0324 -0.0370 
 (-0.82) (-0.77) (-0.45) (-0.43)  (-1.69) (-1.59) (-1.35) (-1.50) 
Leverage 0.0098 0.0126 0.0092 0.0071  -0.2268 -0.2292 -0.2262 -0.2281 
 (0.55) (0.69) (0.49) (0.39)  (-1.52) (-1.54) (-1.49) (-1.53) 
Age 0.0025 0.0020 0.0014 0.0008  -0.0204 -0.0160 -0.0216 -0.0242 
 (0.48) (0.38) (0.27) (0.15)  (-0.49) (-0.39) (-0.53) (-0.59) 
Trading Frequency -0.0221* -0.0204* -0.0219* -0.0197*  0.0297 0.0258 0.0299 0.0221 
 (-1.88) (-1.77) (-1.86) (-1.71)  (0.42) (0.36) (0.42) (0.30) 
Synchronicity 0.0526 0.0502 0.0487 0.0454  -0.1866 -0.2185 -0.2415 -0.1977 
 (1.36) (1.31) (1.26) (1.16)  (-0.85) (-1.00) (-1.10) (-0.89) 
Reporting Lag -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0010 
 (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.46) (-0.61)  (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.59) (-0.75) 
Constant -0.2716*** -0.2934*** -0.2767*** -0.3000***  1.8807*** 1.8188*** 1.8075*** 1.7709*** 
 (-8.68) (-8.84) (-8.86) (-8.61)  (9.25) (8.84) (9.01) (8.63) 
Industry Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1141 1141 1141 1141  1141 1141 1141 1141 












The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the institutional environment on the 
stock market reaction to earnings. Specifically, two factors are analysed; improvement in 
accounting standards through the lens of IFRS adoption and corruption. Analysis of the 
impact of IFRS show that normalised volatility is greater in the post-IFRS adoption period 
than in the pre-IFRS adoption period for Nigerian firms but slightly lower in the case of 
South African firms. Multivariate analyses, however, provide no evidence of the impact 
of IFRS on either CAR or ATV.  Using the Transparency International and International 
Country Risk Guide corruption indices as proxies for corruption, the chapter also finds 
that whilst corruption has no impact on the price changes during earnings announcements, 
it does have a significant negative effect on investors’ actions during the announcement 
window in terms of trading volume. However, the adoption of IFRS, acting as a 
mechanism for improved financial disclosure and governance has a moderating effect on 
the adverse impact of corruption perception on earnings informativeness. 
This chapter provides new evidence which highlights corruption as an explanatory 
factor that could account for cross-country variations in earnings informativeness. 
Although there is a growing literature on how structural and institutional factors affect 
informativeness, the impact of the perception of corruption as an important factor in 
developing countries is yet to gain adequate prominence. This chapter attempts to start 
the process of filling this gap by providing empirical evidence which highlights that, 
perceptions of corruption, as a structural and institutional factor, can affect the 
transmission of value-relevant corporate information as well as how this information is 
acted upon by investors and other market participants. 
Overall, the analysis in this chapter highlights the importance of strengthening the 
financial and institutional framework of countries on the continent. Mechanisms to ensure 
the quality of financial reporting cannot be instituted in isolation. They must be 
accompanied by a commensurate effort aimed at improving investor protection and rule 
of law if capital market benefits are to be realised. Also, the fight against corruption will 
need to be taken more seriously as its impact on economic growth and development can 
be manifest through firm level outcomes whereby investors are discouraged from actively 
participating in the stock market.  





Appendix 7.1: Correlations 
This table presents the correlation of the variables used in the chapter.  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 CAR 1              
2 ATV 0.0529** 1             
3 IFRS -0.0183 0.0158 1            
4 Corruption  -0.00591 0.0203 -0.00785 1           
5 Audting and Reporting  standards 0.0202 -0.0143 0.141*** -0.842*** 1          
6 Earnings 0.0282 0.00395 -0.0239* -0.0176 -0.0144 1         
7 Earnings Growth 0.0216 0.0126 0.00518 0.0207 -0.0241 0.505*** 1        
8 Positive to Negative -0.00602 0.0163 0.00274 -0.00464 0.0219 -0.310*** -0.318*** 1       
9 Negative to Positive 0.0154 0.0418* 0.0183 0.0139 0.00336 0.0550*** 0.343*** 
-
0.0817*** 1      
10 Firm Size 
-
0.000949 -0.101*** -0.00740 -0.00769 -0.00266 0.309*** 0.0425*** -0.157*** -0.139*** 1     
11 Leverage -0.00884 -0.0357 0.0385*** 
-
0.0516*** 0.0776*** -0.304*** 
-
0.0418*** 0.0749*** 0.0569*** 
-
0.182*** 1    
12 Age 0.0506** -0.0134 0.106*** -0.306*** 0.545*** 0.00856 0.0111 0.00427 0.00612 0.0117 
-
0.0721*** 1   




0.0778*** 0.00890 -0.0562** -0.00632 -0.00623 0.0393 0.0455* 0.169*** -0.0235 0.0264 1  
14 Synchronicity 0.0118 
-




0.0623*** 0.613*** -0.100*** 0.137*** 0.236*** 1 
15 Reporting Lag 
-































The thesis is motivated by the apparent recent debate about whether stock prices in 
developing markets are synchronous given that synchronicity can be high in strong 
information environment (Dasgupta et al. 2010), or low in either a strong or weak 
information environment (Xing and Anderson 2011). Using African markets as a setting, 
this thesis addresses three objectives.  The first is to determine the level and determinants 
of stock return synchronicity in stock prices in African markets. The second objective, 
which emanates from the results of the first empirical analysis, is to investigate as to 
whether conditional on the level of stock return synchronicity, earnings announcements 
are informative and whether earnings informativeness is influenced by fundamentals or 
trading frequency. The third and final objective is to investigate the impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS and the perception of corruption on the informativeness of 
earnings. The purpose of this chapter is to present a summary of the main findings from 
the empirical analyses of the thesis. The implications and limitations of the thesis are also 
highlighted and suggestions for future research are provided. 
8.2 Summary of main findings 
Using a sample of five countries namely; Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa, the first analysis, contained in Chapter 5, investigates the average level of firm 
stock return synchronicity. In multivariate analyses, the chapter examines the firm 
characteristics that drive synchronicity of firms and also ascertains whether synchronicity 
is influenced by ownership structure. The findings in this chapter reveal that firms on 
average do not exhibit high levels of synchronicity. This finding is consistent with the 
view that information disclosure in poor information environments leads to greater 
surprise and will therefore result in the incorporation of such information into stock prices 
(Dasgupta et al. 2010). However, synchronicity is higher among larger firms as there is a 
statistically positive relationship between firm size and synchronicity. Large firms may 
have greater media coverage and a generally better information environment. The market 
may therefore be able to learn much about upcoming events concerning them and already 
price these events into stock returns before they occur. Consequently, when these events 
occur, they reflect little information and will lead to higher synchronicity. The findings 
in this chapter contribute to the literature on stock return synchronicity by providing 





evidence to support the theoretical arguments that contrary to conventional wisdom, stock 
return synchronicity can be high in more developed markets and low in less developed 
markets.  
The second analysis, contained in Chapter 6, investigates the informativeness of 
corporate earnings. After demonstrating that stock prices in African markets exhibit an 
averagely low level of synchronicity, it was imperative to examine the implications of 
this using actual corporate events. The analysis in this chapter is also motivated by the 
fact that tests of market efficiency in African markets have mostly been limited to tests 
of the weak form hypotheses. Given that the earnings report is one of the main sources of 
communication between managers and investors, a set of earnings announcements are 
used in this analysis. In both univariate and cross-sectional analysis, the chapter also 
investigates whether earnings informativeness is driven by trading frequency. The 
influence of firm fundamentals, in terms of earnings characteristics, are also examined in 
cross-sectional analyses. The main measure of informativeness is normalised volatility 
which compares volatility in the event window to volatility in a period outside of the 
event window. The results indicate that earnings are indeed informative and consistent 
with the findings of the previous chapter, earnings informativeness have little relationship 
with synchronicity. However, trading frequency plays an important role in driving 
earnings informativeness. Notably, less frequently traded stocks are associated with 
greater earnings informativeness. More highly traded stocks are less associated with 
earnings informativeness. The cross-sectional tests also show some evidence of the 
impact of firm fundamentals, in terms of earnings characteristics, and this varies 
according to the country in question. For abnormal trading volume in Kenya, the 
magnitude of earnings is a key driver whilst in Nigeria, the magnitude of earnings has an 
impact on both price and volume reactions. For firms in South Africa, the growth in 
earnings drives earnings informativeness both in terms of price and volume. Overall, the 
findings in this chapter provide new evidence on the reaction of stock prices in African 
markets to corporate information. It also extends the international literature on earnings 
informativeness and further highlights the role of liquidity in facilitating the ability of 
stock prices to incorporate firm information. 
In the final analysis contained in Chapter 7, the impact of the broader institutional 
environment on earnings informativeness is examined. Specifically, this chapter 
investigates the impact of accounting standards through the lens of IFRS adoption. It also 





investigates whether earnings informativeness is influenced by perceptions of corruption, 
which is a major issue of governance for most developing countries, particularly those in 
Africa. Whilst the impact of perceptions of corruption has been overlooked in the 
literature, the impact of IFRS adoption has produced mixed results. The findings show 
that the mandatory adoption of IFRS led to no improvements in the market reaction to 
earnings. As already mentioned in Chapter 7, this effect in South Africa could also be due 
to early harmonisation of IFRS with domestic standards. Analysis of the impact of 
corruption show that the investors trade less in reaction to earnings announcements in 
situations where perceptions of corruption are high. However, the formal introduction of 
IFRS has had a moderating effect on this relationship. This Chapter contributes to the 
growing literature on how structural and institutional factors affect earnings 
informativeness (eg. DeFond et al. 2007, Griffin et al. 2011, Pevzner et al. 2015) by 
accounting for the impact of perceptions of corruption, which is a reflection of a country’s 
legal, economic and regulatory environment. The literature on corruption is also extended 
by showing that it has implications for firm-level outcomes. This also highlights a call to 
action by regulators and appropriate government agencies to ensure the effective 
enforcement of final reactions to ensure that investors can continue to have the confidence 
in and be attracted to invest in the capital markets on the continent. 
8.3 Implications 
 
The information efficiency of stock markets is crucial if African markets are to attract 
new investment. The African continent is increasingly becoming a viable destination for 
most multinational companies. For example, in January 2018, JP Morgan announced 
plans to expand their presence into Ghana and Kenya. The continuous attractiveness of 
African markets as a destination for both foreign direct and portfolio investors needs to 
be underscored by empirical studies, highlighting the incremental improvements in 
market efficiency. For markets to play their disciplinary role effectively, corporate 
information such as earnings should not only be credible but released on a timely basis. 
The evidence from this thesis points to some informational efficiency in these markets 
with respect to earnings. Yet institutional mechanisms for improving governance and 
information disclosure, such as laws and stock exchange regulations, need further 
strengthening in order that outside investors are protected, and markets become more 
efficient. Hearn and Piesse (2013), who study governance and liquidity in sub-Saharan 
Africa, find that liquidity is positively associated with institutional factors such as the 





effectiveness of the regulatory systems. The quality of regulatory regimes should be 
reflected in corporate reporting and insider trading. Further, the quality of news 
transmission could be enhanced with an emphasis on the use of information systems and 
technology.  Improvement in the quality and quantity of corporate news provision should 
be considered with particular attention to the role of the regulatory news providers and 
the quality of financial journalism. Studies in the UK have highlighted the value of 
corporate news provision (Sheridan et al. 2006). 
 
Further, prior empirical evidence suggests there are potential diversification 
benefits of including African stocks in portfolios due to the weak stochastic trends 
between African markets and World Markets (Alagidede 2009). However, there will need 
to be more empirical studies that help investors better understand the dynamics as well as 
the informational efficiency of these markets within the context of the different 
institutional and regulatory environment that firms operate in. Moreover, Ibbotson et al. 
(2013) argue that liquidity can be an investment style just like size, value/growth or 
momentum. Therefore, and in line with this argument, the results show that as 
international investors seek to diversify, stocks in both our high and less traded categories 
could form the basis for the construction of investment portfolios to take advantage of 
trading opportunities around such corporate events as earnings announcements. 
Finally, this study also shows that there is more work to be done by regulators. 
There needs to be a sustained effort at ensuring that institutions that are meant to enforce 
laws are effective and well-resourced. Throughout the world, measures of the perception 
of corruption have become issues that governments can no longer ignore or take for 
granted. Whilst the impact of corruption on economic growth are quite well documented, 
this study further shows that the adverse impact of corruption on economic growth and 
development can also be manifested through channels that are related to firm-level 
outcomes. Therefore, the need to reduce corruption, both real and perceived, has to be 
taken seriously. One way to achieve this is by improving institutional mechanisms of 
governance and information disclosure such as laws and stock exchange regulations. 
 






Studies of this nature are generally challenging to conduct on African markets due to the 
unavailability of good quality data. Whilst reasonable steps have been taken to arrive at 
the best possible sample and to carry out the analysis using the most appropriate methods, 
this study is still associated with some limitations, many of which have already been 
discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. This section highlights the main limitations inherent 
in the study and also provides information on the steps taken to minimise their impact on 
the results. 
Firstly, earnings announcement dates were obtained from Datastream, rather than 
the well-known sources of earnings announcement such as the I/B/E/S. This 
notwithstanding, efforts were made to confirm the accuracy of these dates. A small sub-
sample of earnings report dates, obtained from published reports on the stock exchange 
websites of some of the countries in the sample, was compared to the dates in Datastream 
and found to be an exact match. This therefore provides reasonable assurance that the 
earnings announcements dates used are accurate and reliable. Moreover, the choice of a 
relatively longer event window of (-10, +10) implies that any reactions around the 
announcements of earnings will still be captured in the event of a slightly different date 
to what was obtained from Datastream. 
Another limitation may lie in the choice of selecting only five countries for the 
analysis. As already indicated in Chapters 2 and 5, this choice was motivated mainly by 
the need to focus on countries where the stock market plays a more prominent role in the 
financial system. Although it is expected that we can draw insights from this study about 
African markets in general, the focus of this study is also to gain a better understanding 
of the individual countries used. Therefore, the issue of selection bias should not be a 
major concern. 
 Thirdly, Chapter 5 of this thesis explores the role of ownership structure in 
explaining synchronicity among firms. Similarly, Chapter 6 also examines whether there 
are differences in ownership structure between firms in the HTF and MTF categories to 
help explain variations in earnings informativeness. Whilst the introduction of ownership 
structure presents an interesting perspective, the lack of sufficient ownership data could 
limit the robustness of the findings with respect to ownership structure. Again, and as 
already indicated, many studies argue that developing and emerging markets are 





characterised by complex ownership structure such as pyramids and cross-holding. This 
would have provided a firmer perspective. However, data on these could not be obtained. 
 Further to the preceding point, one main way of obtaining ownership data and 
other corporate governance data is to hand collect these directly from the annual reports 
as done in some previous studies (eg. Ntim 2009, Ntim et al. 2012a, Ntim et al. 2013)   
However, getting annual reports for all 616 companies proved a serious challenge. But 
given that one of the sources of Osiris ownership data is the company annual reports itself, 
this was cross-checked against a few annual reports obtained to assure the accuracy of 
this data. Thus, inferences and conclusions drawn for analysis involving ownership 
structure data are appropriate. 
 Additionally, the main model for computing abnormal returns is the market 
adjusted model. This model relies on the assumption that the expected return for a stock 
is the return on the index, which may sound rather too simplistic to some. However, as 
already demonstrated in Chapter 4, beta and alpha estimates from the more popular 
market model are inaccurate and problematic to improve, which therefore influenced the 
decision to maintain the use of the market-adjusted model. Moreover, the main measure 
of earnings informativeness, normalised volatility, is computed based on market adjusted 
model abnormal returns (Griffin et al. 2011).   
 Another limitation lies in the fact that in Chapter 7, the impact of corruption on 
earnings informativeness is analysed with a combined sample of three countries. This 
raises some concerns of limited variation due to the small number of countries. Also, as 
this part of the analysis could not be undertaken on an individual country basis, there is a 
chance that the results may be driven by the impact of South Africa. However, the 
findings suggest that this is viable ground for more detailed exploration using more 
countries on the continent and the possibility of including a sample of developed countries 
for comparison purposes. 
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
Based on some of the shortcomings discussed in the previous section, the analyses in this 
thesis provide avenues for further research. Firstly, given the availability of data, it would 
be useful to extend the reaction of stock prices to an expanded set of news items. This 
will help to gain a comprehensive view of which corporate information have pricing 





implications for stocks in African markets. Neuhierl et al. (2013), using a sample of US 
firms, find that stock markets indeed react to a wide variety of news including new 
products and services, legal developments and management changes. Whilst the 
infrastructure in more developed markets like the UK will create an enabling environment 
for investors to react to many kinds of news, this may not be the case for developing 
markets, particularly those in Africa. However, it would be worthwhile to determine 
whether aside from more regulatory news items like earnings, investors also pay attention 
to other types of corporate events.  
Secondly, although a justifiable basis has been established in this thesis for focusing 
on countries that are common law oriented, it would also be useful to undertake a 
comparative analysis of the impact of synchronicity and stock price informativeness 
between common law and civil law countries. Finally, given data availability in the near 
future, more analysis on the impact of ownership structure on earnings informativeness 
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